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The Ethical Patiency of Cultural Heritage
Robert Francis John Seddon
Current treatments of cultural heritage as an object of moral concern
(whether it be the heritage of mankind or of some particular group of
people) have tended to treat it as a means to ensure human wellbeing:
either as `cultural property' or `cultural patrimony', suggesting con-
comitant rights of possession and exclusion, or otherwise as something
which, gaining its ethical significance from the roles it plays in people's
lives and the formation of their identities, is the beneficiary at most of
indirect moral obligations. In contrast, I argue that cultural heritage, as
something whose existence can go well or badly, can itself qualify as a
moral patient towards which we may have obligations which need not be
accounted for in terms of subsequent benefits to human beings. Drawing
inspiration from environmental ethics and suggesting that heritage, like
an ecosystem, is a complex network of interrelations which invites a
holistic understanding, I develop a framework for thinking about cultural
heritage which shows how such a thing can feature in our ethical
reflections as intrinsically worthy of respect in spite of its most obvious
differences from the `natural' world: the very human origins of cultural
heritage and its involvement with human life in all its forms. As part of
the development of this framework I consider the epistemic difficulties
which arise when for all our holistic sophistication we do find ourselves
in the predicament of having to judge the moral worth of some item
of heritage, possibly someone else's heritage and possibly something
which we find ourselves disposed to value more because of than despite
any mysteries surrounding it. I conclude by offering some tentative
illustrations of how such a framework might operate in the practical
course of normative moral reasoning about what should be done with
items of cultural heritage.
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Nomenclature
The following terms are used throughout the present work. Readers are asked to
note that my distinctions, in particular in employing references to culture and the
cultural, may differ from other writers', including those quoted in the text.
Antiquity (When referring to an object) an artefact from the ancient world.
Artefact Any physical object of human manufacture, especially in an archæological
context, and including but not limited to antiquities.
Association Between cultural items, any link such as e.g. that one book inspired
another, or, that two paintings were produced by the same studio.
Cultural group A collective of people distinctively sharing some culture in common.
(I invoke no especial subcategory of `Indigenous peoples'.)
Cultural item A (roughly) discrete thing, concrete or abstract, or a group of related
things considered as a discrete thing, or a practice or combination of practices,
which is distinctively connected to one or more cultures for whatever reason.
This may refer to either a token (an individual object, &c.) or a type (a class of
objects; a repeating festival; the sort of propagating theme or idea sometimes
called a `meme';1 &c.). Strictly speaking it is not quite true that the thing qua
cultural item is the thing simpliciter ; they may, for example, have different
persistence conditions, such that an object may be destroyed but persist in
the collective remembrance of a cultural group.
Cultural heritage One or more cultural items considered as a cohesive collection,
either as a general phenomenon (what is sometimes styled the `heritage of
mankind') or as the specific cultural heritage of some cultural group. (In many
cases my usages of culture and heritage come close to co-referentiality, but
technically the two phenomena have some different properties: for example,
cultures, but not heritages, may be `living' or `dead'.)
Culture An intersubjective context for meaningful activity, considered either as a
general phenomenon (`culture') or as a distinctive whole within it (`a culture';
`the culture of ' some people). For a more discursive commentary see Chapter
5. Unlike some other writers on culture and cultures, I never use the word
with the sense in which I speak here of a cultural group.
1Although see Midgley, 1999, contra memetics.
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Elgin Marbles Those of the Parthenon Marbles which were removed on Lord Elgin's
orders.
Heritage The same as cultural heritage unless otherwise qualified.
Insider A member of whatever cultural group is under discussion.
Moral Patient An object of moral obligations. (What makes an obligation moral
is a topic largely outside the scope of this document.)
Outsider Anyone not a member of whatever cultural group is under discussion.
Parthenon Marbles Any parts of the Parthenon frieze, including but not limited to
the Elgin Marbles.
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Part I.
These Things Called Culture
and Heritage

...[A] curiosity,a desire after the things of the mind simply for their
own sakes and for the pleasure of seeing them as they are... This is the
true ground to assign for the genuine scientific passion, however
manifested, and for culture, viewed simply as a fruit of this passion...
Matthew Arnold
(2006, p. 33)

1. Introduction
It does not at first come naturally to speak of acting for the good of a cultural
heritage, even where the heritage in question is in some sense one's own. Even if
we are minded to expand the moral circle (Singer, 1985, pp. 9-10) to include some
non-human animals; even if we endorse an `ontocentric' ethics that accords some
minimal worth to all things in existence (Floridi, 2004, p. 10), we shall ordinarily
do so on the basis that these entities exhibit some morally salient features in their
own right: if we admit certain animals into the moral circle, for example, it may
be because we believe their capacity to feel pain makes them moral patients.1 But
when in addition to noting any inherent features a thing may have, we then observe
that it qualifies as cultural heritage, one naturally supposes that what we are saying
has everything to do with the interests of human beings. To be cultural heritage
involves a relation, that of being the heritage of somebody; one no more expects
to speak of the value of cultural heritage without reference to the people dwelling
within cultures than one would look for value in a text without reference to readers.
Small wonder then that it is tales of clashing human interests that fill the ethical
literature on heritage: we hear of disputes over the ownership of antiquities with
murky pasts, or over whose practices should determine the fate of human remains.
Sarah Harding has defended the claim that cultural heritage has intrinsic value and
that there exist duties towards it (Harding, 1999), but (although she says much with
which I am in sympathy) it turns out that her conception of the `intrinsic value'
of heritage is rooted in its role within a flourishing human life, and that the duties
which it generates regarding heritage are grounded in human self-respect.2 Since
any world of which humans can conceive will be a world of human concepts, and
since our concepts and our cultures are closely related, it is not surprising that when
we ask what it is about heritage that animates our concern, we seem invariably to
come back to the interests of human individuals.
It is not the act of imputing a potential for benefit and harm to the items a
heritage may include that creates this difficulty in thinking otherwise. Items of
1If one does go so far as to act `for the sake of' inanimate things, perhaps out of a virtuously
gentle character, one may still deny that they have `moral status', a good of their own
which could be a source of obligations (James, 2011).
2For discussion see Chapter 8.
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human invention carry with them familiar teleologies, and so we may without obvious
personification say that it is good for houses that they should be dwelt in and well
maintained, bad for them to be left derelict and vandalised; good for stories if they
are told and retold, bad for them to be forgotten, or worn so thin in the retelling
that their themes are reduced to cliché; good for the library of some historical figure
to be kept together as an aid to scholarly interpretation of the former owner, and
bad for it to be broken up and dispersed without a trace. Yet the ease of this manner
of speaking, which evokes echoes of the Aristotelian final and formal causes without
any definite ethical implications in the modern mind, seems to fall swiftly away when
we turn to consider buildings, stories and libraries as items of cultural heritage; for
who but human beings has a culture or a heritage, and what else, therefore, could
invest such a thing with the possibility that anything `good' or `bad' could befall
it? More securely in the sphere of culture than anywhere else, we might well expect
man to be the measure of all things.
The purpose of the following is not a call to abdication from concern for human
interests but a defence of a certain general view of the place which cultural heritage
should occupy in our moral landscape: that heritage itself counts as a moral patient,
not sui generis but also not merely dependent on the aggregated needs, interests or
preferences of human individuals. This does not diminish the interests that human
beings do have in what happens to the heritage of their own and other humans'
cultures; on the contrary, I shall argue that one of the tasks to be faced by an
ethics of cultural heritage ought to be the reconciliation of our obligations to each
other where they involve heritage, and our obligations concerning the treatment of
heritage independent of any direct or indirect duties towards other people.
I shall not be laying out a complete and all-encompassing normative theory of
heritage ethics; quite apart from the sheer scale of such an undertaking, it would
inevitably balance on so many foundational premises as to become unsteady, or
unwieldy, unless a basic framework should first be developed which grounds the
core of such a theory with some measure of security. Suppose, for example, that
I had approached the topic of æsthetic value in heritage by selecting my favoured
accounts of the nature and value of æsthetic phenomena, and had woven these into
my overall account of heritage ethics. (This would not have been an altogether
senseless way to proceed, since the choice of which accounts of æsthetics, of history,
of language, &c. to favour will affect the questions which arise when one comes to
integrate them into a discussion of cultural heritage at large: for example, it is only
if one affirms the autonomy of art that one might need to explain how autonomous
art might be brought under the broad umbrella of heritage.) As a result the entire
edifice would have been made a hostage to fortune: a new breakthrough or a change
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of academic mood in the field of æsthetics might have cast sudden doubt upon
my general account of cultural heritage in the field of moral philosophy, probably
not fatally damaging it but forcing an expansive refit. This threat would have been
mirrored in any incorporation of assumptions about law, religions, history, language,
sports, cuisine, and myriad other relevant matters in which I am in no way expert.
Far better, then, to ensure as best I can that as many assumptions as possible about
such related phenomena can be plugged in and switched around without threatening
the plausibility of the core theory; although it is inevitable that this core will not
be wholly pure and independent of broader assumptions about the nature of culture
and cultural heritage.
Since what I have to offer is a framework, a core theory with slots reserved
for additional elements, in what follows I shall say little that is decisive about
what our obligations concerning heritage precisely are, and still less in the way
of exact and casuistical advice to moral agents grappling with planned alterations
to some Grade II listed building, or squabbling over antiquities of murky provenance.
Nevertheless, as usual in a work with the eventual aim of contributing to practical
moral guidance, my argument will be heavily shaped by reflection on cases which
exemplify the ethical difficulties that arise within the ambit of cultural heritage; and
in the closing chapters I shall sketch, under certain broadly plausible assumptions,
how a recognition of heritage as a moral patient might play out in some exemplary
cases, showing how the present work can therefore be of assistance to more directly
applied moral philosophy.
Meanwhile, in the second chapter I shall continue to set the scene by surveying the
practical background to this enquiry: examination of a range of cases will illustrate
the broad scope of `cultural heritage' while starting to tell a story about why a
moral philosopher might want to get involved, and why these fairly disparate cases
might start to look related when we begin talking about cultural heritage. The third
chapter shifts to the philosophical background, situating my work in the context of
the existing literature and introducing some critical discussion of current approaches
to thinking normatively about heritage, principally the influential model of `cultural
property'. In Chapter 4 I offer further consideration of what criteria a theory of the
ethics of cultural heritage, and more specifically a theory that advertises itself as a
framework, ought to fulfil in order to be considered successful.
If the Scylla for discussing this notoriously vague concept of `culture' is termino-
logical imprecision, the Charybdis, in light of my comments about the need for a
minimal core with frugal assumptions, may well be excessive exactitude, for
culture can mean anything. Different conceptions of the term are
embedded in various disciplinary and national traditions. By 1952, the
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anthropologists A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn tracked down about
164 separate usages, and since then, needless to say, many more have
accrued. (Jusdanis, 1995, p. 24)
Clearly it would be inviting trouble for me to rely on the applicability of any one of
the 164. No doubt discussion of cultural heritage has not confined itself neatly to any
single one; and so, with a neat and simple definition of culture not obviously within
reach, I must offer instead a philosophical reflection on what we may understand
culture, or a culture, to be when we need to grasp what it then means for something
to fall under the banner of cultural heritage. Chapter 5 therefore asks what it is
that we suggest when we declare, `That's part of our culture!' What makes a culture
one's own, and what is involved when we consider items to be associated with one
culture or another?
Chapter 6 considers the identity of cultures, particularly over time: can cultures
split or merge, and if they can, what does that portend for questions of which items
are whose heritage? Can a culture become `distorted' or `inauthentic'? Chapter
7 addresses a different aspect of temporality: the role of origins and traditions in
debates about cultural heritage, the one concerned with tracing items' history back
to some critical point of emergence, the other with their gradual accumulation of
layers of significance. Some current disputes concerning the proper fate of objects,
particularly between archæological and museological perspectives on the custody of
unprovenanced antiquities, may be partly unravelled if we understand them to be
drawing on low-level conceptual differences; and in discovering two clashing ways of
seeing an object as existing in time, we have a further indication of what it might
mean to talk about `heritage', a word inherently suggestive of acts of inheritance.
Chapter 8 moves to direct consideration of the moral salience of cultural
heritage, chiefly through the prism of value, which has previously been employed
philosophically by James O. Young (Young, 2007) and Janna Thompson (Thompson,
2003). Clearly many people think heritage is important, but are there solid grounds
for thinking that the interests we take in items of heritage tie together in some
philosophically interesting fashion into a question about `cultural heritage' and
its moral importance in general? I begin to develop my position on the matter,
and distinguish it from earlier work by Sarah Harding on cultural heritage as a
repository of intrinsic value. Chapter 9 continues the discussion, developing the
claim that cultural items may possess what we might think of as quasi-intrinsic
value: although their moral standing is not intrinsic in the full sense in which we
might call, for example, human persons intrinsically valuable (and indeed their very
nature as cultural heritage is bound up with human deeds and concerns), I develop
the view that by virtue of participation in a wider phenomenon of culture they count
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as bearers of moral standing and recipients of direct obligations: as constituents of a
genuine moral patient.3 Chapter 10 expands this theme in an exploration of the role
played by categorisation: what happens when we consider the various ways in which
we put items together and track their interactions and interrelations? It is plain
enough that people are concerned with the literary genre, the artistic movement,
the historical era, &c. in their evaluations of cultural items, but how are we to go
about incorporating such things into our moral thinking? In the later part of the
chapter I defend the view that cultures possess a patiency which is linked to their
capacity for flourishing.
Given an account of heritage as a moral patient, then, Chapter 11 asks what we
are to say about its interactions with other moral patients and agents. If I should
expand the group of patients with potentially conflicting interests without offering
even a preliminary indication of how these conflicts might be resolved, that might
be considered a somewhat regrettable outcome; but I shall contend that even at the
framework stage there are reasons to be optimistic.
Chapter 12 returns to the topic of value, and explores the associated moral
epistemology. Given that members of a given cultural group presumably have an
epistemic advantage in discovering where value lies in their own culture's heritage,
what kind of authority might they possess exactly, and what are outsiders to do
if they disagree? Examining knowledge from a different angle, Chapter 13 then
wonders: what about those cases where a sense of mystery and antiquity beyond
our complete grasp, far from being inimical to it, seem central to our appreciation
of some item of heritage? Does appreciation of the mysterious in heritage not sit
awkwardly with the epistemological aspirations of the previous chapter? The more
directly experiential and sometimes quite emotional ways in which we may encounter
heritage are further pondered in Chapter 14, which cautiously suggests that these
may be a source of morally salient understanding; or at least, that they are aspects
of our lives with which he have got to deal.
The concluding chapters pull the threads together and demonstrate how they
might be applied to some practical examples, before finishing with a reflection on
how this enquiry might be expanded or refined if I or anyone else were to build on
the ideas presented herein.
3We would not, of course, say that anyone had duties towards my arm not to harm it, or
that it was possible to act for the good of my arm; but it might not sound so strange
to say that my arm participates in my moral patiency. Similarly, cultural items might
derivatively be called moral patients, although the patiency in which they participate
is in fact a broader one, and the same is true of any `good' which they possess or
`flourishing' of which they are capable.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The Development of the Project
Those ideas did not, of course, come into being in the order in which they are
presented here, and it may help to account for them if I briefly explain their genesis.
Their roots most clearly lie with the environmental ethics of `deep ecology'; like
Harding, I am much impressed by the work done by environmental philosophers
to extend our understanding of what can possess moral standing. For J. Baird
Callicott, the very possibility of a distinctive domain of environmental ethics depends
on the possibility of nonanthropocentrism, of discovering an intrinsic value4 in
the environment and an ethics which could not be reduced to human-to-human
obligation (Callicott, 1995).
At around the same time I was reading items by two legal scholars based in the
U.S.A., Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle, who were raising concerns about the
duration of modern copyright,5 and its effects on the preservation, dissemination
and creation of cultural items. Since `the vast majority of our film heritage remains
under copyright... general freedom to build upon the film archive of our culture...
is now a privilege reserved' for those who can afford to clear the rights (Lessig,
2004, p. 107). Copyright law can uselessly leave creative works without continuing
commercial value to sit `in vaults gathering dust' (ibid., p. 224), or even to be lost
altogether:
[B]y the time the copyright for [films from the early decades of cinema]
expires, the film will have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-
based stock, and nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone,
and the metal canisters in which they are now stored will be filled with
nothing more than dust. (ibid., p. 225)
Copyright can thereby become a self-defeating institution, and a culture-defeating
one, even given the capacity for storage and transmission of which we have become
technologically capable:
Now that technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the
law gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful copyright
purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the commercial market
that spreads culture.6 No, we are talking about culture after it has lived
its commercial life. (Lessig, 2004, p. 227)
4For discussion of this term see Chapter 8.
5Fourteen years for authors, renewable once, under the 1710 Statute of Anne, compared
to a minimum of life plus fifty years for signatories to the 1908 Berne Convention.
Meanwhile Lessig, 2004, p. 134 outlines thirteen extensions of U.S. copyright terms from
1831 to 1998.
6I concur with this view of what it takes to justify copyright, but other putative
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1.1. The Development of the Project
Where Lessig uses the language of culture and heritage,7 Boyle has advocated
a rhetoric drawn from the language of the environmental movement. The difficulty
for intellectual property minimalism was in conceptualising the `public domain', the
space of intellectual material which is not subject to division between intellectual
property rights holders: how do you frame a negative concept so as to proclaim
its positive value? Do you perhaps speak of a commons, as Boyle sometimes has,
and compare intellectual property maximalism to the enclosure movement (Boyle,
2003)? Then you must be ready to explain why the `tragedy of the commons', in
which the uncoordinated exploitation of a shared resource results in its depletion and
everyone's disadvantage, does not apply (ibid., pp. 35-6). What sort of commons do
you mean, in any case: would you sooner conceive of this intellectual commons as
commonly owned, thereby possibly encouraging its common owners to oppose raids
on it (Drahos, 1996, p. 66), or as truly unowned and in that sense free? Or shall
we speak of the commons as a resource, `an unusual resource in that it grows in
strength through use and exploitation', to which duties of preservation and nurture
relate (ibid., pp. 63-4)?
In searching for an analogy for the public domain, for a way of talking about why
it matters, Boyle looked to environmentalism:
Why talk of `an environment' or `environmental harm?' Why not simply
list the pros and cons of each particular piece of development, type of
technology, aspect of land use? ... Why reify these individual loci of
potential harm into a single entity called `the environment?' Part of the
answer, of course, is rhetorical. The idea of the environment seems to
add a moral overtone to the discussion, to counterbalance the arguments
about `progress' and `growth' and `modernity.' And this is hardly an
unimportant function.
But that is not all there is to it. The environmental movement also
gained much of its persuasive power by pointing out that [in existing
legal and scientific] conceptual systems, the environment actually dis-
appeared; there was no place for it in the analysis. Small surprise,
then, that we did not preserve it very well. In other work, I have
argued that the same is true about the public domain... The idea
of the public domain takes to a higher level of abstraction a set of
individual fightsover this chunk of the genome, that aspect of computer
justifications have been defended. For comparison with an account inspired by John
Locke's theory of property, see Hettinger, 1989. For comparison with the droit d'auteur
prominent on the Continent, see Goldstein, 2003, p. 135ff. I comment further on this
topic in 3.1.
7Admittedly I have just quoted his sole use of the word `heritage' in the entire book.
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programs, this claim about the meaning of parody, or the ownership of
facts... The concept of the environment allows, at its best, a kind of
generalized reflection on the otherwise unquestionable presuppositions of
a particular mode of life, economy, and industrial organization. At their
best, the commons and the public domain can do the same in helping
us to reimagine creation, innovation, and speech on a global network.
(Boyle, 2003, pp. 70-4)
Part rhetorical armament, part conceptual model: it seems improbable that
Boyle's `environment' is also Callicott's. Yet suppose we try pushing the model
further than Boyle himself might wish to: suppose we ask ourselves whether some
of the methods and ideas of environmental philosophy might in fact be applicable
to a concept like `the public domain'. Suppose we go further, and take Lessig at
his word when he writes of `unintended consequences for the cultural environment'
(Lessig, 2004, p. 129). Suppose we note that Michael F. Brown has recommended `an
ecological approach, one that moves constantly between specific problems and the
larger whole' (Brown, 2010, p. 570), when considering `the links between indigenous
rights in heritage and parallel debates about the future of the public domain' (ibid.,
p. 570):
Analogies between culture and the problem of environmental contam-
ination are not as implausible as they might seem at first glance.
Molecules are often mobile, combining readily with air and water,
thereby incorporating themselves into living things. So, too, do elements
of culture  memes, if you like  which subdivide and spread via global
media and informal personal contacts in ways that are not readily
subject to collective control... No society can accurately be said to enjoy
autonomy over its cultural resources, although communities do have
a modest ability to encourage and defend elements of culture that they
value highly. The limits of this control are evident in the declining use of
many Native American languages despite the unstinting efforts of tribal
governments to preserve them. (ibid., p. 571)
Might this cultural environment too be a candidate for moral patiency, a possible
object of moral obligations in its own right? Recall that Callicott was anxious
to discover a nonanthropocentric moral worth in the natural world; and recall my
earlier remarks about how very anthropocentric the notion of a culture or a cultural
heritage looks. The difficulty has perhaps been best expressed by Holmes Rolston
III, in whose view `culture' is precisely what is to be contrasted with `nature', if the
latter term is to be employed in a sense of interest to environmental ethics (Rolston,
1999, pp. 151-2).
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Rolston, like Callicott, believes that value exists in the natural world prior to the
arrival of any human valuers. This holds, he argues, for plants as well as animals:
We are misled to think that all the value of the tree, instrumental or
intrinsic, must be subjectively conferred, like the greenness, a secondary
quality, or even a tertiary one. A simpler, less anthropically based, more
biocentric theory holds that some values, instrumental and intrinsic, are
objectively there, discovered not generated by the valuer... Even those
who think that all the tree's intrinsic value has to be conferred by humans
still think that matters can be better or worse for the tree, and this
amounts to saying that the tree on its own has its goods and harms.
(Rolston, 1994, p. 19)
Organisms act to sustain themselves, and so we may say that they value
themselves (ibid., p. 15ff.). In somewhat like fashion, species propagate themselves
(ibid., pp. 20-2); in ecosystems we encounter `a spontaneous order' (ibid., p. 23); and
even at the planetary level what we find is a biosphere, a self-sustaining planetary
ecology (ibid., p. 26).
One respect in which Rolston's views differ from Callicott's, however, is in his
disinclination to naturalise culture (Rolston, 1999, p. 153).
Wild animals do not form cumulative transmissible cultures. Informa-
tion in nature travels intergenerationally on genes; information in culture
travels neurally as persons are educated into transmissible cultures. The
determinants of animal and plant behaviour are never anthropological,
political, economic, technological, scientific, philosophical, ethical, or
religious. (ibid., p. 152)
Living organisms and ecosystems are one thing, lifeless cultural items another:
We can value collections, as of stamps, but this is just the aggregated
value of individual stamps. Still, an ecosystem, if it exists, is rather
different. Nothing in the stamp collection is alive; the collection is neither
self-supporting nor self-maintaining. Neither stamp nor collection is
valuable on its own. (Rolston, 1994, p. 22)
This in turn is where my thinking parts company with Rolston's. To be sure, the
creation and maintenance of a stamp collection depend wholly on human actions;
the collection itself engages in no activity which we might interpret as self-valuation.
However, it `isn't at all clear why there is anything special about life... Perhaps
only living things can be injured, but non-living things can quite easily be damaged'
(Christopher Belshaw, quoted in James, 2011, p. 389), and when it comes to cultural
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items we need not even characterise this damage in terms of their strictly physical
properties, and also need not be concerned by the thought that from `the point
of view of the Universe (if such a phrase has meaning), the event of the chipping
[sc. of a vase] would seem to constitute not damage but simply a value-neutral
change from one state of affairs to another' (ibid., p. 390). A stamp collection has
a structural integrity both as a collection and as an instance and a part of a wider
milieu of philatelic practices. The creative human input which allows us to see a
stamp collection, not just an assortment of brightly coloured sticky things, is itself
responsive to this structure and this milieu, filling in gaps in the collection or sorting
stamps according to rarity.
Now of course, it is human beings who decide to prize certain kinds of postage
stamp and adopt certain approaches to arranging them. There are, as Michael
Flanders observed in At the Drop of Another Hat,
only two kinds of stamps. English stamps, in sets, at the beginning of
the album; foreign stamps, all mixed up at the other end. Any Gibbon
can tell you that.
The philatelists of other nations, however, may recognise different taxonomies.
Nevertheless, the possibilities for organisation of which they make use  notably
suitability for being arranged in sets, but also unplanned features such as printing
blemishes  are discovered in the stamps themselves. Collector and collection act
upon each other.
As I discuss further in Chapter 10, our talk of cultural heritage is frequently
concerned with quite overt examples of collection and categorisation: the literary
genre, the artistic movement, the museum exhibition, and so on. Indeed, in calling
something an item of cultural heritage one implicitly relates it to other such items,
all set against a common cultural backdrop. Perhaps, I thought, if there is value for
the moral philosopher to discover in cultural heritage it lies only derivatively in the
individual items which sometimes become objects of controversy, and should in the
first instance be sought in the various clusters which these form: in precisely the
structures of our cultural worlds which we presuppose when we ask what would be
the right and best thing to do with respect to some item of cultural heritage.
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The design of my desk (functional, mass-produced, flat-pack self-assembly); the
construction of my shoes (rugged-soled, suitable for the great outdoors, imperfectly
comfortable because of my uncommon size and fitting); the sound in my earphones
(a classically styled remix of some decade-old videogame music): each of these falls
readily under the grand banner of the cultural in its widest sense, a heading so
expansive that it engulfs positively all human activity. Indeed, one of the benefits of
the intellectual work discussed in the next chapter has been to show how ostensibly
diverse and distinct ethical problems, such as those concerning the ownership of
archæological finds and those involving outsiders' copying of indigenous peoples'
artistic motifs, may be fruitfully brought together under such headings as `cultural
appropriation'. In the present chapter my purpose is not to embark at once on any
systematic treatment of the various manifestations of the cultural (for which see
Chapters 5 and 6), but to give an early and broad indication of how the language of
culture and heritage can start to look applicable to a considerable range of morally
salient topics.
For this reason, some of the following cases will be familiar to and expected by
anyone broadly familiar with the contexts in which `cultural heritage' and `cultural
property' are discussed, while others with which they rub shoulders will be less
predictable: the Elgin Marbles commune with amateur software modification, and
language conservation sits alongside the flavour of New Coke. Beginning in the most
familiar of territory, I discuss controversies over the market in antiquities without
archæological provenance, drawing particularly on the sometimes antagonistic
positions of James Cuno, until recently President and Director of the Art Institute
of Chicago and now President and C.E.O. of the J. Paul Getty Trust, and the
archæologist and peer Colin Renfrew (2.1). This is a debate conventionally framed
in terms of `looting', but it turns out to be a disagreement about whether there is
much left to appreciate once an antiquity's archæological context is lost; here I prise
open the question, which will occasionally hover over later chapters, of whether such
a proprietorially tinged term as `loot' is conceptually helpful.
If proprietorial thinking is questionable where physical objects are concerned, it
is even harder to say in what senses intangible heritage belongs to a culture (2.2):
cultures lack obvious boundaries within which a story or an artistic motif might
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be kept. Moreover, if we did somehow manage to assign every cultural item in the
world to the culture to which it principally belongs (a fanciful task in itself), our
labours would still not be over: as the case of `fan culture' demonstrates (2.3), it
is in the nature of cultural items that they occasion new creativity and new forms
of cultural participation, to the extent that we may wish to say that new cultures
and subcultures are emerging. In later chapters I shall speak of the flourishing of
cultures; here, then, are some of their buds.
2.1. `Looting' and The Market In Antiquities
`Why focus on looting? Because it is believed possible to stop it.' (Cuno, 2009, p. 3)
These words were written by a museum director, but the `looting' in question does
not involve the stealthy pillaging of art museums after hours. It involves digging
antiquities out of the ground: `what today we would often call looted ' objects (ibid.,
p. 7) are those which have been subjected to `the illicit, unrecorded and unpublished
excavation of ancient sites to provide antiquities for commercial profit' (Renfrew,
2000, p. 15). To speak of the clandestine excavation, sale and export of antiquities as
illicit acts, as `looting', has become commonplace, and it is worth asking at the outset
why this should have been so. The mystery is not that it attracts condemnation when
artefacts are unceremoniously pulled from the soil in pursuit of a ready profit, but
that excavation of objects from vanished civilisations and long-forgotten generations,
of objects which can with no exaggeration be called abandoned, should be spoken
of with a vocabulary suggestive of theft.
The word does not always refer to freshly excavated objects, of course, and its
usage has not been forever unchanged and uncontested. The Elgin Marbles had
long stood in public view when they were removed from their monument, and
their removal may have been given official sanction (Williams, 2009, p. 71, but
see Rudenstine, 2002); nevertheless, one legal commentator has felt quite able to
write that `Great Britain shamelessly looted and exported much of the sculptured
integrity of the Parthenon' (Kelly, 1995, p. 34). Meanwhile Kwame Anthony Appiah,
commenting on `the looting of the palace of King Kofi Karikari' (Appiah, 2009, p. 72)
which was undertaken by British troops in 1874, notes that the officer overseeing
the deed regarded it quite differently:
it was done honestly and well, without a single case of looting. Here was
a man with an armful of gold-hilted swords, there was one with a box
full of trinkets and rings..., yet in no instance was there any attempt at
looting. (Robert Baden-Powell, quoted in ibid., p. 72)
Looting is an illicit activity, the reasoning must have gone, and the routine actions
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of the military could not therefore be looting. These examples highlight another
aspect of the word `loot' which is even less obviously applicable to illicit excavation:
its potential to suggest `that objects were taken by the victors of battle (physical or
ideological)' (Glass, 2004, p. 119; see also Merewether, 2003, p. 87).
Perhaps this apparent mystery is little more than a lexicographical puzzle;
perhaps, if we may fairly use the language of plunder to refer to the `grave robbers' of
any place and time, then to employ such a word as `loot' even when less deliberately
deposited artefacts are taken is merely pragmatic and convenient. Archæological
condemnation of looting has been centrally concerned not with the fact that objects
have been carried away but with damage to archæological sites, and with the
destruction of the contextual information contained in them.
Whenever we archæologists speak to the general public, it is important
for us to stress that the purpose of archæology is not just to recover pretty
objects from the ground; it is to reconstruct the history of the human
past. Indeed, some of the most useful information for archæologists
comes from items that have no monetary or æsthetic value at all: pottery
shards, pieces of charcoal, human and animal bones, even seeds and
pollen. Through the scientific study of a site, we can learn what people
ate, what type of houses they lived in, which diseases they died from.
We can learn about their social organization, their religious beliefs and
rituals, and patterns of trade and migration.
All the information that could be obtained by scientific excavation is
irreparably destroyed every time an archæological site is plundered. At
best we are left with a few objects, beautiful but silent. (Papa Sokal,
2006, p. 2)
No clearly proprietorial attitudes are evident here, unless they concern the lost
information as a common good which has been snatched from all of us. James Cuno
concurs that `the archæological context is, like any other, important, and anything
that causes its destruction should be discouraged. Museums and archæologists agree
on this.' (Cuno, 2009, p. 3) As we saw above, the language of looting and plunder sits
comfortably in his vocabulary too. Somehow, whether through linguistic accident
or through tacit sympathy, museums and archæologists alike are speaking as though
the sites of buried objects were merchant ships fleeing pirates off the Spanish Main
(cf. Renfrew, 2000, pp. 77 & 79), when in fact they are alike concerned with the
preservation of information, the only difference in emphasis being Cuno's worry that
a purely archæological perspective disregards other ways in which antiquities can be
meaningful (Cuno, 2009, p. 5ff.).
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Pause. As everyone knows, this isn't how the script is supposed to play out;
everyone knows that when the chairs are laid out for great debates about the custody
of sites and the transfer and acquisition of antiquities, Cuno should be seated on
one side of the table, an archæologist on the other. Cuno will criticise archæological
collusion with `nationalist retentionist' (Cuno, 2008, p. xxxii) political schemes that
employ archæological finds in the service of governments' myth-making (ibid., pp. 9-
13), all at the expense of encyclopædic museums and the public they serve (ibid.,
pp. xxxi-xxxii & 123-4). Archæologists will counter that if looting is to be prevented,
the market in antiquities must be controlled so as to prevent the sale of items without
a demonstrably legitimate provenance (see below). Tables will be pounded. Books
will be sold. Everyone knows this.
What everyone knows is substantially correct: there are genuine problems,
and genuine differences of opinion over the solutions. Cuno, with other museum
curators, has put much energy into demonstrating both the narrowness of calling
decontextualised antiquities `silent' and the length of the spoon required when
inviting regulation by national governments. He observes that there are contexts
other than the archæological which invite study and veneration: that a piece of
ancient craftsmanship may remain fit for appreciation as an æsthetic object (Cuno,
2009, p. 7) (whatever happens to Marina Papa Sokal's charcoal and pollen), or may
possess a history which enlightens us regarding the interplay of cultures (Cuno,
2008, p. xxxi), most effectively when displayed in a universal museum wherein the
ingenuity of these different cultures may be compared (ibid., p. xixff.).
He warns us, too, that the interests of the governments that (to greater and
lesser degrees) regulate archæological digging and the export of finds are not
grounded in the priorities of archæological science, and that these governments may
prove false friends. Looting is a problem, he agrees, but restricting the legitimate
market in antiquities simply loses unprovenanced objects to the black market (ibid.,
p. 127). States have ulterior motives in asserting proprietorial interests in the objects
discovered in their soils: archæological objects may prove useful in massaging
popular sentiment, folded into domestic political narratives intended to present
modern nation-states as the rightful and proper successors of the regimes of antiquity
(Cuno, 2009, p. 28). Or a narrative of cultural patrimony may simply help to `retain
cultural property within the territorial boarders of the nation-state for the benefit
of the nation and not to share it with the world for the benefit of the world' (Cuno,
2008, p. 126). In Cuno's judgment this way of approaching antiquities misrepresents
the historical importance of cultural cross-pollination (2009, p. 27); and when states
prove willing to impose strict policies of retaining antiquities found on their lands
within their borders, indulging politicians' willingness to make use of archæological
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objects becomes injurious to the comparative and universal understanding of human
culture which is embodied in the encyclopædic museum.
There are archæologists, and others, who put no less vigour into defence of
positions unsympathetic to Cuno's. For those concerned primarily with the
preservation of the archæological record, the matter is pragmatic: looting must
be prevented, and since demand drives the market, demand for unprovenanced
antiquities must be checked. If only items known to have been scientifically
excavated are in demand, then only these will be supplied. It is necessary to place
restrictions upon the antiquities trade simply because, as Lord Renfrew has put it,
to diminish or eliminate clandestine excavation in the country of origin...
is no easy task. It is desirable that each nation should have strong
laws protecting its antiquities and a sound and well-informed antiquities
service... [but] in many countries this desirable infrastructure is lacking...
The second approach to the problem is to tackle the distribution and
consumption of illicit antiquities. The role of the academic community...
is to persuade the informed public that the purchase of unprovenanced
antiquities has the inevitable consequence of funding the ongoing looting
process. (Renfrew, 2000, p. 16)
Antiquities may of course be valuable as works of art, but looters are poor
custodians of art history, willing to reduce a coherent assemblage to `a number
of isolated... items occurring individually on the market' (ibid., p. 24).
It is irrelevant from such a point of view [as Renfrew's] whether [looting]
is carried out in Italy by professional tomboroli, by amateur treasure-
hunters in the U.K. or by local community pot-hunters in Bolivia. It is
equally irrelevant whether the material retrieved belongs to the state as
in Italy, to the landowner as in the U.K., or to a commune as in Bolivia.
All are equally guilty of damage to the archæological record. (Carman,
2005, p. 18)
Where information has been wilfully destroyed (and sometimes it is more than
information which is destroyed in the search for marketable antiquities buried in
the ground), it is irrelevant even whether items were excavated for the export
market or whether they ended up in domestic national museums; Renfrew is scarcely
more inclined than Cuno to approve of `the chauvinism which besets many national
governments' (Renfrew, 2000, p. 62). Indeed, he writes that `in the archæologist's
book looted is worse than stolen precisely because it means that the excavation
has been clandestine and unrecorded' (ibid., p. 58; see also p. 79, on which a similar
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distinction is drawn between stolen and illicit antiquities).1 Ownership, in all its
forms, is a secondary concern: Renfrew is prepared to write that `in a sense' it is not
looting `when a landowner [in the U.S.A.] leases his own land out to a professional
pot hunter and allows an ancient site to be bulldozed for profit. But the effect is
the same.' (Renfrew, 2000, p. 81)
We cannot, then, accuse Lord Renfrew of thinking too much in proprietorial terms.
If anything he says too little about private property: the privacy of private owners
through whose hands antiquities may pass carries little apparent weight with him
even as an argument to be countered (ibid., pp. 33 & 37). Which makes it no less
curious that in his vocabulary, as in Cuno's, the destruction that contrasts with
common-or-garden theft is called looting. It may be that questions of custody lend
themselves readily to proprietorial language; this may also explain the popularity of
the term `cultural property', which I discuss in the next chapter.
In neither Cuno's nor Renfrew's thinking, however, is this term `loot' unambigu-
ously being used as though by analogy with private (or state) property. Rather,
each of them seems to have in mind something which can be plundered, through
being wrongfully depleted, but something more like a resource (and a public one
at that) than like somebody's estate. For Renfrew the resource in question is
the archæological record, the `historic heritage' which is the `world's archæological
resource, ... our principal source of knowledge about the early human past' (ibid.,
p. 9). For Cuno, it is the visible antiquities market from which museums acquire their
collections for subsequent display and mutual loan, contrasted with the underground
market into which artefacts may disappear when the visible market shrinks. In
both we encounter visions of a fragile whole, something vulnerable to depletion; in
fact, with Renfrew in particular we may have found ourselves further from private
property than from Boyle's `information commons' (Boyle, 2008, p. xv). This is what
the language of loot partly obscures; and in later chapters I shall be suggesting that
the holistic language of cultural heritage might have brought it forth more fully.
1See also p. 37: `I do not doubt that nearly all dealers genuinely try to avoid selling objects
that have been stolenthat is to say removed from the collection of an individual owner
or a museum. The case of looted objects is very different, however: these have been
clandestinely removed from the ground and have never had an effective owner, even if
the landowner at the time of the removal is in a legal sense the owner of such goods. In
many countries the law determines that it is the state itself which is the owner of buried
antiquities, but the state as rightful owner is the last to hear of it when they are illicitly
exported.'
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2.2. Stories, Styles and Symbols
If the author is indeed dead, one may sometimes have the sense that the cultural
group from which his work emerged would like to replace him. Sometimes the author
in question is both identifiable and literally deceased: the papers of Franz Kafka, for
example, have been the subject of a long-running legal battle for possession. The
office of the Israeli Prime Minister contends against other claimants that they are
`valuable for the history of the Jewish people and the State' (Schneider, 2010); one
infers that in its judgment Kafka, a Czechoslovakian Jew who wrote in German, was
more critically a Jewish than a Czechoslovakian or European or global literary figure.
The case of folklore, in contrast, offers one in which there is often no known author
and no fixed and final form of a work, which develops within the ongoing life of
a community (UNESCO/WIPO, 1999). The impossibility of identifying individual
authors of what are sometimes styled `traditional cultural expressions'2 (including
stories, symbols, ceremonies, designs and other intangibles) has not impeded claims
that their use by cultural outsiders may in some cases constitute an invasion of
privacy (Brown, 1998, p. 193), a source of offence (Young, 2008, p. 129ff.), or a
threat to the source people's distinctive existence as a cultural group (Coleman and
Coombe, 2009, pp. 178-9). In some cases recognisably culture-based arguments cut
both ways: news reports in 2006 of legal action by the Chilean Mapuche people
against Microsoft, arising from Microsoft's production of a version of its Windows
operating system in the Mapuzugun language of the Mapuche, had the complainants
stating that `Mapundungun is a fundamental part of [their] culture and it is [their]
right as an indigenous nation to preserve and develop [their] cultural heritage'
(Oiaga, 2006), while Microsoft had sought to `open a window so that the rest of
the world can access the cultural riches of this indigenous people' (Reuters, 2006).
Intangible cultural items introduce distinctive complications. Tangible cultural
heritage  such as Kafka's papers, considered as unique physical objects distinct from
whatever their contents may be  can likewise be subject to claims of continuing
interests by the cultural groups within which they originated, or by people claiming
close association with those groups (for example, because of lineal descent; for
more on the identity of cultures over time see Chapter 6). The archæologist Zahi
Hawass, formerly Secretary General of Egypt's Supreme Council of Antiquities and
later a Minister of State with the corresponding portfolio, has repeatedly called
for the repatriation of the Rosetta Stone to Egypt from the British Museum, not
because of concerns about present-day looting (the Stone was removed from Egypt
in the Napoleonic era) but in explicit service of the Egyptian nation: `It is an
2A term favoured in the WIPO literature; see http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore/
(retrieved 24th January 2010).
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icon of our Egyptian identity and its homeland should be Egypt.' (Quoted in
Bradley, 2009.) A similar line of thinking about national identity animates Greek
demands for the return of the Elgin Marbles to Athens (Gillman, 2006, p. 15).
In the case of intangibles, however, there are no discrete objects to possess or
surrender: appropriation need not involve expropriation. When the artistic style of
an Australian Aboriginal artist is appropriated by someone outside the Aborigine's
cultural group, if it is done skilfully enough `there is no reliable way for viewers
to tell, just by looking at a painting, whether it is by a member of an aboriginal
culture or by an outsider' (Young, 2008, p. 39). The Aboriginal artist does not
lose the ability to produce artworks in this same style; if something is lost to the
Aborigine and his cultural group, it is the distinctiveness of the style as a style of
that group.
The idea that an individual creative can be plagiarised, and thereby wronged,
is familiar enough; it is when collectives claim to have been wronged or harmed
through outsiders' use of their intangible cultural heritage that controversy may
arise. Examples may be found of claims that if all and sundry are permitted to
represent a cultural group in their writings (for example, in a novel whose characters
are members of the group), then market saturation will deprive its members of an
audience when they try to tell their own stories (ibid., pp. 114-8); or that inaccurate
representation by outsiders may aict insiders' own understanding of their culture,
weakening its distinctive identity (ibid., p. 118ff.); or that appropriation and
commercialisation by outsiders threaten to dilute the significance, including any
religious significance, of cultural items, converting the sacred and hallowed into
mere commodities (Osborne, 2003, pp. 205-6). The various suggested mechanisms
of collective harm have been assessed by other commentators, and their plausibility
does not directly concern me in this discussion; indeed, in some of these cases
it is not immediately obvious whether anything notably distinguishes harms to
cultural groups from harms to, for example, racially defined groups, which might
also be subject to representation which is offensive or a source of market saturation.
Why then do we find people writing about cultural appropriation, or about the
representation in the arts of cultural groups in particular?
Some conflicts are no doubt partly rooted in conceptual differences and misun-
derstandings between cultures: for example, authorship and ownership may turn
out to be understood differently within different cultural groups (Nicholas and
Bannister, 2004, p. 329, although see Young, 2008, pp. 76-7). Thus disputes may
arise in which the dividing lines are most clearly drawn in cultural terms. If, say,
some cultural group lays claim to collective ownership of a tangible or intangible
item, and thereby to the rightful authority to restrict cultural outsiders' access
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to or use of it, through appeal to `laws or traditional practices' which `are said
to make ancient (unattributed) works collective property' (ibid., p. 74), then the
difficulty arises that the outsiders whose actions the law or traditional practice aims
to restrict are precisely those who do not participate in the culture within which
the law or traditional practice exists. They may have reasons for respecting the
insiders' wishes, but they cannot share the insiders' own reasons; and an outsider
cultural group without great sympathy for collective ownership of artistic styles, for
example, will not necessarily be inclined to make exceptions as a principle of charity
to cultures other than its own (ibid., p. 81).
On other occasions, the active concern appears to be for the viability of the
culture and, accordingly, of the cultural group in question: here the thought is that
a culture is something which can be susceptible to assimilation into another, more
widespread, more powerful culture, and that when this occurs, even if it should
occasion some great outburst of creativity in which elements of the donor culture
find themselves invigorated through mingling with elements of the engulfing culture,
nevertheless something is lost when the smaller culture loses its distinctiveness and
integrity.3 Such concerns are not limited to indigenous peoples in Australasia or
the Americas, as long-lived British anxiety about Americanisation demonstrates.
Sometimes specific aspects of certain cultures are the objects of concern, as for
example when language extinction is presented as a problem because it represents
the loss of information encoded within linguistic conventions (F.f.E.L., 1.2); but
one also encounters suggestions that culture is itself a human good (Appiah, 2005,
pp. 120-30).
It is in the context of such concerns as these that intangible cultural heritage
tends to loom large: the Rosetta Stone or a Kafka manuscript can be only in one
place at a time, and consequently is readily treated as property, but no such natural
restrictions prevent an artist from happening (not necessarily even consciously) to
draw some stylistic inspiration from another culture's traditional artistic forms,
or even from independently happening to reinvent them by chance. If we regard
cultures as capable of possessing boundaries (which would be a controversial view
in itself; see Chapter 6), we shall have to acknowledge that such boundaries are
porous in the extreme. Somehow, we need to be able to talk not only about
cultural heritage at large, the cultural heritage of mankind, but also about the
heritage of distinct cultures, even as we question what makes one culture distinct
from another. Somehow, moreover, we need to be able to talk about one culture
or another without artificially reifying cultures into rigidly bounded blocks, and
3For discussion of what it means for the identity of a culture when it merges with another,
see Chapter 6.
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likewise without implausible reification of intangible heritage in its various and often
amorphous forms.
2.3. Fan Cultures
The cases discussed in the previous two sections have tended to take cultural identity
as more-or-less given and then concern themselves with what it portends for cultural
items: we want to know whether the Egyptian origins of the Rosetta Stone can form
the basis of a sound argument for its repatriation, and what we should make of Israeli
claims on Kafka's papers given that Kafka was a Jew but not an Israeli. However,
things do not always happen this way round: sometimes the item comes first (as a
product of one or more cultures), and subsequently a new and distinctive cultural
group forms around it, often producing further cultural items in turn. This is most
clearly so in the case of fan culture: fandom
selects from the repertoire of mass-produced and mass-distributed
entertainment certain performers, narratives or genres and takes them
into the culture of a self-selected fraction of the people. They are
then reworked into an intensely pleasurable, intensely signifying popular
culture that is both similar to, yet significantly different from, the culture
of more `normal' popular audiences. (Fiske, 1992, p. 30)
Moreover,
fans often turn [their] semiotic productivity into some form of textual
production that can circulate among  and thus help to define  the fan
community. Fans create a fan culture with its own systems of production
and distribution that forms... a `shadow cultural economy' that lies
outside that of the cultural industries yet shares features with them
which more normal popular culture lacks. (ibid., p. 30)
It is with respect to these forms of fan activity that controversy sometimes arises.
Take the case of fan-fiction, the simple act of telling and sharing stories using settings
and characters from a favourite novel or film or other authored source:
there are many writers who hate fanfic. Some argue that fans have
no business appropriating their characters and situations, that it's
disrespectful to imagine your precious fictional people in sexual scenarios,
or to retell their stories from a different point of view, or to snatch
a victorious happy ending from the tragic defeat the writer ended her
book with. (Doctorow, 2008, p. 90)
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Look, but don't touch: instead of claims made by a cultural group on its products,
here we have claims by individual creatives about the proper limits of cultural
activity forming around their creations, about what a fan culture may include. This
is a fairly striking form of interaction between producers and customers; compare
the disastrous introduction of New Coke in 1985, when the Coca-Cola Company
decided to change the taste of Coke. `Half a million letters and telephone calls later,
Coke bowed to consumer demand; under the circumstances, pretty quick timing
for a gigantic organization previously convinced that it controlled the brand. Coke
Classic was back just sixty days after New Coke was introduced.' (Biel, 1997, p. 201)
Perhaps the `sublimated essence of America' (quoted in Chidester, 1996, p. 750)
attracts a devotion more powerful than fandom; perhaps different industries simply
have different approaches to customer relations. In either case, no culture of Coke-
drinkers is noticeably involved in the account (although we may wish to talk about
the place of Coke in American culture). It would perhaps be rash to deny outright
that `the Coke-drinkers' as a cultural group exist and were culturally affected, but
the story is first and foremost one about individuals' gustatory experiences and their
reactions. The case of fan-fiction is different, at any rate once it is distributed among
fans: writing presupposes an audience, and fan-fiction not written purely for one's
own amusement is consequently born into an environment of cultural interchange
between the fans whose shared love of whatever it draws inspiration from enables
them to interpret and appreciate it as fan-fiction. Changing the taste of Coke
produced dissatisfied customers; if the fanfic-hating authors to whom Doctorow
refers were granted their wish, the activity of entire (albeit small) cultural groups
would cease. The moral questions which arise are not only those of business ethics,
authors' rights, and so on; we have to talk about cultures.
Let me illustrate the point with a specific example: one which blurs the distinction
between initial authorial creation and fan modification even more than the case of
fan-fiction does. When you count yourself as a fan of something translated from a
foreign language, and no official translation of its sequel proves forthcoming, what
is to be done? If any members of the fan community are competent to produce a
translation of their own, the solution is obvious. Western fans of anime (Japanese
animation) were trailblazers here, developing elaborate production and distribution
networks for `fansubs' (recordings subtitled by fan translators) to provide where
the market did not, with schemes of `fansub ethics', admittedly contested and
often honoured in the breach, to distinguish the practice from ordinary copyright
infringement (Hatcher, 2005, pp. 531-3). (This has not always resulted in success in
avoiding legal entanglements (Clements, 2009, p. 102).) One writer has noted with
retrospective approval that `unlike other crazes that grew out of clever, professionally
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guided merchandising concepts, anime [in the West] is a phenomenon that was
discovered by the fans, nurtured by the fans (despite professional dismissal), and
firmly established by the fans' (Patten, 2004, p. 45).
What if the foreign object of desire is not a video recording but a piece of software?
This was the problem facing the EarthBound video game fan community in recent
years, as it became gradually apparent that the only English version of the sequel
Mother 3,4 and therefore the only opportunity for Anglophone players to uncover
its narrative, would be one they made themselves.
The scenario was far from unprecedented: ROM hackers trace the history of their
translation projects back to 19935. Some computer games have been designed to
facilitate and encourage modification (Kushner, 2003, pp. 165-9 & 193), but others
are editable only as blobs of binary numbers extracted from the physical storage
medium (the ROM, for `Read-Only Memory') on which the game was sold. Many
ROM hacks, like fansubs, provide otherwise unavailable translations (or aim to offer
more faithful translations than the official ones); some fix bugs or add functionality;
and some make sweeping changes to create parodies, fan-sequels, &c. By their
nature, however, they all require a copy of the original commercial ROM's data
(which can then be modified and played, usually using computer emulation6 of
the hardware for which the ROM was made); usually the hacks themselves are
distributed as `patches' to be applied to the ROM data by users, so that distributors
avoid liability for unauthorised distribution of copyrighted ROMs.
The effort required is considerable: making a translation patch for a ROM involves
working out how it stores its text data, creating a full translation into a language
which may have a wholly different writing system from the original (Mother 3 was
originally scripted in Japanese), then devising a means of neatly inserting the new
text and making it display correctly. All of this has to be done by reverse-engineering
an agglomeration of numbers: viewed in a hex editor (hexadecimal, i.e. base sixteen,
being often more manageable than binary), program code and data alike have all
the obvious meaning of 74-68-65-73-65-20-77-6F-72-64-73. During the development
of the hack, http://mother3.fobby.net/ would regularly broadcast status reports
4EarthBound is the name under which Mother 2 was released in North America. The
first game in the series (supposedly named in reference to a John Lennon song) was, like
Mother 3, never released outside Japan.
5http://www.romhacking.net/transhistory/ (retrieved 1st February 2010)
6The programming of emulators also poses challenges;
http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2011/08/accuracy-takes-power-one-mans-3ghz-
quest-to-build-a-perfect-snes-emulator.ars (retrieved 10th August 2011) offers comments
on the difficulty of accurately replicating the performance of the original hardware,
which is particularly important if the emulator is being written with preservational
purposes in mind.
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concerning the arcana of proportional fonts. A considerable effort presumably entails
considerable perceived value, but what value might that be?
There is of course the straightforwardly Utilitarian account: a view concerned with
the effects on happiness at large, treating the game as a repository of instrumental
value. Or the translation project could be regarded as action to put the culmination
of a series into the hands of those who have an emotional investment in it, and
whose affection gives them interests of some sort in it; under this interpretation
the focus shifts to the fans in particular. Or it could be considered an effort to
ensure that a worthy creation receives the international appreciation it deserves
(and on this account the focus shifts from gamers' benefit to that of the game and
its creators)if we are agreed that anything can be meaningfully said to be `good
for' a creative work.
No doubt a mixture of those things is involved, and perhaps more besides; but our
understanding of the project would be clearly lacking if we did not take into account
that it was the concern of an established EarthBound fan community: one whose
dedication to maintaining visible interest in the series, when a Western release for
Mother 3 still seemed possible, had extended to compiling and circulating a 268-
page printed book of commentary and fan-art, with accompanying DVDs, in a bid
to reignite the curiosity of the specialist press.7 And we cannot consider such a
fan community without recognising that through such activities it both shares and
sustains the fan culture which defines it.
If, then, we want to ask about the ethics of appropriation by fan communities
that take it upon themselves to translate or expand upon other creators' output,
we cannot avoid talking about the fan cultures which are nourished by their own
cultural activity in its various forms. We need, in fact, to possess an account of
how culture assumes a place in our moral landscape in order to arbitrate not only
between the competing demands of separate cultures, as in the previous section, but
also between culture and subculture. In addition to sometimes having to ask just
whose heritage an object or practice is, we shall also have to take into account the
potential of cultural items to foster the development of new and different cultural
forms.
Shortly after the Mother 3 translation was completed, another hack by other
people turned out to enjoy less toleration, or to have less luck: Crimson Echoes,
intended to be a fan-continuation of the largely dormant Chrono series, was stopped
in development by a cease-and-desist letter from the copyright holders of the Chrono
franchise. There is a point of view from which this is nothing more than the law
acting as intended; but from another perspective it may seem that the flourishing of
7http://starmen.net/ebanthology/ (retrieved 2nd February 2010).
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subcultures, and the viability of fan cultures, risk bring left out of the analysis and
of policy considerations, much like Boyle's public domain. The language of rights
and permissions does not always fit easily together with the shared dynamism of
culture; and who would ever have thought that items of any sort of property could
inspire the germination of new and creative cultural enclaves?
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In thinking about the ethics of cases such as those cited in the previous chapter,
the available philosophical literature itself stands against and interacts with a much
wider legal, political and professional backdrop. One cannot reasonably claim that
within this broad intellectual milieu there is nobody thinking philosophically, and
accordingly not every name in which I shall draw in this chapter (or elsewhere) is
that of someone predominantly purporting to be, or employed in academia as, a
philosopher; but the suggestion may still be and is sometimes made that dedicated,
specialist philosophers have a distinctive contribution to make, the absence of which
is still too often felt. The editors of The Ethics of Archæology, for example, observe
that
there has been much good and innovative writing on the ethics of their
discipline by archæologists themselves... That is just as it should be,
since ethical problems in archæology are the problems of archæologists...
But whilst archæologists may have the advantage of relevant experience,
few are also moral philosophers, with the conceptual tools and analytical
skills that have been developed in that tradition over centuries. (Scarre
and Scarre, 2006, p. 1)
When it comes to the ethics of cultural heritage in general, similar and starker
comments may be found:
The last decades have seen an improvement in awareness about these
ethical problems, and there has been a corresponding increase in the
number of publications dealing with these issues.
However, a sizeable proportion of output has been unsystematic,
ad hoc or little better than special pleading, and most display scant
knowledge of current work in theoretical ethics. There are few dedicated
research centres in the area of archæological and cultural heritage ethics,
though the need for them is great. (C.E.C.H., 2009)
This chapter must therefore survey both the contributions philosophers have made
to the field and, to some extent, the intellectual context in which they have done so.
Aspects of this intellectual background inevitably seeped into the previous chapter,
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but here the focus shifts from the kinds of problem that emerge to the conceptual
apparatus which has been developed to address them.
Some topics will be more fully developed in later chapters: in particular, discussion
of the nature of culture(s) will take place mainly in Chapters 5 and 6, while value
is explored in Chapters 8 and 9. My first concern in the present chapter (having
already struck some cautionary notes about proprietorial thinking) is to examine
what is probably the predominant scheme for organising our thoughts about ethics,
law and politics concerned with cultural items, that of `cultural property'. Its
ubiquity is demonstrated by, to give just three noteworthy examples, the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, and the International
Journal of Cultural Property. Since so many disputes involving cultural items
are concerned with control and who should have it, it is hardly surprising to see
them analysed in terms of `property'; but when emphasis is placed, like mine, on a
holistic conception of cultural heritage which refuses to begin with discrete cultural
items, the atomising implication of property, of division into lots subject to rights
of exclusion, is at the very least worthy of a closer and quizzical look.
If `cultural property' arouses my suspicions, what then of the term I prefer to use,
`cultural heritage'? Heritage by implication is somebody's heritage: have I not let
propertisation slip in through the back door? I will agree that a measure of caution
is needed, although I remain inclined to think that talk of heritage does at least sit
more comfortably with the conceptions of holism and moral patiency which I seek
to develop.
3.1. `Cultural Property'
Unlike real, personal, or intellectual property..., cultural property is
a descriptor or a valence rather than an exclusive label. Property
belonging to any other established category can concurrently be cultural,
and its status as cultural property can develop or fade over time...
Nevertheless, in some disputed cases political pressure and moral
persuasion have been effective in restoring property to claimants offering
superior cultural arguments. (Scafidi, 2008, pp. 684-5)
`Cultural property' as a term of art was born with the 1954 Hague Convention
(Mezey, 2007, p. 2009), making it an instrument of legal and diplomatic thinking
from the (quite recent) outset; but its use has spread, and in the hands of
philosophers outside the legal academy it has offered a starting point for critical
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reflection. Karren J. Warren has expressed misgivings about `so-called cultural
properties ' (Warren, 1999, p. 1), contending that `it is at least an open question'
whether concepts of property and patrimony capture `the relevant information
about the relationship of all people to their cultural history' (ibid., p. 15). (I am
unconvinced, however, by the stronger claim that since `there are alternative ways
to conceive the debate and to resolve the conflicts over cultural heritage issues, the
dominant perspective [sc. of cultural property] seems inadequate by itself' (ibid.,
p. 21); it is unclear to me why the existence of multiple possible frameworks, even
where they hold different details to be relevant, should automatically entail a need
for synthesis.) Janna Thompson, in `Cultural Property, Restitution and Value', has
taken the cautiously phrased line that `there is a plausible conception of cultural
property which can be used to justify some restitution claims' (Thompson, 2003,
p. 252). James O. Young, in `Cultures and Cultural Property', takes the `notion
that a culture can be the collective owner of cultural property' (Young, 2007, p. 111)
initially as a given, in order to examine what might or might not offer a basis for
a justifiable claim on some item by a cultural group. It is worth noting that in the
paper in question Young introduces `what may be called the cultural significance
principle' (2008, p. 122; italics in original), defined in terms of cultural property,
in order to address claims of ownership through the prism of value (for more on
which see Chapter 8); but in an earlier publication of the same period, concerned
more specifically with the ownership of archæological items, this was the `cultural
property principle', then defined in terms of archæological finds (Young, 2006, p. 25).
`Cultural property' is thus present in both permutations, but its shifting presence
gives the impression that Young does not consider it definitionally central to his
principle or principles; it serves, perhaps, to characterise the principle's scope of
application.
Indeed, recent work by Young has tended to emphasise not so much the state
of being cultural property as the appropriation of cultural items and the various
forms which it may take (Young, 2008; Young and Brunk, 2009; Young and Haley,
2009). In his taxonomy, acts of cross-cultural transfer of physical objects, of stories
or songs or other `content', of styles, or of motifs can, though clearly different
and demanding different analyses, all be understood as falling into subcategories
of `cultural appropriation' (Young, 2008, pp. 5-7). Even the depiction of members of
one cultural group in artistic works by members of another (fiction or non-fiction)
counts as a form of such appropriation (ibid., p. 7). The consequent impression is of a
concern for the aspects of possession involved in the very concept of appropr iation,
but with the possession under discussion being a decidedly diverse and manifold
phenomenon.
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If philosophical reflection has sometimes made pragmatic use of `cultural prop-
erty', more as a useful piece of terminology or as a starting point for ethical reflection
than as a perfect fit for any gap in our moral vocabulary, it may be that this
pragmatism has been for the best. `When we're trying to interpret the concept of
cultural property,' writes Kwame Anthony Appiah, `we ignore at our peril what
lawyers, at least, know: property is an institution, created largely by laws' (Appiah,
2009, p. 82). Moreover, the term's application has not been restricted to clearly
fixed boundaries:
When comparing today's discussions of cultural property with those
taking place only two decades ago, one is immediately struck by the
radical broadening of the field's scope. Prior to the early 1980s, `cultural
property' was invoked largely to denote portable works of art and
architectural monuments that embodied the history and identity of
particular peoples or nation-states. Today the expression is applied to
things as disparate in their scale and characteristics as human remains,
art genres, and regional landscapes. Indigenous-rights advocates have
gone so far as to identify biological species (as distinct from plant or
animal populations) as items of cultural or intellectual property. (Brown,
2005, p. 40)
If we want to know what cultural property is, we cannot analyse it like a natural
kind; however, this is not to say that it must go unscrutinised, or that even pragmatic
use necessarily carries no hidden complications. In the judgment of one legal
commentator, the yoking of `culture' to legalised `property' is itself not without
cost:
The problem with using ideas of cultural property to resolve cultural
disputes is that cultural property uses and encourages an anemic theory
of culture so that it can make sense as a form of property. Cultural
property is a paradox because it places special value and legal protection
on cultural products and artifacts, but it does so based on a sanitized
and domesticated view of cultural production. (Mezey, 2007, p. 2005)
What Naomi Mezey considers paradoxical, John Carman criticises in stronger
terms:
It is by treating the heritage as an object of ownership that its reduction
to a commodity is effected and the gift increase that represents the
creation and maintenance of the community is thereby taken away. If
`Property is Theft'... then the category of Cultural Property should be
considered no less than the theft of culture. (Carman, 2005, p. 44)
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Carman is drawing here on Lewis Hyde's conception of an opposition between `gift'
and commodity: `art is in danger from economics' (ibid., p. 42) because the `value1
of a commodity is fixed by the value given for it, while gifts are bound to increase
in value as they move, especially when a circulation of gifts creates community out
of individual expressions of goodwill' (Carman, 2005, p. 43). Thus commoditisation
devalues the `gift' element in artistic creation, and may in turn undermine its role
in the generation and sustenance of communities. For both Carman and Mezey, in
somewhat different respects, there is something in the very idea of `property' which
is fundamentally unsuited to being applied to culture.
Elsewhere, though, one sees it questioned whether `cultural property' is in fact a
wholly unitary concept: the legal scholar John Henry Merryman is willing enough
to employ the term, but in his 1986 paper `Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural
Property' he sought to draw a distinction between cultural nationalism, with its
emphasis on control of cultural items by source nations, and `cosmopolitan' cultural
internationalism, which is `protective' but not `retentive' (Merryman, 1986, p. 846).
Both ways of thinking about cultural property are in some measure valid.
There are broad areas in which they act to reinforce each other's values.
Those are the easy cases. The interesting ones arise when the two ways
of thinking lead in different directions. Then distinctions have to be
made, questions require refinement and it becomes necessary to choose.
(ibid., p. 852)
Merryman's worry that debate about `cultural property' has tended to tilt exces-
sively towards cultural nationalism (ibid., p. 850), and his `regulatory imperatives'
of `preservation, truth and access' (quoted in Cuno, 2008, p. 13)  in which `truth' is
concerned with `historical, scientific, cultural, and æsthetic truth' (quoted in ibid.,
p. 13)  have been an influence on James Cuno, whose edited volumeWhose Culture?
concludes with a reprint of one of Merryman's papers. It may therefore occasion
surprise to see Renfrew , not a man one might expect to see set alongside one of
Cuno's heroes, sharing the criticism of John Carman:
In attempting to resolve the problem of the illicit trade in antiquities
and the `retentionist' policies of states, Merryman does not challenge the
basis on which these phenomena operate but instead responds in kind:
to a problem of ownership he responds with an increase of ownership
opportunities. By the same token, Renfrew responds to a problem of
ownership by placing ownership in the hands of a single authorised entity.
1Elsewhere Carman distinguishes between several different kinds of value; but I defer
discussion of the topic of value to Chapter 8.
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[In reality,] it is the notion of ownership itself which is the problem in
our treatment of ancient remains. (Carman, 2005, pp. 27-8)
I suggested in 2.1 that Cuno and Renfrew were in fact united by the proprietori-
ally tinged language of `looting', and indeed Carman regards Merryman's enthusiasm
for a licit international market in antiquities not as an internationalist corrective to
excessive nationalism within the space in which the `interesting' debates happen,
but as little more than proprietorialism in another form.
I have little more to say about `cultural property' in this discussion, since much
of what has been written on it is chiefly of legal (or sometimes political) rather
than directly philosophical interest, but I must close the present section with a nod
towards what is sometimes called `cultural intellectual property'. I noted in 2.2
that abstract items, being naturally nonexclusive and nonrivalrous, pose especial
difficulties for parties who would rather see some of them more tightly controlled;
and where control can be asserted, questions of who may permissibly wield it may
arise. `Acts of taking and using traditional knowledge beyond the cultural context
where it originated have become increasingly complex and contested, particularly
when commercial exploitation is involved' (Bannister and Solomon, 2009, p. 143):
opponents of appropriation argue that knowledge and resources are
being `stolen' from indigenous communities, eroding their cultures
and the ecosystems on which they depend, interfering with cultural
responsibilities (e.g. to past and future generations) and undermining
Indigenous rights to traditional resources, intellectual property and
cultural heritage. (ibid., p. 144)
In response to controversies concerning control over `traditional knowledge' and
`traditional cultural expressions' (see also p. 35 above), we see movements towards
the adoption of what are in effect intellectual property regimes in which cultural
groups become recognised as rights-holders; and this development in turn has begun
to generate theoretical critique. The journal Current Anthropology, for example, has
carried articles with titles one might have expected to find instead in the speculative
corners of the legal academy: `Can Culture Be Copyrighted?' (Brown, 1998) and
`Copyrighting the Past?' (Nicholas and Bannister, 2004). As the former points out,
while such measures may have been proposed with the aim of benefiting indigenous
peoples  for example, as an attempt to undo the coercive information-gathering
which characterised the ethnography of the colonial era (Brown, 1998, pp. 199-
201)  it is unclear how a line could neatly be drawn around `designated folkloric
populations' and `certified indigenous peoples' (ibid., p. 203). At worst (recalling
Boyle), the outcome might be a hyperparochial `impound[ing of] knowledge in a
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new reservation system: reservations of the written word, an apartheid of the mind'
(ibid., p. 204).
Among philosophers there has been discussion (for example, by Will Kymlicka,
noted for his work on social minorities and `group-differentiated rights') of whether
members of certain cultural groups possess `cultural rights', and whether culture
is in some sense a good which may be due to them (Appiah, 2005, pp. 120-30),
but less on the specific theme of cultural groups' control over their members'
intellectual products. Young has addressed the matter in the course of his Cultural
Appropriation and the Arts, dismissing objections to the appropriation of stories or
songs in broadly economic terms:
When a corporation patents a medicine or crop varietal they are profiting
at the expense of the culture in which the patented item originated. The
insiders have been stripped of the opportunity to patent something. On
the other hand, we see a Pareto improvement when artists appropriate
a story or a song. That is, the outsider artists (and their audiences)
benefit, but the insiders are not made worse off. (Young, 2008, p. 94)
Conrad Brunk is more open to the idea that it is a peculiarly post-Enlightenment
`knowledge paradigm', a particular conception of the nature of knowledge and its
universality, that leads people operating within it to conclude that `anyone who
claims that a bit of knowledge about the world is their domain, or property, over
which they have exclusive rights of revelation and control, appears to be claiming
the indefensible, if not the incomprehensible' (Brunk, 2009, p. 163). (Similar doubts
about whether the assumptions undergirding current intellectual property regimes
are anything but parochial animate Rosemary Coombe's criticism of `the imperialist
claims of the Romantic author' (Coombe, 1997, p. 78).) Brunk draws on a Lockean
conception of property (Brunk, 2009, p. 163), and by implication, I think, on a
Locke-inspired way of thinking about intellectual property, to claim that according
to a `scientistic-rationalist paradigm' much knowledge is `owned by no-one, because
it is not knowledge that has had value added to it' (ibid., p. 165). It is unclear
to me whether his pluralistic stance on different cultures' conceptions of knowledge
is supposed to cast doubt on not only Locke-inspired but also what are sometimes
called utilitarian justifications of intellectual property (which I myself favour over
the Locke-derived, as mentioned in note 6 on p. 24); these appeal more to pragmatic
considerations, to the usefulness of limited intellectual property regimes in enabling
profit to act as an incentive to publication, than to any supposed natural right.
Locke's place in the history of not owning intellectual items is less clearly significant
than Thomas Jefferson's much-quoted observation:
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If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea,
which an individual may exclusively possess as he keeps it to himself;
but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of
every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possess [sic] the less, because every other
possess [sic] the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper
at mine, receives light without darkening me. (Quoted in Boyle, 2008,
p. 20)
On a view of intellectual property grounded in public utility, the objection to
recognising a cultural group's claims to proprietorship over such knowledge as an
understanding of the medical potency of local plants is not that `Indigenous peoples
clearly have not mixed their labour with this knowledge in a way that adds value
in the Western sense of the term' (Brunk, 2009, p. 165). It is that the optimal
length of an intellectual property right is precisely that duration which will act as
an incentive to intellectual work and its publicationand no longer. It does of
course follow that the knowledge which a cultural group has brought forth is not
in any way still undiscovered and available for, say, a multinational pharmaceutical
corporation to close off and monopolise; and so Brunk still has a point when he
questions whether, when a cultural group already has knowledge of the medicinal
benefits of a given plant, the conversion of this knowledge into a scientific form is
such as to warrant the granting to those performing the research of an intellectual
property right in the results (ibid., pp. 165-6).
Despite his overemphasis of the Locke-derived tradition in intellectual property,
Brunk does in fact recognise the Jeffersonian contention that intellectual items are
nonexclusive and nonrivalrous (ibid., p. 167). His reply is that the appropriation
of `traditional knowledge' can amount to a depletion of a culture or cultural group
itself: of `the security of the culture and the landscape or ecosystem that has been
shaped by the culture, and upon which the identity and very existence of the culture
and its people depend... In this respect there is a definite taking of something to
which the culture has a rightful claim, insofar as it has a right to its cultural identity'
(ibid., p. 167). I do not know what a right to cultural identity might be (though I
suspect the influence of Kymlicka), or whether this is supposed to be a universal right
rather than a parochially post-Enlightenment, Lockean natural right; the nature of
cultural identity still awaits my analysis, and must continue waiting until Chapter
6.
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3.2. `Cultural Heritage'
What, in the meantime, of those who prefer to speak not of cultural property, but of
cultural heritage?2 Derek Gillman, in the opening paragraphs of The Idea of Cultural
Heritage, sees no apparent difficulty in simply drawing on Merryman's `Two Ways of
Thinking About Cultural Property': Merryman's cosmopolitan internationalists (see
p. 47) are those `who seek to promote the idea of the heritage of all mankind ', and
they are contrasted with `cultural nationalists for whom art, architecture, theatre,
music and food are always a part of someone's particular heritage' (Gillman, 2006,
p. 1). In the quoted passage Gillman apparently regards Merryman's comments
on cultural property and his own work on cultural heritage as wholly compatible
parts of the same conversation. The full story, however, may be less simple.
Gillman writes that `two parallel debates have occurred with respect to public
policy on heritage. The first has involved cultural officials, museum administrators,
archæologists, anthropologists, collectors and lawyers.' (It is with this debate
that he associates Merryman.) `The second debate takes place between political
philosophers  especially liberal and communitarian thinkers of various shades 
who argue about human agency, and which has primacy in the political arena: the
individual or community.' (ibid., p. 1)
Merryman's own stated view is that `cultural heritage' is a loaded and nationalistic
term which is consequently inferior to what he takes to be the comparative neutrality
of `cultural property':
Partisans, secure in their cause, substitute romance for reason and
advocacy for scholarship. The resulting literature is liberally salted
with prejudicial terms like `patrimony', `repatriation' and `heritage'... To
assert that an object is part of the cultural `patrimony' of Peru or Greece
or Indonesia implies, since Byron, that it has a `patria', a homeland, a
nation to which, and in which, it belongs. If found abroad it should,
accordingly, be `repatriated', returned to the national territory... To
suggest that an object is part of the cultural `heritage' of a nation has a
similar paralytic effect. (Merryman, 1990, p. 521)
In order to retain terminological neutrality,
such terms as cultural `object' and cultural `property'  neither term
is ideal, but the English language lacks a better equivalent for `beni
culturali'  are preferable; they do not assume the answer to the question.
(ibid., p. 522)
2I largely gloss over the third term one typically hears, `cultural patrimony', since it does
not strike me as having any particularly distinctive features in its own right.
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Now what are we to do? In the last section I noted claims to the effect that
it amounts to distortion to shoehorn culture into a property-based model; now we
hear that `cultural property' is as close to a neutral terminology as we can hope to
get, and that it is talk of cultural heritage that threatens to smuggle bias into our
thinking.
We should note at once that the cultural objects which Merryman has principally
in mind are antiquities, artworks, and so forth; it seems unlikely that he intended his
criticism to catch, say, Janna Thompson's conception of `Environment As Cultural
Heritage' (Thompson, 2000).3 (Sometimes one does see the term `heritage' employed
in a strongly restricted sense: for example, in Avishai Margalit's assertion that
`shared memory can be expressed in a legacy  that is, a memory of abstract things
such as attitudes and principles  or in a heritage, which consists of concrete objects
such as buildings and monuments' (Margalit, 2002, p. 61).) One finds it contended
by other legal scholars that `the existing legal concept of property does not, and
should not try to, cover all that evidence of human life that we are trying to preserve:
those things and traditions which express the way of life and thought of a particular
society; which are evidence of its intellectual and spiritual achievements. [Moreover,]
property does not incorporate concepts of duty to preserve and protect.' (Prott
and O'Keefe, 1992, p. 307) Others in turn have replied that what we really need
is `a stewardship model of property' (Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, 2009, p. 1022,
abstract).
Heritage may imply ownership inasmuch as it suggests inheritance (though insofar
as we concern ourselves with the import of English terms, we may note that traits or
characteristics as well as possessions may be inherited), but arguably it lacks some of
property 's connotations of division and allotment: one might speak of a wilderness,
a local festival, or an attitude towards one's neighbours as cultural heritage, but
conceived of as property they emerge as land, `traditional cultural expressions' and
the sheer implausibility of claiming restricted English ownership of jokes made at
the expense of the Welsh. I agree, accordingly, that heritage is in part a romantic
notion, but am not immediately persuaded that the stuff of culture is unromantic.
What then is it, this phenomenon styled `cultural heritage', if the term is
intensionally and perhaps extensionally unlike `cultural property'? Atle Omland,
examining conceptions of `World Heritage' as enshrined in the work of UNESCO and
its list of World Heritage Sites, regards even this more specific term as ambiguous:
emphasis may be placed in its interpretation on `global obligations to preserve or
on rights of access [or on] our shared world history' (Omland, 2006, p. 249). In this
3One does, of course, also see `cultural' and `natural' heritage elsewhere presented as
contrasting categories.
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third interpretation the `World Heritage is taken to consist of memorials to historical
periods and events that connect the people of the earth, past and present' (ibid.,
p. 249).4 Du²an Pokorný strikes some related notes:
Speaking of a nation, the reference [of `cultural heritage'] is essentially
to the cultural objects created by its members, found on its territory,
or lawfully acquired elsewhere. In addition, objects of a state's cultural
heritage that are of `outstanding universal value' become part of the
`world's cultural heritage'...5
In turn, `heritage' evokes continuity and succession. The artifact is
seen as testifying to the historically developed, and developing, identity
of a human group. But `world cultural heritage' quickly reminds us
that a cultural object does not bear witness only to the identity of its
creators. it also sheds light on `who were'  and, therefore, on `who
are'  their neighbors, the communities or societies with which the
producers exchanged ideas and techniques; and the more contacts are
established among previously isolated groups, the wider the circle of `co-
creators' becomes. On a rebound, as it were, the object contributes to
the formation of identity on the part of the beholders, be they of the
same culture or a different one. Ultimately, the artifact testifies to the
identity of mankind. (Pokorný, 2002, p. 356)
Sandra Dingli associates the notion of `the common heritage of mankind' precisely
with what is not open to claims of ownership, drawing on Grotius's conception of
the seas as open to common use but not to appropriation (Dingli, 2006, p. 222). `If
the past can be considered to be owned by no one, it could be seen as representing
the cultural heritage of all beings who have ever lived on earth or will live on it
in the future' (ibid., p. 223, italics in original). I am not sure I wholly follow this
inference (even if we assume that in referring to `all beings who have ever lived
on earth' Dingli in fact has only humans in mind); it seems to suggest that there
is a connection between the negative state of being unowned and the ostensibly
positive state of being (representative of) everyone's cultural heritage. Compare
Drahos, 1996, pp. 65-6 on positive and negative conceptions of community and
the commons (including the sea-bed as common heritage): that which is open
to anyone's appropriation versus that which is held jointly. Perhaps, though, the
difficulty lies precisely in my taking `common heritage' to imply something like
a stake in the commons; perhaps the idea is that cultural items are everyone's
responsibility, even  or especially  if nobody has staked a claim of ownership. Dingli
4I discuss heritage in relation to temporal continuity in Chapter 7.
5Here Pokorný is referring to the UNESCO Conventions.
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comments that Emmanuel Agius `draws attention to the fact that the concept of
common heritage does not involve a new theory of property but implies the absence
of property. He views the key consideration as being access to common resources
rather than to ownership.' (Dingli, 2006, p. 235)
Certainly one routinely encounters the language of stewardship, particularly
in archæological contexts (Bendremer and Richman, 2006, p. 100; Groarke and
Warrick, 2006, p. 163). Dingli endorses it, citing Warren (Dingli, 2006, pp. 235-
6). Michael Brown agrees that `the most promising approach' to some disputes over
cultural items is that which judges that `frameworks based on joint stewardship
are preferable to models based on rights and rules', on the pragmatic grounds
that joint stewardship `implies a willingness to compromise, which is essential for
hammering out workable agreements between parties who may hold incompatible
attitudes toward the proper use of information' (Brown, 1998, p. 205).
A more sceptical note is struck by Yannis Hamilakis: while stewardship
is commonly accepted (and enshrined in various archaeological codes
of ethics and practice) as the archæologist's primary ethical and
professional responsibility, [it] is increasingly recognized as ontologically
and epistemologically problematic and ethically self-serving. The
`record' has not been entrusted to archæologists, who then become its
stewards; rather, archæologists are instrumental in producing that record
out of the fragmented material traces of past social practices. Their
self-appointed role as stewards of that record, therefore, is ethically
spurious and may imply the desire to exclude others from engaging
with the material traces of the past... If the concept of stewardship
is therefore an inadequate basis upon which to discuss issues of ethics
and responsibility, the notion of shared stewardship (involving various
indigenous groups and publics as well as archæologists) that Nicholas
and Bannister propose can be equally problematic. It simply extends
the authority of archæologists' own problematic concepts to incorporate
indigenous groups and publics rather than imagining new concepts
and forging new modes of engagement. (Critical comment included in
Nicholas and Bannister, 2004, pp. 343-4.)
Groarke and Warrick, meanwhile, contend that `the principle of stewardship is
an unsatisfactory basis for an archæological ethics because it: (1) is vague and
difficult to apply in practice; (2) confuses ethical and political concerns; (3) has
inconsistent implications in circumstances in which different groups vie for control
of archæological resources; and (4) does not properly recognise those aspects of
archæological ethics which transcend (and sometimes limit) stewardship' (Groarke
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and Warrick, 2006, pp. 163-4). David Lowenthal, perhaps thinking less specifically
of stewardship of the archæological record, adds a further complaint: `Stewardship
saves the past from decayand robs it of majesty and mystery.' (Lowenthal, 1998,
p. xvi)
For those of us who look with suspicion on talk of `cultural property' and its
owners, then, alternative models are available: we can speak of cultural heritage,
even the cultural heritage of mankind or of the world, and we can speak of
stewards where we judge questions of particular ownership to be doubtful. Yet
such moves may in turn attract censure (and we may note in passing that at least
one commentator has recommended extracting the culture from cultural property,
replacing concerns about cultures with a stakeholder model (Wilk, 1999)).
Since the purpose of the present work is to defend an understanding of cultural
heritage itself as a moral patient, the language of cultural property is, if not outright
uncongenial, at least too limited; and accordingly I favour that of cultural heritage
more or less by default. All the same, when I read Dingli calling for efforts `to
conserve and protect that which has become a rapidly diminishing resource' (Dingli,
2006, p. 238), or when it is suggested that the `shared global responsibility' implied
by the World Heritage concept `reveals itself as an interest (in some cases as a right)
of the world community to claim access to shared cultural resources' (Omland,
2006, pp. 246-7), I cannot escape the suspicion that in this `resource' model we have
a subtler and more cosmopolitan form of propertisation on our hands. Which is not
to say that there is automatically anything wrong with being subtle or cosmopolitan;
but in the end it remains unclear to me whether the differences between conceptions
of cultural heritage and cultural property have tended in practice to be great or
small.
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What a varied and complicated thing cultural heritage turns out to be: this thing
called cultural heritage, which may or may not be equivalent to cultural property,
manifests itself in items (concrete and abstract) which are owned by, or resources
for, or embody or symbolise the spirit of, one or more cultural groups, or nations, or
mankind as a whole, as a result of which they find themselves under the sometimes
contested influence of states, or indigenous peoples, or private owners, or UNESCO,
or some combination.
In spite of these uncertainties, that heritage benefits human beings seems to be
widely agreed: `our global cultural heritage strengthens identities, well-being, and
respect for other cultures and societies' (Salzburg Global Seminar, 2010, p. 609);
`cultural heritage is a powerful tool to engage communities positively and, as
such, is a driving force for human development and creativity' (ibid., p. 609); `an
appreciation of diverse cultural heritage and its continuity for future generations
promote [sic] mutual understanding between people, communities, and nations'
(ibid., p. 609); `parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest
and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind
as a whole' (UNESCO, 1972); `intangible cultural heritage [is] a mainspring of
cultural diversity and a guarantee of sustainable development', and is `invaluable...
as a factor in bringing human beings closer together and ensuring exchange and
understanding among them' (UNESCO, 2003). Accordingly, `deterioration or
disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful
impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world' (UNESCO, 1972).
With all this eulogistic effusion for the capacity of heritage to bring human beings
`closer together' in `mutual understanding', one could be forgiven for wondering how
it can be that there are still ethical controversies to write about. Nevertheless, the
previous two chapters have noted profound differences in both practical judgment
and conceptual understanding of cultural heritage.
If a litany of ways in which heritage benefits humans has not calmed all storms,
what then can a moral philosopher hope to offer; and what will be my criteria
for success or failure? You will recall from Chapter 1 that I propose to defend a
conception of heritage not primarily as a source of benefit to human beings but as
itself a moral patient, and thereby to offer a framework (see p. 20) for thinking
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about what our moral obligations are towards cultural heritage, and what it means
for things to go well or badly for it. Since my intention is to develop a framework
which will require supplementary theorising before any casuistical conclusions can
be drawn in any given case, I do face the question of how to tell whether the
framework actually works. In Chapter 16 I shall sketch out some possible scenarios
given plausible-looking assumptions about the sort of supplementary principles that
might be employed; but this will demonstrate (1) that what I propose can give rise
to action-guiding results, and (2) that these are not obviously misconceived, i.e.
they collectively possess cogency. Whether these prescriptions are right or not will
remain open to challenge.
The problem of how to tell when a theory's prescriptions get it right (or, perhaps
more problematically, wrong) is of course a standard one for moral philosophy.
Intuitions have their defenders as a court of moral appeal (and their critics, e.g.
John Cottingham (2009, p. 243) on the risk that intuitionism robs moral reflection
of any truly transformative potential), but I rather take it that there is no shakier
ground for intuitionistic thinking than that which occupies the borderlands between
cultures, as so many debates over cultural heritage do. (See also Chapter 12 on
the difficulties of cross-cultural moral epistemology.) Neither does extrapolation
from `easy' cases seem promising as a method; it is unclear that where heritage
is concerned there are any thoroughly non-trivial cases of settled consensus from
which to argue by analogy, and indeed the cases that come to the attention of moral
theorists are bound to be the `hard' ones on which no general consensus has been
forthcoming at all.
For me the difficulty is compounded by the fact that what I am trying to put
together is (and for reasons of time and space must be) less than a complete
normative system: formal cogency (what one might style an `internal' success
criterion) will not confirm that I am moving in a productive direction. I noted earlier
that the present work on its own is not intended to be a complete philosophical kit
for arriving at casuistical conclusions about moral problems concerning heritage; but
in the absence of a definitively chosen collection of the other parts of such a kit, I
risk ending up with the perhaps unsatisfying conclusion that mine is a grand project
only partway to completion when this thesis is done, and that only in a future in
which I possess the complete kit will I be able to prove the proverbial pudding and
say with certainty whether my framework is `externally' successful, i.e. whether it
is helpful in solving moral problems.
Let me try a different tack. Whom am I trying to convince? Is it someone (let us
imagine) who does not already possess some sense of cultural heritage as a repository
of worth, and therefore as morally salient? Someone who (prior to receiving the
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enlightening ministrations of philosophy) sees nothing in culture(s) but means to
his present ends? Imagine a complete and utter philistine: a being who perceives
in culture (in all the diverse senses of the word) absolutely nothing of any value
that is not merely functional value as a means to obtain whatever such a being may
be assumed to want. Not merely an entity who disregards `high' culture in favour
of binge-drinking culture, say, but one for whom all forms of human communion
and creativity are of no more than pragmatic interest. I confess myself inclined to
doubt whether such a being could exist in human society; or, if indeed anyone could
live with such a minimal sensibility, whether philosophers of psychiatry might not be
better placed to understand him. Perhaps the complete and utter philistine inhabits
the same regions of thought as the complete amoralist who denies that moral claims
have any hold on him, or even the philosophical zombie. It may be possible to make
the c.a.u.p. slightly less of an unattractive and two-dimensional prop if we imagine
him to be still receptive to natural wonder, some combination of feral child and
Rousseauesque `natural man' for whom the mediations of Wordsworth are simply a
useless encumbrance when looking at daffodils; but to imagine this being divorced
from all appreciation for `culture' in its wider senses, as well as from `civilisation',1
would nevertheless require us to imagine an unsettlingly alien sensibility towards
all human concourse: a kind of psychopathy for the arts, for language, for human
artifice at large.
Is the c.a.u.p. the limiting case whom I should be seeking to (imagine that I)
persuade? It is not clear that the challenge need be so strong. The figure of the
amoralist casts a shadow over moral philosophy precisely because the authority
of ethics is not transparently obvious (Williams, 1985, p. 25) and because the
attractions of immorality are easily catalogued:
Suppose now that there were two... magic rings [sc. conferring
invisibility], and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other;
no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would
stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his
own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go
into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from
prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men...
For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable
to the individual than justice... If you could imagine any one obtaining
this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching
what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most
1I do not necessarily mean the words to be taken in the senses given by Johann Gottfried
Herder to Kultur and Zivilisation.
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wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces,
and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too
might suffer injustice. (Plato, 1888, pp. 39-40)
Perhaps the praises sung to cultural heritage which I quoted earlier owe something
to the attitudes of these `lookers-on', inasmuch as diplomacy such as that practised at
the United Nations is never far from self-interest; but it is doubtful in the extreme
that a disinclination to care for cultural heritage typically carries an attraction
comparable to theft. There is simply no systematic profit in it. There are profits
to be had in certain specific cases, and here we certainly do encounter, for example,
the illegal looting discussed in 2.1. A subtler profit motive is in play when people
neglect (to employ an admittedly loaded term) their ancestral languages in favour of
more widely spoken tongues that might more easily gain them employment. What
we nowhere see, however, is a systematic and comprehensive disregard for culture
and cultural heritage in all possible respects. The closest we might come would
be those cases where one cultural group has attempted to destroy the culture of
another by forcefully imposing its own: the imperial Japanese occupation of Korea,
for example, or former Australian governments' abduction of Aboriginal children.
Certainly these demonstrate that it is disturbingly possible to bear ill will towards
a whole culture, which is something even stronger than a disregard for it; but we
are still some way from an encounter with the complete and utter philistine. If the
c.a.u.p. is such an unlikely threat, then, need we, even we philosophers, be troubled
by the thought of him?
It is not obvious what a justification of the ethical life should try to
do, or why we should need such a thing. We should ask a pretended
justification three questions: To whom is it addressed? From where?
Against what? Against what, first of all, since we must ask what is
being proposed as an alternative to the ethical life. It is important that
there are alternatives to it. `The amoralist' is the name of somebody.
(Williams, 1985, p. 23)
Applying Bernard Williams' three questions to the more specific case of the ethics
of cultural heritage, and having cast some doubt already on the possibility of a
being living a recognisably human life who presently sees only functional value in
culture, how might we answer the other two questions? My work is not, of course, in
practice addressed to a c.a.u.p.; it is most immediately addressed to my examiners,
and more widely to philosophers at large and to anyone interested or embroiled
in moral problems concerning heritage. Cuno and Renfrew, for example, evidently
see enough value in antiquities to disagree passionately about just what aspects of
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them are truly valuable: Cuno finds a plurality of values where for Renfrew the
informational value of a contextualised archæological artefact is what matters, but
we can hardly call either of them a philistine. Neither sees cultural items simply as
means to his own or his party's own satisfaction; and neither, it seems, sorely needs
to be told that heritage possesses value.
`From where' am I speaking? Presumably I am speaking from the position of
someone already thinking there are ethical questions in need of answering about how
we should act towards cultural heritage (hence not from the position of a c.a.u.p.);
but if I am trying to justify a particular approach to thinking about cultural heritage
in moral terms `from the ground up, what is the ground?' (ibid., p. 28) What can
we take for granted? Presumably that cultural heritage (their own and the world's
at large) is something about which a great many people are immensely concerned,
albeit in a great variety of ways and not always for the same reasons: that human
life, everywhere, takes forms within which culture matters to us, and so its custody
and transmission matter to us too.
Consequently, I need not undertake to produce a rigorous demonstration from first
principles that culture ought to matter to anyone; if ought implies can, then cannot
nullifies ought, and it is reasonable to suppose that culture cannot but matter to us.
Yet it is no less plain that not every aspect of a culture will be felt to be something
that matters by every participant in that culture: not every participant in British
culture cares a whit for trainspotting on Britain's railways, for example. Observing
that culture matters does not permit me to take it as a given that any particular
aspect of culture matters, or ought to matter, to anybody. This is a difficulty faced
both by my attempt to cast cultural heritage as a moral patient and by anyone
preferring a purely anthropocentric approach towards a general view of heritage
ethics: to get from the observation that culture (in general) matters to people to
any prospect of drawing specific ethical advice out of this starting point requires, at
a minimum, an account of how the cultural specifics of, say, British trainspotting
relate to British culture considered as a totality.2
So: to return to this chapter's original questions, what is needed from a framework
such as mine, and how will I know when the needs are met? The problem is not
predominantly one of showing that my approach is more helpful (that is, that it
produces the foundations of clearer or otherwise better moral guidance) than some
alternative: if I can show with reasonable plausibility that cultural heritage is a
moral patient, then that becomes one of the basic data which work on heritage
ethics ought to take into account (or to undertake to refute), and so it counts
as no genuine advantage to some account which limits itself to considering only
2On the relations of constituents of cultures to cultural wholes, see Chapter 5.
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human patiency if it should lead to clearer or more intuitively correct or otherwise
more palatable guidance, since this would come at the cost of overlooking the actual
moral standing of our topic, cultural heritage. A revised answer to one of Williams's
questions would therefore be: there is an alternative to what I am peddling, namely
an anthropocentrism which assumes that all the moral patients an ethics of cultural
heritage need take into account are human beings (and hence that whatever value
cultural heritage may possess boils down to human interests), but if I am correct
then its prescriptions will simply be grounded in mistakenly narrow assumptions.
All the same, it is of course not sufficient just to contend that heritage is a moral
patient and leave it at that, since it is clearly one of a somewhat different sort
from human moral patients. I should have created something very ragged-ended
if I were simply to announce that the patiency of heritage must perforce be taken
into account, but to drop the requirement into other philosophers' laps without
giving them some reason to expect that the framework will deliver practical efficacy.
What is needed from me, in substantial part, is therefore an exploration of cultural
heritage which helps to show how it could fit as a moral patient into the sort of ethical
landscape suggested by Chapters 2 and 3. The `fit' may well be as sketchy as the
landscape, since it is obviously not my intention to suggest that thinking of heritage
in this way is without implications for the moral prescriptions we expect a framework
for heritage ethics to help to generate. Consequently I do not anticipate some kind
of seamless fit that changes nothing. What is needed is more an elaboration of the
moral status of cultural heritage by means of which we can start to make sense of
the very possibility of taking heritage into casuistical account when we are trying
to address particular ethical questions concerning it.
What counts as success for an elaboration? Given how many assumptions must
be involved in even the most intentionally minimal of frameworks (see p. 20),
there is already worryingly little to prevent my simply tweaking the parameters
into whatever constraints I might desire. If I conscientiously manage to impose
constraints that guard against that possibility, might the result not be that we end
up with either results which are too rigid and artificial to reflect the complexities
of the real world (and not much of an elaboration after all, perhaps), or results
too vague to be of any evaluative use? Including examples of how the framework
might operate in practice (in Chapter 16) will be of some help in demonstrating its
practical efficacy, but will not prove it to be generally efficacious (and in any case
it will not be a complete and free-standing toolkit). This means that I find myself
having to demonstrate the potential for efficacy: to show that my line of thinking
is promising. But what does `promising' work look like? What systematic methods
exist for determining whether a line of philosophical thought is moving in the right
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direction?
It seems reasonable to suspect that `promising' belongs with `interesting' and
`important' in the category of terms of approbation which are either outright
subjective or most securely applied in retrospect. (At least one philosophical
journal overtly declares itself to have the aim of selecting submissions based on
their estimated long-term significance. I have no idea what method of estimation
is used.) Yet we cannot simply give up hope, since after all, every completed piece
of philosophical work was once an incomplete one whose author had to judge how
best to continue; every well-trodden area of research was once virgin territory which
somebody realised was worth exploring; and every ostensibly completed work of
philosophy is, no doubt, capable of extension or embellishment in some respect,
when somebody realises how it might be made use of. The very fact that we can go
about doing philosophy indicates that we can, however imperfectly, perceive where
the fertile soil is and in which directions one might set about ploughing it.
A happy thought, but imperfectly so given my scepticism about intuitionism on
p. 58. I am reluctant to cross my fingers and simply hope that my readers share
my perceptions of what is philosophically promising. On the other hand, I am also
reluctant to devote yet more space to metaphilosophical reflection. What I shall
perhaps have to do is indicate the parsimonious appeal of a way of thinking about
cultural heritage which at least fleshes out how `heritage' can emerge as a morally
salient idea, and which can still promise to escape fragmentation and serve us as
a general account when we try to apply it to moral reflection about the variety of
domains within which we talk about `cultural heritage'.
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It is probably impossible to come up with an account of cultural heritage which
would satisfy all the various ways in which people have spoken of `culture' and
`heritage'. Simply in asking what kinds of phenomena are to be counted as cultural
heritage, for example, we would arguably have already distanced ourselves from a
view like David Lowenthal's, of heritage as a way of engaging with the past which
complements the practices of the historian but remains strictly distinct from them:
`not an inquiry into the past but a celebration of it' (Lowenthal, 1998, p. x) which,
`no less than history, is essential to knowing and acting' (ibid., p. xv). Then, of
course, there are the 164 different usages of the word `culture' (recall p. 21). We
can find disagreement over usage even within a specific domain of enquiry; as long
ago as 1944, David Bidney observed that some anthropologists
maintain that culture consists of acquired capabilities, habits or customs
and that culture is a quality or attribute of human social behaviour
and has no independent existence of its own. From a philosophical
point of view, this position may be designated as realistic since culture
is regarded as an attribute of actual or real individuals and societies
which exist independent of the observer. Other anthropologists. . . tend
to define culture in terms of `communicable intelligence', `conventional
understandings' or `communicated ideas'. Their implicit presupposition
seems to be that the distinguishing feature of culture is the fact that
it is communicated knowledge. Philosophically, this position may be
described as epistemological idealism, since those who hold it maintain
that culture is to be defined primarily in terms of ideas. (Bidney, 1944,
pp. 30-31)
He went on to note that while the `realists' `hold that culture consists of the body
of material artifacts and non-material customs and ideals', some `idealists' `maintain
that the social heritage is a superorganic stream of ideas and that any particular
culture is an abstraction from the historical complex of ideational traditions' (ibid.,
p. 31). Faced with such a cornucopia of semantic variation, what is a poor moral
philosopher to do? I cannot uncontentiously select any one conception of culture
to depend on, and it would be difficult if not impossible to establish what all
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these different conceptions of `culture' have in common. Still, my project is not
anthropological, or lexicographical; I need to know not so much how to classify
cultural heritage as what place it is fitted for in our moral lives. When we speak,
often so passionately, about cultures and their heritage, what kind of thing is it that
our words evoke?
It is perhaps doubtful that labelling something as somebody's cultural heritage
can be a purely descriptive act. Of course, there must be some descriptive aspect,
since claims about whose heritage some item is invite defence (and attack) by means
of appeal to facts about the world: who descends from whom, where an item was
made, and so on. (The difficulties inherent in pinpointing origins are discussed in
7.2.) So initially it may look as though identifying what counts as a cultural group's
heritage should be a matter of applying the concept of `heritage' with exactitude,
having first arrived at some sort of consensus on how the word should be applied
with the specificity of a term of art. The task of the moral philosopher would then be
to establish what ought to follow from identifications of a cultural item as someone's
heritage: firstly, to work out what prima facie moral demands these identifications
might place on us regarding who (if anyone) should own the item, whether the
owner might permissibly destroy it, and so on; and secondly, to determine how
these prima facie demands might interact with others, such as those implied by
legal ownership. An `ethics of cultural heritage', on this account, would take its
subject matter already as a given.
The complication for the moral philosopher, however, is that ethics must take
account of the first-personal predicament of the moral agent as well as the third-
person viewpoint of the neutral observer; and as agents we not only do things
but make commitments and projects of what we do. An ethics of parenthood,
for example, may well consider `being somebody's parent' not only as a biological
relationship between organisms and as a matter of social expectations, but moreover
as a part of life which someone can commit to doing well. More generally, we speak
not only of being alive but of leading our lives; not only of being ourselves (and
already we think that `to be oneself' is to opt to do something) but of making
something of ourselves. And this business of living is the stuff from and in which
culture emerges: Alasdair MacIntyre, discussing those especially pronounced fusions
of personality and social role which he calls characters, writes that
the culture of Victorian England was partially defined by the characters
of the Public School Headmaster, the Explorer and the Engineer; and
that of Wilhelmine Germany was similarly defined by such characters as
those of the Prussian Officer, the Professor and the Social Democrat.
Characters have one other notable dimension. They are, so to speak,
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the moral representatives of their culture and they are so because of
the way in which moral and metaphysical ideas and theories assume
through them an embodied existence in the social world. Characters are
the masks worn by moral philosophies. (MacIntyre, 1982, p. 28)
Far from having to be sorted out prior to the work of moral philosophy, `culture'
as MacIntyre speaks of it turns out to have moral philosophies already incorporated
into it and made concrete through it; and if we accept that ethics manifests itself
as a part or aspect of culture, then the prospects for sorting out what cultures and
their heritages are before we begin to do any moral thinking suddenly start to look
shaky. Any ethical conclusions I might eventually draw, after all, will not so much
operate on cultures as (should they be remotely influential) be propagated into and
through them.
What then is it exactly that will hopefully receive my conclusions: what is the
nature of the cultural environment with which an ethics of cultural heritage must
be concerned? And what does it mean to belong to, or to be part of, a culture?
`Exorcisms are part of our culture' (John, 2005); `Foie gras is part of our culture,
declare the defiant French' (Ganley, 2005). We sometimes say a practice is `part'
of someone's culture, or that an item is `part' of somebody's cultural heritage, and
perhaps both we and `the defiant French' have in mind something more action-
guiding than a strictly descriptive claimsince presumably we say such things
without meaning to imply that a culture is readily conceived of as a mereological
sum. But what exactly might we mean by it?
If you ask a simple question such as `is toothpaste part of culture?' then
[Johann Gottfried] Herder would say `definitely not, though maybe it
is part of civilisation'. [Matthew] Arnold would also say no, adding,
however, that the toothpaste deployed by Pam Germ in her prize-
winning `Portrait of a Tape-Worm' is part, though perhaps a regrettable
part, of the national culture. The professor of cultural studies will
probably reply `of course toothpaste is part of culture', since after all
toothpaste is a way in which people form and express their social identity
and the decision to use or not to use it is a decision directed towards
others. (Imagine America without toothpaste!) (Scruton, 2005, p. 4)
Even if we posit arguendo the idea (pace e.g. Seyla Benhabib, who regards cultures
as `complex human practices of signification and representation, of organization and
attribution, which are internally riven by conflicting narratives [and] are formed
through complex dialogues with other cultures' (Benhabib, 2002, p. ix)) that cultures
are things of a kind which can have rigid boundaries, we do not seem to speak of
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them as things which are capable of division: what on Earth would half a culture
look like? Cultures may be capable of impoverishment, of a diminution of the sum
total of those things which may be considered to make up their heritage; but while
there are no doubt viable alternative ways of making possible sense of `That's part
of our culture!' as a descriptive statement, such as by drawing on the sense in which
we can identify an item as `part' of a shop's inventory, or on the sense of `part'
which we use when speaking of a mixture of one part cordial to five parts water
(take a glass of liquid, pour out part of it and you're left with less liquid, without
ever having to worry about `half a liquid'), the sort of interpretation we are left
with leaves us some way short of understanding why a defiant cry of `x is part of
our culture!' should qualify as headline material.
Consequently I am inclined to suspect that in practice such a claim typically is
not purely descriptive, but more like a warm reference to someone who has become
a close friend as `quite part of the family now', with all the tones of value-laden
endorsement and human affection that involves. To label an item part of one's
culture accordingly looks like an evaluative act, and typically (though this need not
be so1) it conveys the thought that for the culture to lose the item, as when anything
loses an integral part, would be felt as loss rather than mere lack and would amount
to damage to the integrity of the culture.
5.1. Loss
If we conceive of a culture or cultural heritage as simply an aggregation of practices
or objects, as a kind of inventory (which arguably is implicit in the label `cultural
property'), then we may find ourselves doubting whether cultures can ever suffer
loss of items other than in the routine sense in which property can be lost. Yet this
routine sense does not exhaust the ways in which the possession of cultural items
can be a salient matter for us: Young writes, for example, that
Stonehenge is what is sometimes called the `mana' of the English. It is
part and parcel of who the English are as a culture and they ought to have
it. Its sale to an American businessman, and relocation to Druidworld
in Southern California, would have been scandalously wrong. (Young,
2007, p. 121)
1I remark on the possibility that some aspects of a culture may be morally unpalatable
and best abandoned in Chapter 11.
68
5.1. Loss
If this `mana' has anything to do with common-or-garden property and its potential
for loss, its possessor seems more closely to resemble the sentimentally valuable
family heirloom2 than whatever other items a person may happen to own.
If we are properly to understand what it is to be part of someone's culture, then,
we may take it that a successful account will pay heed to this potential for loss of a
`scandalously wrong' variety. But what exactly does it mean for a culture to suffer
loss? There is of course a perfectly routine sense in which a cultural item can drop
out of existence: the world's culture has suffered the loss of most of the plays of
Sophocles, for example, in the straightforward sense that none of us has them or
has access to them, because no known copies exist anymore. Practices, similarly,
can die out when people cease to participate in them. What we must note, however,
is that these lost plays do play a cultural role for us: not the roles they could if
they survived, to be sure, but a role which enables us to think of them precisely
as objects of cultural loss. The things themselves are gone, but as cultural items
they seem to enjoy a kind of subsistence: they retain their associations with other
cultural items, and can even acquire new ones, such as the link I just created to the
lost Sophoclean plays by employing them as an example.
If we take `x is a part of culture c' to mean something like `x plays a role in culture
c', then it turns out to be entirely possible to be part of a culture without actually
existing in the world. Other things play cultural roles by possibly still existing: the
legends surrounding the post-Biblical fate of the Ark of the Covenant, for example,
gained one fairly concrete instantiation in our cultural life with the production of
Raiders of the Lost Ark, while in the real world Ark-hunters have followed possible
leads indicating a resting place in Ethiopia (Raffaele, 2007) or Zimbabwe (van Biema,
2008). The religious importance of the Ark assures its cultural significance; the
absence of the physical object affects the role it plays for us, making it a mysterious
thing of ancient worshipful repute rather than another artefact available for museum
display and examination, but in a very real sense the absent Ark does play a role
in our culture. The Holy Grail, meanwhile, inspired a large portion of Arthurian
literature, and entered cinematic culture through both Indiana Jones and Monty
Python; the crown jewels King John is supposed to have lost in the Wash are the
stuff of national legend; and so on.
2It need not follow that we can always pinpoint exactly which items are at stake; we
can regard as a cultural loss the destruction by fire of roughly 500,000 volumes in the
Bucharest University Library during the revolution of December 1989 (Raven, 2004,
p. 5) without having at hand a list of precisely what books were lost. Some of them
might indeed be replaceable, non-unique tokens (copies) of a given type (edition); but
in such a case as this, it is not only certain individual volumes which are lost but the
painstakingly accumulated collection and the institutional memory it embodies. To
replace a substantial library collection from its catalogue is no trivial task.
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All of these, of course, are nonetheless quite definitely `lost' in the bluntest of
senses. Other items may be said to have been lost in the sense that they have been
expropriated, but here, too, they can continue to play a cultural role; it is precisely
because he claims that the Rosetta Stone is an `icon of... Egyptian identity' (quoted
in Milmo, 2009) that Zahi Hawass has previously demanded its repatriation to Egypt
from the British Museum. This is not a question of the Stone's survival, or to a large
extent of access (since it can be viewed by any Egyptian able to travel to London),
but of possession. But possession of what? Not merely of the Stone qua stone,
but of a particular item of importance in the history of Egyptology: the Stone qua
cultural item (and, according to Hawass, qua icon). Yet it is precisely the Stone qua
stone that is clearly in the possession of the British Museum; whereas it is not at
all clear that the Stone qua cultural item is altogether in its grasp.
I have already noted that the persistence conditions of a cultural item do not
seem to be limited to those of the actual thing with which we should ordinarily
take the cultural item to be identical. The persistence of a cultural item as such
depends on memory; this is most obvious in the case of events, which, having passed,
play their cultural roles purely through the recollection that they once occurred.
(Strictly speaking, it is perhaps an act of convenient reification to speak of them as
`cultural items', but for our purposes as moral philosophers it does appear reasonable
to speak of one or another more-or-less distinct event and of its roles within the
recollections of a culture.) Another thing which is made plain by abstract cultural
items (remembered events, artistic styles, and so on) is that cultural items need not
necessarily have any definite location; and while concrete objects clearly do for as
long as they persist, when we consider them as cultural phenomena, embedded into
one culture or another by virtue of the roles they play within this culture at large,
what we have in mind is precisely a sphere of influence exerted beyond the objects'
physical bounds. It is trivially true, of course, that the Rosetta Stone is extended
in space, composed of granite, and located within a certain building in London; but
we need hardly say the same thing about the iconicity of the Stone in which Hawass
is interested. The Stone is iconic precisely because its image is so widely recognised:
the Stone in this sense is everywhere.
It is nevertheless the case, of course, that people go in droves to see the physical
stone directly; evidently its omnipresence as an icon in no way eclipses the object
itself. Something is understood to be important about actual places and actual
things; and an encounter with this something, whatever it is, is removed as a
possibility when an object is `lost' in any way, in spite of the persistence of the
object's cultural presence. Without the object itself, we have a kind of echo, with
a reduced productive potential: we can have various thoughts about the ancient
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comedyMargites, not least the thought that it's a great pity we know it only through
fragments, but we cannot even arrange a performance of the work, let alone (for
example) adapt it for cinema.
Practices, too, can cease to be living possibilities even as they are remembered:
I can make a donation to a church, but I cannot genuinely pay tithes to it.
Burke A. Hendrix observes that a cultural group, in seeking or being encouraged
to maintain its practices, may nevertheless appear to lose `authenticity' (though
in his judgment this notion of `authenticity' is in fact `problematic' (Hendrix,
2008, p. 181)); he gives the example of the Pintupi people of Australia, whom the
Australian government recognises as a distinct and semi-autonomous group. Among
the concrete manifestations of this recognition is the gift by the government of four-
wheel drive Toyotas to Pintupi men founding outstation communities (ibid., p. 190).
`Are the Pintupi still authentically different,' Hendrix asks, `if state laws help to
keep them that way?' (ibid., p. 190)
The idea seems to be this: political, legal and other circumstances may make
it advantageous for a group for its culture to appear to have, and hence actually
to take, a form which is held together through these external nudges as well as
(or even instead of) through the persistence of any inner cultural life. When, for
example, a regime which aims to help indigenous peoples, and consequently rewards
the persistence of outward signs of traditional, indigenous distinctiveness, props up
cultural forms or community boundaries which might otherwise have passed into
history or developed differently, an examination of minority cultures existing as
legally protected bubbles may begin to feel like a tour of Barn County. In effect,
the culture itself becomes a sort of socio-legal theme park, whereupon it becomes
questionable whether it is actually deserving of special preservation anymore.3
Nothing has unambiguously been lost in such a scenario (and the Pintupi have
gained some benefits), but the introduction of new incentives from outside portends
an alteration in the reasons for which people act. The customary practices of a
culture may be apparently unchanged (indeed, they may in effect be fossilised),
but the rationales which formerly supported them will have undergone some degree
of replacement. From one point of view, therefore, a practice may be continuously
part of a culture, while from another (if we think that the same practice is persisting
at all), it may effectively become moribund and lose its `authentic' reality, leaving
behind another kind of echo. In asking what it is to be part of a culture, it seems
we must attend not only to practices themselves but (again) to the roles they play
within a culture as a whole.
3Of course, there is a danger that excessive concern for `authenticity' might also have
perverse results; one must be careful to avoid acting like a romanticising tourist in
pursuit of the raw, authentically indigenous experience.
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This is not to say that the `parts' of cultures are cemented together into wholes
entirely by reasons or roles; I said earlier that `That's part of our culture!' seems
to me to be as much endorsement as description, akin to being called `part of the
family'. Just as a loss experienced by a family is in no way a matter simply of
biological and socially recognised associations, the loss of a culturally important
artefact or social practice is not simply a matter of lost potential for role-playing to
which we react affectively as emotion springs suddenly forth; rather, the social role
played by the artefact or practice is already loaded with affective salience for those
involved in the culture. As for `cultural property'the law recognises the family
dog as `property', but that fact is of little relevance when the dog is lost, and in no
way precludes the dog's also and more significantly being `part of the family'.
If any literalistic analysis of cultural parthood is indeed partly mistaken in
something like the way in which it misses the point to point out that man and
wife do not literally `become one flesh', has it got me any closer to understanding
what these things called cultures are to enquire what their `parts' are and how
these may be lost? (Or should I just sidle quietly away from the half-unwoven
rainbow and wander off home, bearing a renewed suspicion about surface language?)
Certainly I am barely closer to a totalising theory of culture, but I never intended
to produce one, or even much of a demystification. What has come to the fore,
I think, is the sheer difficulty of drawing any but a fuzzily definitive boundary
around a cultural item: the very act of pointing out a piece of `cultural heritage'
to which some moral status or significance might be ascribed turns out to be far
from a straightforward matter, precisely because of the associations with a culture
at large which enable an item to be `cultural'. Since the exact roles which an item
plays within a culture may be obscure and mutable, it may consequently prove
difficult to say precisely where the cultural item as such begins and ends. In part, of
course, this follows from the myriad ways (themselves developed in culturally specific
circumstances and possessed of histories of their own) in which humans have learnt
to put items into categories; I discuss this further in Chapter 10. Shakespeare's The
Tempest ; D'Avenant and Dryden's derivative play The Tempest, or, The Enchanted
Island ; Peter Greenaway's cinematic adaptation Prospero's Books; `Shakespeare's
problem plays '; `Elizabethan and Jabobean theatre'; `English literature': all of
these overlapping and interrelated things can be regarded as cultural items,4 and
4It is trickier to say whether principles of transitivity apply. It may be, for example,
that a Titian painting is part of Renaissance art; Renaissance art is part of our culture;
therefore a Titian painting is part of our culture. But of course I immediately face the
objection that here I am simply using the word `part' in two different senses: if being
part of Renaissance art were qualitatively similar to being part of a culture, the question
of what it is to be part of a culture would, we may suspect, not have occupied me for so
long to begin with.
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consequently none of them in isolation can be altogether adequately understood as
such.
One further upshot is that there is limited scope for attempting any wholly
ahistorical treatment of culture, as though, whatever being part of a culture meant,
it had to depend purely on the formal properties of cultures, and not at all on how
something might become part of a culture. Items insinuate themselves into our ways
of life and thereby spread ripples beyond their immediate presence; and the network
(to mix metaphors in anticipation of 9.3) which results from this acquires a shape
which is not determined by any one of its nodes. We can speak meaningfully (though
loosely) of `Internet culture', for example. Web sites are constantly coming online
and going oine, and in the face of these changes to the Web and the other parts
of the Internet it remains entirely possible to refer to Internet culture as though to
an undivided whole. What then might make a Web site part of Internet culture?
Consider the quotation database at bash.org, which collects excerpts of conversations
using `chat' and `messaging' software protocols which range from the humorous to
the plain obscene (more of the latter, admittedly). An explanation of why it might
seem natural and reasonable to call bash.org `part of Internet culture' might have
proceeded by noting that this website is part of the Internet (on the grounds that it
is accessed through a public-facing Web server, is identified by a domain name, &c.)
and that it collects and archives snippets from (among other protocols) Internet
Relay Chat, so that its content comes from discourse elsewhere on the Internet.
One might additionally note the existence of occasional references to the quotation
database elsewhere on the Internet. The role of the quotation database in Internet
culture has not, however, been simply a matter of the formal relations it exhibits
with other parts of the Internet. Rather, the existence of the quotation database has
given online chat discourse generally the potential to end up in the public database:
the site's role in `Internet culture' is grounded in what it portends for people who
might find their (often unintentionally) humorous comments preserved on bash.org
and in consequence readily available for reference by other people elsewhere. Here
we see a history of growth and entanglement with the Internet at large which is
obscured if we attempt to take a snapshot of Internet culture today and ask what
might make a Web site a part of it.
5.2. Other Kinds of Cultural Item
Perhaps it is because cultures are so inescapably part of our lives (to employ possibly
yet another sense of `part') that we find ourselves so readily reifying them with
our language. (Indeed, according to the anthropological theorist Ruth Benedict,
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`cultures... have a distinctive essence because key values are learned by individuals
as members5 of particular cultures' (Moore, 1996, p. 63); though perhaps we ought
to avoid reading `essence' in the light of its fullest metaphysical connotations.) One
has to wonder whether there is anything that is not part of some culture. If being
part of a culture involves playing a role within it, am I part of a culture? Admittedly,
when I try to bring to mind particular persons whom we might wish to say were
partly constitutive of British culture, I find myself coming up with people whose
`cultural' credentials seem defined by their public roles: the Queen qua Sovereign;
Churchill qua wartime Prime Minister; Shakespeare qua playwright; Morecambe
and Wise qua performers; and so on. These people  like artefacts, practices and
so forth  seem `cultural' by virtue of the prominent roles they play for others,
rather than on account of qualifying for a place in British culture simply through
participating in it in the sense that Britons generally might be thought toBritish
culture being shared amongst the population at large, including the altogether less
famous majority of us.
Yet on the other hand, the place of Morecambe and Wise in our culture is
clearly bound up with their particular personalities and accomplishments in a way
that cannot be reduced to the role of `comedian': nobody would say that another
professional comedy duo was interchangeable with Eric and Ernie. Your or my own
particular personalities and accomplishments may be more narrowly broadcast, but
we have them and they serve to bind us into our cultural networks through the
ways in which we interact with other people who share in those cultures. Our local
and everyday actions make up the aggregate demographic trends of which we take
note when we recall how Hume's Treatise `fell dead-born from the press' as most of
the world ignored it, and how Goethe's The Sorrows of Young Werther was received
with a `Werther fashion..., a Werther fever, a Werther epidemic, a longing for suicide'
(Unseld, 1996, p. 21). We look, in short, very much like cultural items.
Yet if the category of `cultural items' breaks the common-or-garden bounds of
`cultural heritage' or `cultural property' so that it is unclear what (or even whom) it
does not encompass, where does that leave any effort to talk about ethics concerning
cultural heritage? Of course there is a minimal sense in which everything (or rather,
everything knowable) is cultural, in that the conceptual apparatus by means of
which we can have any knowledge of things consists of hand-me-downs which have
developed within certain cultural milieux. (I commit myself to no relativism here: we
can speak perfectly well of scientific cultures or mathematicians' culture without any
such implications.) There may consequently be a minimal sense in which everything
5Recall that I prefer to say that cultural groups have members, but some writers are happy
to speak of the members of cultures.
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is cultural heritage (at least, insofar as we know about it); but this observation
threatens to dilute rather than to heighten our grasp of what exactly we have in
mind when we speak of `the heritage industry', or of `the culture sector', or indeed
of an ethics of cultural heritage. Suppose that persons can be heritage; it seems
unlikely, all the same, that we shall soon see Her Majesty's Government imposing
an export ban on Alan Bennett, even though
[h]e is, according to the papers, a national treasure. Also a `national
teddy bear' (Francis Wheen), `prose laureate' (David Thomson), `cur-
mudgeon laureate' (Mark Jones), and Oracle of Little England (Matthew
Norman). (Edemariam, 2004)
At least human beings share with artefacts the property of having an identifiable
physical location. There are more abstract things which we may wish to call parts of
cultures, and some of them carry the additional complication for moral philosophy
that they are in some respect normative.
Entering the search term `cultural norm' into Google Scholar reveals it to be in
widespread use,6 although I have experienced difficulties in locating a definition.
In recent years there has been some political commentary on `British values', which
were even considered as a topic for the school syllabus (B.B.C., 2006). More recently
still, the Abbot of Worth has stated in opposition to Disney that `[w]here once
morality and meaning were available as part of our free cultural inheritance, now
corporations sell them to us as products' (quoted in Wynne-Jones, 2008). Can such
things  norms, values, moralities themselves  be considered parts of (a) culture?
It is certainly easy enough to think of rules and standards which we might
associate with particular cultural backgrounds: bodies of laws; parliamentary rules;
manners and etiquette (and British queueing practices); linguistic conventions and
local variations on them; and so on. All these are parochially constructed rules,
rather than universal `laws of logic'; moreover, they developed gradually through
co-operative processes, rather than being products of individual genius.
Often there are epistemic headaches to take into account, not least when we try
to distinguish between a norm and an implementation or interpretation of a norm.
It is probably correct to say that our culture includes rules themselves: that it is
not only true as a matter of empirical fact that on British roads people drive on
the left, but moreover it is the case that on British roads one follows the rule of
driving on the left. Yet things begin to look awkward once one recalls that statutes
require interpretation, languages require analysis for their grammatical structure to
be discovered, and so on. (Is it a rule of Western storytelling that at the end of
6http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=cultural+norm&hl=en&btnG=Search&as_sdt=2001
(retrieved 2nd August 2010) produced about 1,030,000 results.
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modern fairy tales `they all lived happily ever after'? A convention? A cliché?)
We face not only an epistemological problem  how do we establish just what the
rules are in any given domain of regulation (by applying higher-level rules?), and
can we confidently identify them as parts of a culture if they persistently resist our
certain knowledge?  but also a difficulty in identifying where there are determinate
rules in play at all. This, however, is not a particular difficulty I propose to explore
further (the Wittgensteinian tradition alone having produced a considerable volume
of analysis of what exactly it might mean to follow a rule), although some of my
general comments on epistemic matters in Chapter 12 will be of relevance.
Assume then that we are able to get some reasonable purchase on what norms
are active within a culture. Take such rules governing general behaviour  morals,7
manners and so on  as we might expect to be widely internalised, expounded
and upheld against deviants. Such things possess an ostensibly public character,
frequently made manifest through outright vocalisation: `Thou shalt not kill', to
take a famous and culturally loaded example of a verbal rule intended to govern
moral conduct. As for etiquette, entire books are available for those needing to
know the proper way to open a letter to the widow of the second son of a duke;
and few things are more notoriously culturally specific than etiquette. If anything
is part of a culture, these things look like promising candidates; but often it is at
most in the latter case, that of a rule of etiquette, that the content of the rule stays
comfortably within the bounds of the culture of which the rule is ostensibly a part.
`Thou shalt not kill' may originally have been understood to be part of a specifically
Judaic covenant, but Christianity, as a missionary religion, ascribes to it a universal
significance: its content, therefore, is supposed to apply outside Christendom. This
has the upshot that for us to regard it as `part of Judæo-Christian culture', as though
it were as unassumingly parochial a thing as a letter-writing convention, looks rather
strikingly at odds with the import attributed by believers to the commandment
itself. We can adopt such a stance, for even someone who regrets the existence
of any non-Christian cultures will accept that in fact there are some; but simply
and without qualification to call such a commandment a part of Christian culture,
as though it were some colourful local custom or item of regional cuisine, fails to
acknowledge its universally normative import.
Once again, I find myself minded to draw the inference that the cultural items
under examination cannot be strictly identified with their manifestations: that there
is an Alan Bennettish nexus within British national culture, and that there is a vivid
Decalogical tinge to the colour of Christian culture, but that in pointing to these
7By `morals' in this context I mean those things which are taken to be morally correct in
a given culture, which are not necessarily identical with what is morally correct (given
the assumption that cultural relativism in ethics is false).
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we are reminding ourselves of what each portends for the form and development
of its culture as a whole, and only indirectly to the actual Mr. Bennett or to a
certain normative injunction. After all, while we cannot predict with certainty that
Alan Bennett will be made immortal by his work, we can be confident that it,
and consequently his cultural stature, will not be snuffed out when his life ends;
and meanwhile `Thou shalt not kill' comes as part of a pack of ten to begin with,
and enjoys further and wider resonances with other parts of biblical exegesis and
Christian practice.
The upshot for ethics of all this is that it becomes difficult to talk, except in the
interests of convenience, about the cultural significance or value of a thing when the
role which the thing in question plays within a culture is so vaguely and expansively
bounded. This is not to say that there is no sense to be made of questions about
what should be done with, for example, the Elgin Marbles. It is to say that we
cannot escape the need for a holistic approach to cultural heritage which considers
the value of a given cultural item to be derivative of what value we can ascribe to
the wider cultural milieux and trends and genres in which it participates. I shall
expand on this theme in Chapter 9; but in the meantime I want to address a few
brief points concerning how it is, if we are to conduct our moral philosophy in light
of a strongly holistic and contextual conception of what it is to be part of a culture,
that we find ourselves able to disentangle and distinguish between different cultures
at all, let alone discover any semblance of persistent identity in them as they mutate
and blend and divide over the course of time.
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One sometimes hears politicians, businessmen and others speak of the creation of a
culture as an objective. What I think they have in mind in practice is something less
grandiose: the alteration of some aspect of organisational, local or national culture
by way of the endorsement of certain standards of behaviour, rather than the actual
creation of a culture outright or even of a subculture contained within an existing
one. Yet the language is telling nonetheless: culture emerges as a malleable thing in
the service of administrative ends and policy aims, rather than as an environment
within which living some human sort of life becomes possible. Here is a vision of
`culture' which has little to do with the inheritance of conceptual resources and their
concomitant conceptual horizons, or with our profoundest sense of who we are and
what shared identity envelops us: a culture, under this conception, is almost a sort
of bureaucratic project, a thing which can be brought into being (and, presumably,
dismissed from it again) through an act of organisational willpower.
RCN general secretary Peter Carter said: `It is up to child protection
services to create a culture where it is acceptable for staff to express their
concerns and reservations if they suspect a child is at risk...' (Ford, 2008)
Though the amount of the awards are not so impressive (top prize is
$500), the ministry still hopes to inspire young Christians to take up the
pen and promote the Christian worldview through fiction and create a
culture of quality writing reflecting that worldview. (Chan, 2008)
The handbook, Promoting Transformative Innovation in Schools, aims
to support education practitioners to create a `culture of innovation' in
schools by detailing resources designed to help teachers to be innovative,
both in and out of the classroom. (Education Executive, 2008)
The people behind these statements clearly think that at least some things which
can be brought under the word `culture' are such that we can have fairly definite
and considerable causal influence over the shape they take, and know when we have
accomplished our aims in constructing them. Yet even if we are indeed dealing with
a different and a narrower sense of the term `culture' than is employed elsewhere in
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this document (almost a given, given the difficulties in defining the word; see p. 21),
questions nevertheless are already lined up to beset the creator of such a `culture'
which threaten ourselves to at least as great a degree. What could it mean to say
that a distinct culture has been brought into being? What distinguishes a `culture of
innovation' from mere circumstances in which innovation is found to occur? What
distinguishes one culture of innovation from another one? What links a culture of
innovation found at t1 with a subsequent culture of innovation at t2?
These are not questions, in light of the very difficulty of agreeing upon a definition
of culture in the first place, to which I shall be furnishing ready-made and all-
purpose answers, even to assist those people for whom it can seem that `culture'
means something like `working environment'. My comparatively modest objective
in this chapter and the next is to continue with the emphasis on a holistic and
contextual approach which was partly established in the last one, and to ask whether
and to what extent it leaves us able even to speak of distinct cultures existing,
at present or across spans of time. Suppose we allow the principle, defended in
the previous chapter, that qua cultural item the Rosetta Stone exists not only in
the British Museum but wherever it is acclaimed, discussed and otherwise held
significant. What effective scope is left for drawing cultural boundaries, if the Stone
can be so held not only in Britain or France or Egypt but moreover in Vietnam or
The Gambia? Only flimsy epistemic limitations on how many things can be widely
known would seem to prevent everything from ending up as part of the culture
of the world at large; and while it is not immediately obvious that this should be
an unacceptable conclusion, the very fact that we do routinely speak of different
cultures should be sufficient to make us pause and draw breath.
Our position remains insecure when we contrast, for example, the culture of 16th
Century and 20th Century England. Are we to consider these as two distinct cultures
(for there are certainly differences between them), or as two phases of a roughly
continuous `English culture'? It is not even clear to what extent the term `English'
has a historically continuous meaning, given that the England of the 20th Century
had become formally part of the United Kingdom, geographically much the same
but politically rather different. Nebulous as they are, and capable of spawning
offshoots and absorbing foreign influences, cultures compound the usual problems
of identity through change because of their unsuitability for obvious metaphysical
characterisation. What could we call the essential characteristics of English culture?
Even the link to a presently existing England is inessential; if England should sink
into the sea in some seismic cataclysm, we should hardly have warrant to infer that
her survivors had undergone an instantaneous change of cultural identity. If the
survivors were scattered in small groups all over the Earth, and formed separate
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communities of which each developed its inherited `English' culture in markedly
different directions, none of them (after some time) looking closely similar to English
culture as we know it presently, then at length we should probably find ourselves
inclined to deny that English culture survived as a living phenomenon; but while
cultural groups persisted that looked recognisably English in their ways of life, even
if they did so in markedly different ways (we can imagine, perhaps, the Old Etonian
exiles, the Mummerset exiles, and so on, with the appropriate cultural stereotyping),
then we should not be in an obviously strong position to question their Englishness.1
Presumably it is necessary that England should have existed  for one could hardly
pretend that `English' culture is only accidentally associated with the geography
and history of England, and might conceivably, if impractically, have been otherwise
instantiated in some other place and under different conditions  but this observation
is of limited use: many different cultural phenomena can emerge (and many indeed
have emerged) in such a place as England, and we are concerned not with all the
English cultures that could have existed in alternative possible histories, but with
English culture as it has in fact come down to us.
This is the tricky double aspect of such a phenomenon as `English culture': it is
contingently English, in that if the English tend to like X and the French typically
prefer not-X then we call these respective traits of English and French culture just
as surely as we should say the reverse if the English favoured not-X and the French
X. Yet at the same time `English' is in no way a purely geographical expression,
and the culture of England can only with the utmost artificiality be abstracted
from the settings in which it emerged and to which it has responded. (What
`English culture' would we be talking about if we tried to ignore any mention in
its literature, history, folklore and so on of the actual geographical setting we call
England? Taking the case of songs alone, off the top of my head I can bring to
mind bluebirds over the White Cliffs of Dover, ferrying 'cross the Mersey and Mike
Harding's complaint that `It's hard being a cowboy in Rochdale'.) Should we then
seek to distinguish cultures not in essentialist but in historical terms? If we do then
we shall find ourselves grappling with the complexities of history. It may initially
look attractive to draw parallels with memory-based theories of human personal
identity, and to make some form of `cultural memory' a criterion of cultural identity
and its continuity, but while a human individual has one past and one future (except
in split-brain thought experiments and the like), cultures are perhaps more closely
1Unless, perhaps, they were to forget what the origins were that gave them their
characteristics. In his book Forgotten Fatherland, Ben MacIntyre reports that the people
he met in the Paraguayan colony of Nueva Germania, originally founded as a `new
Germany' by Elisabeth Nietzsche and her husband, retained some cultural differences
from their neighbours but had largely forgotten the original ideological basis for them.
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analogous to waterways, with multiple sources or tributaries and, perhaps, multiple
outlets. Which aspects of the past can be remembered as `our own' cultural heritage,
and which are remembered as someone else's? To answer such a question we should
need a prior conception of who `we' are as a cultural group.
What are we to say of the elements which English culture takes from the classical
world of the ancient Greeks and Romans, or those it has seeded in Britain's
former colonies? There are causal, historical links here no less than between the
cultures of 16th and 20th Century England herself; so it seems that either we
allow the bounds of English culture to be drawn at an effectively meaningless level
of indefinitude, or we make the perhaps arbitrary judgment that cultural identity
should be subject to geopolitics, precisely contradicting Mary Midgley's contention
that cultural boundaries cannot be drawn like those of nations (Midgley, 1991, p. 84).
Now, if it is indeed possible for policymakers in some sense to ordain that a culture
of innovation shall be created in schools, then it may be tempting to suspect that
there can be an element of convenient pragmatism in the circumscription of cultures.
Yet if it can mean anything in the first place to speak of the creation of one sort of
culture or another, then the boundaries of that culture must be drawn at least partly
in accordance with some criteria more principled than arbitrary human whim.
This is not, however, a promising juncture at which to delve into the question
of whether culture is a natural kind; and even if it can be, we can hardly suppose
that English or any other particular culture is of such a kind. The development of
any culture clearly depends to a substantial degree on the choices individuals make:
the choice of whether to write poetry or take up crochet; the choice of whether to
publish a book of poems or reject the manuscript; the choice of whether to purchase
such a book; and similarly through other threads of cultural life. A culture is
voluntarily cultivated even in the sense that one can choose to contribute to one's
culture with, for example, an entry into the traditions of English literature. To do
this, of course, one must already believe that one belongs to or is otherwise in a
position to contribute to the culture in question, and herein lies the rub: there is
a voluntary aspect to the definition of a given culture, but the act of volunteering
comes with certain presuppositions about who is and is not qualified to volunteer.
What determines who may or may not volunteer? Why, the candidates' relation to
the culture which we are hoping to see delineated; and so we had better hope that
the circularity is of a virtuous sort.
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For my present concerns, however, the central point of interest is that if we cannot
delineate a culture strictly by reference to features of the environment within which
it exists and came into existence (that is, to features of the natural world and
of what we are already certain are other cultures which differ from the one under
examination2), then at least some of the criteria which we employ must themselves in
fact qualify as features of the culture itself; and indeed, since cultures are inhabited
by thinking human beings it is hardly surprising that a culture should incorporate
resources for its own definition. What does it mean to be English? We can hardly
avoid looking to the various English people who have addressed this question before
us, be it with ardent patriotism or embarrassment or any other attitude; and though
of course it must be grudgingly admitted that other and particularly neighbouring
nations may also have something to say on the matter, the English inevitably are in
a position to possess a certain expertise by default,3 as well as the greatest power
to determine what being English shall mean into the future.
What are the characteristics of these internal features that contribute to the
identity of a culture? If practically anything can be `part of' somebody's culture,
then there is no evident reason to suppose that any of these parts is automatically
excluded from contributing to the delineation of what that culture is. What form
then does the contribution take? When Vergil identifies the Romans as the toga-
wearing race (Æneid I.282), whether we understand him to be straightforwardly
reporting a discovery or received opinion about what it was to be Roman, or whether
we consider his words to play at least a partly stipulative role, what we can say with
historical confidence is that his judgment itself, as part of the Æneid, forms a part
of Roman culture and was propagated into it (and indeed has outlasted the Roman
Empire). In short, it is itself a part of the very culture it seeks to characterise. As a
part of a culture, it accordingly has the features of a cultural item discussed in the
previous chapter: it consists not so much of a judgment in the long-dead Vergil's
mind (and consequent act of poetic writing) that Romans can be identified as the
2One easy case might be the germination of new cultures expressly based on earlier ones.
A member of a philosophical reading group in one town who moves to another where
there is no such group, and undertakes to start one, will model it in large part on that
of which he has been a member, and may very well hope (whether consciously or not)
that the culture of the new group shares characteristics with that of the older. The
express aim, of course, is to found a society rather than a culture, but this is a case
in which a desire to `create a culture' may not appear so very implausible; it is fairly
straightforward that there will be a culture of the new reading group, and that one can
form certain desires about the characteristics which it will exhibit, some of which may
include explicit reference to the cultures of other groups.
3See also Chapter 12 on the epistemic authority of a cultural group.
83
6. The Identity of a Culture
toga-wearers as it does of an indefinitely reduplicated slogan tied to no particular
event or circumstances. If it follows from the indefinite nature of cultural items that
parts of a culture cannot easily be kept within that culture's `boundaries', then it
becomes tricky to say that a certain culture exists to have parts in the first place.
Do we not care merely about whether Vergil was correct or not? We do of course
care about that, which is why it concerns us that such a judgment can have the
character of a self-fulfilling prophecy: it was with a quotation from Vergil that
Augustus decreed that the toga must be worn to the Forum, according to Suetonius
in his Lives of the Twelve Cæsars (Aug. 40.5). In the very act of making such a
judgment Vergil commenced its influence on the subsequent development and self-
reflection of the very culture it was a judgment about.
Perhaps, then, a decision to `create a culture' is not so strange after all; perhaps
our judgments about what defines a given culture  or at least one's judgments
concerning one's own culture, or what one believes to be the identity of one's own
culture  inescapably possess a creative element. We should certainly, I think,
be reluctant to charge people with `getting it wrong' in developing their culture
in whichever ways they desired, although the question of `authenticity' raised by
Hendrix (see p. 71) indicates that we might not feel completely inhibited from so
doing, at least when we come to consider the temporal continuity or discontinuity
of a culture between two points in its history. Maybe the object of concern here is
a thought that somebody's culture, as a form and expression of somebody's identity,
is subject to the demands of somebody's collective autonomy: that the culture of
group x ought, in order to qualify as such, to be really and deliberately endorsed
by group x as its proper way of life, and that there are standards by which such
a judgment may itself be judged. James O. Young, drawing on work by Thomas
Hurka, considers the possibility that a culture might become `distorted' through
outside influence in particular:
[Hurka] is particularly concerned about the danger that small, indigenous
cultures will be overwhelmed by the voices of outsiders. He considers
the case of a white author who writes about a First Nation culture and,
through ignorance, distorts the culture's symbols. `If the white's novel is
read by Natives, they too may understand the symbols inauthentically.
The Native artist then can't speak even to his or her own people.' Native
artists will have lost some of their cultural identity. They and, perhaps,
some of their audience will be partly assimilated into the majority
culture. This strikes Hurka (and me) as objectionable harm. (Young,
2008, pp. 118-9)
At face value this suggestion seems problematic, in that it looks as though
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it implies a kind of essentialism for cultures  those wildly mutable, endlessly
permeable things  as though a culture were a phenomenon with some sort of
natural and normatively `correct' trajectory of development. (How, indeed, might
we distinguish between cases in which symbols simply undergo changes in meaning,
with or without external influence, and cases in which groups become collectively
mistaken about their meaning?) The difficulty is compounded if, as I have just
suggested, in looking for those features of a culture which can be judged to be
definitive of it we find ourselves regarding a collection of cultural items. (Recall
my suggestion in the last chapter that the indefinitude of cultural items rather calls
for a holistic approach to understanding the roles they play.) If the roles of the
parts are to be understood in terms of the whole, where are we to look in order
to judge whether the whole has developed authentically and undistortedly, so as to
have become `actually different [sc. from other cultures] in the right kind of ways'
(Hendrix, 2008, p. 191)?
Hendrix, at at least one point, seems to advance the suggestion that the identity
of the agents originating changes to a culture is of greater significance than the
changes themselves: `Are the identities at stake merely political artifacts, created
by ethnic entrepreneurs seeking wealth and political power, or are they authentic
expressions of an ongoing collective life?' (ibid., p. 181) Yet his conclusion is that `the
real character of groups is generally difficult to recognize, and that authenticity
is a problematic notion even in the abstract' (ibid., p. 181). I am not at all sure
what a cultural identity that was `merely' a political artefact could look like: to
speak of such a thing conjures up images of people utterly duped or bewitched
into believing themselves to be united by a cultural identity, without even so
much wilful endorsement of their self-identification as is required for self-deception;
but for whom is a sense of cultural identity a strictly passive affair? There can,
perhaps, be a reasonable presumption in favour of frank collective self-examination
and historical investigation, whereby we might be able to advance counterfactual
judgments to the effect that if some cultural group had been better informed about
what exactly it had inherited, its members might well have chosen to develop their
culture differently. All the same, counterfactual speculation is risky, and if we do
not rein in this criterion somehow it will lead us to conclude that in fact all human
culture is distorted or inauthentic, on the grounds that our self-knowledge (historical
and otherwise) is always imperfect.
As a moral matter, it may well be that a cultural heritage can in effect be tainted
by the ways in which it is employed in the subsequent development of a culture, such
that we might wish to say that it had been distorted. We might want to say, for
example, that the Nazis' construction of a German race myth actually besmirched
85
6. The Identity of a Culture
German folklore, the history of the Teutonic Knights, and so on, not through making
any retroactive changes to what had happened (which would be impossible), but
through the way in which the Nazis appropriated and distorted historical treatment
of German culture at t1 in forming a mythology for their own unpleasant t2 culture.
(That the Nazis were themselves German  i.e. that these agents were very far from
being cultural outsiders  may seem scarcely relevant; in this example, at least, no
outsider/insider distinction seems to diminish the taint.) Yet this ethical observation
is of limited import when we just want a way to tell whose culture is whose: Nazism
and its cultural trappings simply are a tragic episode in German history. What
we can perhaps say, however, is that the history of a culture's development is not
straightforwardly cumulative: the Germans of today are free to repudiate the Nazis
and their interpretations of Teutonic history and folklore, and to draw directly on
those same cultural resources whilst rejecting their development through Nazism as
a dead and disgraceful offshoot rather than part of an overall historical continuity.
It is exactly this, in part, which makes it difficult to formulate judgments about
the `continuity' of a culture. It is tempting to think, as beings which exist from
moment to moment in linear time, that our cultural memory must develop like
our mental recollections, imaginable as the steadily progressive narrative of a life.4
Yet the indefinitude of cultural items is smeared across time as well as space: the
conception of an item may long precede its inception (see the discussion of origins
in 7.2), and an object may be long remembered after its destruction, or an event
after its termination. Our age can still (just about) read Chaucer, and regards
Shakespeare as a central element of its own curriculum, not as a matter of historical
interest alone but as part of a living practice of æsthetic appreciation; a complaint
that `only the naïve or the unschooled can now engage in whole-hearted communion
with folk from any past' (Lowenthal, 1985, p. 375) depends on a decidedly high
(or low) expectation of what background familiarity must be in place for `whole-
heartedness' to be a possibility. Moreover, a modern interpretation of the Æneid
need not be cumulative with Dryden's verse translation of 1697: historical and
linguistic differences will blunt the immediacy of the encounter, to be sure, but
Dryden acquires no priority as an interpreter over the classicists of our day. It is
more the case that they undertake to reach back to Vergil than that his work exists
for them as a thing of the present day (although of course there is a straightforward
sense in which it does persist, and in which other creations do not). In relation to
4Of course, cultures do come into being and develop within the course of human history,
and so there is a narrative aspect to understanding what makes a given culture what it
is. The strongest version of such an observation, which I associate particularly with the
work of Seyla Benhabib, is of a sort which associates `culture' with the construction of
narratives contributing to what one understands to be one's identity.
86
6.1. Authenticity, Distortion, and Culture As Network
the cultural resources out of which it continues to construct itself, our age is not so
much the most recent layer of a palimpsest as the current configuration of a shifting
network of jumbled cultural items (cf. 12.5).5
So far this has been a fairly inconclusive chapter, and as such it turns out to mirror
its subject matter: it is not in the nature of cultures that they surge purposefully
forward through their developing history like a military column. It is not invariably
a criterion of philosophical success that the reader should be left feeling confidently
enlightened, and hopefully any lingering perplexity about culture-spotting befits
the scale of the difficulties involved; but if we do conceptualise cultures and cultural
interchange after the image of a network, then where we see a striking density
of interconnected nodes  that is, where a noticeable cluster of cultural items
seems to emerge by virtue not of what items exactly they individually are but of
their collective influences on one another, as we familiarly encounter in the artistic
movement or the literary genre  then perhaps we have no worse a warrant for
labelling this cluster as the culture of a coterie or a social grouping or even a whole
nation than we do for looking at a confluence of narrowly separated contour lines on
a map and applying the label `mountain' as though mountains were neatly separated
from the surrounding landscape. Imagine cultural items marked as points on some
sort of geohistorical chart, with connecting lines wherever one item has influenced
another: there will be lines all over the place, and some of them will be very long
(reflecting cross-cultural influences remote in time and space), but it will be possible
to pick out clusters of especial density, even if we cannot strictly define them.
To conceptualise time as another dimension across which nodes in the network
may connect may demand some further imaginative effort, but it offers a potential
characterisation of change within a culture which escapes a need to explain what
it essentially is that persists while undergoing changes in its inessential aspects:
instead of identifying English culture at t1, and then asking what features of it
might let us identify an English culture at t2, we escape the metaphysical quandary
by regarding English culture as a cross-temporal network of linked cultural items to
begin with, i.e. as one which already incorporates nodes existent in different eras,
with the present state of English culture amounting to a cross-section of a `thing'
which properly cannot be understood to exist in instants from moment to moment.
(Again, contrast the case of personal identity: if I lose my sense of who I am by
coming to suffer total amnesia, I nevertheless have a physical existence right now and
can coherently believe that I exist right now. A somewhat less extreme case would
be suggested by Galen Strawson's repudiation of any `diachronic', as opposed to
5Of course, items come into being predominantly under the influence of what counts as
the past at the time of their creation, but they can also be influenced by anticipated
futures: the case of science fiction most clearly illustrates this.
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`episodic', sense of personal identity (Strawson, 2004): a sense of having a past and
a future, he thinks, is simply not a requirement. But I am deeply uncertain what it
would involve to conceive of a culture's existing in the moment, as it were.) It is not
simply that Shakespeare's-works-now are part of our culture; Shakespeare's works
when he wrote them are part of our culture, more precisely our cultural history.
(And if it is the case that we can harm or wrong long dead persons at the time
at which they were living, through a retroactive implication of our actions (Scarre,
2003, p. 240ff.), then it is worthwhile to wonder whether such a principle of moral
community might be extended beyond the anthropic and directly person-affecting
spheres of action.) Since duration, albeit a vague duration which can dwindle as the
links become sparser, is built into our understanding of what to look for in a culture,
and since at any temporal stage in its existence a culture can and will draw directly
on the cultural resources offered by other stages, the question of continuity becomes
in the first instance the epistemic one of exactly how to identify intra-cultural links
across time.
This line of thinking also allows us to acknowledge that attempting to capture
what it is for cultures to merge or diverge over time need not amount to saying that
at one point we have a clearly unified culture and at another we have two quite
different ones, and then trying to isolate the approximate period during which the
branch or join occurs. Things need not be so straightforward: English culture can
draw on its Roman influences even though `the Roman world' no longer exists for
it to be part of, and it can draw on more recent Italian influences too. Cultures for
the most part do not so much join or separate as blur and smudge at the edges, and
they can at once have both deep and shallow roots coexisting.
Can such a model capture distortion and authenticity, or must we conclude that we
have to jettison the concepts? We can say, I think, that the influence of one cultural
cluster upon another has a vector rather than a scalar character: influence, whether
it is welcome or unwelcome, comes from somewhere and is received somewhere else.
Import and export (of both material and intellectual cultural items) are indeed part
of the ordinary life of a non-isolated culture, and we should not regard them as
inherently suspicious. Neither is it automatically worrying when a cultural group's
self-image is influenced by the thoughts of outsiders; indeed, especially when not
trying to `create a culture' from scratch we are always influenced by others, our
predecessors, who are often but not necessarily our genetic ancestors. (If we do
not think Vergil is a cultural outsider, it is presumably because his influence on
English culture has been consecrated by the ages, and the Roman military conquest
no longer upsets anyone.)
One of the capacities of a human cultural group is that of collective self-reflection,
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in which the arrows of cultural influence are turned upon their own source as the
group undertakes both to understand and to develop itself.6 It would be too strong
a requirement to demand that this practice should be fearlessly and invariably
complete and accurate; if it is automatically a problem for a cultural group to possess
a slightly rosier view of itself and a slightly more selective view of its past than might
be strictly warranted, then we are probably all in trouble. Yet we might have cause
for disquiet if, within a given culture, the practice of self-reflection came to depend
so heavily upon imported intellectual resources that a recognisably home-grown
cultural introspection became effectively impossible. Something like this disquiet, I
suspect, underlies the concerns about both distortion and authenticity: the thought
that perhaps some culture or other exists, as clearly and definitely as any culture
exists, but its self-knowledge, and consequently the historical trajectory chosen for it,
are pulled about so strongly by the `gravity' of another culture that no unmediated
self-reflection (or self-criticism) can realistically take place. It is as though we could
know ourselves only through our reputation among foreigners; and if we agree with
Socrates that it is a good to know thyself, then we are likely to take the same
attitude towards cultural self-knowledge.
Thus a culture may remain distinctively identifiable and yet lack the resources
fully to appreciate and develop its own identity : what it will lack is not adherence
to some supposed essential nature and trajectory, but a secure capacity for the
people whose culture it is to employ self-examination and impose checks on its
development. A cultural group may of course pick any course it sees fitbut it will
need a corrective mechanism to ensure that the development of its culture is indeed
on that course, and this mechanism too can be vulnerable. Here we have at least a
possible approach to understanding how concerns about distortion and authenticity
might reasonably be raised without any implicit appeal to cultural essentialism, and
within a `network' model of cultural identity as I have sketched it; although I make
no claim to have set forth a grand theory of either, and indeed it seems reasonable to
doubt that the terms in their broader usage admit of any very systematic treatment:
Since this is a book about cultural authenticity, we knew that we would
be expected to provide a foundational definition of cultural authenticity
to frame the book. This undertaking seemed appropriate and important
to us, until we attempted to draft a definition. We then realized why
6I am reluctant to go so far as to say that a human culture must exhibit self-reflection,
less still critical reflection; I do not think it is clear that this is implied by our (various)
notions of `culture'. However, I suspect that we should be hard pressed to discover
a human cultural group (some subcultures perhaps excepted) which did not in some
manner reflect upon its own nature as culturally constituted, whether or not it employed
a concept directly resembling that of `culture' in order to do so.
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so many authors and educators who discuss cultural authenticity are
reluctant to define it in formulaic or prescriptive terms. We found
ourselves agreeing with Rudine Sims Bishop, who argues that cultural
authenticity cannot be defined, although `you know it when you see it'
as an insider reading a book about your own culture. (Fox and Short,
2003, p. 4)
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If the content of the last chapter had sketched out all that we needed to consider
when enquiring into the nature of cultures as they develop over spans of time,
we should have headaches enough; but there are two further aspects of temporality
which demand especial attention. The first is that of tradition, in which the very fact
of continuity becomes an arguable reason to hold whatever it is that is traditional in
a particular esteem and, perhaps, to resist some forms of change in it. The second is
concerned not so much with what happens to cultural items over time as with tracing
them back to some definite point of origin, since many of the moral difficulties which
we face, particularly if we are disposed to think in terms of `cultural property' and
by implication of a first rightful possessor, involve attempting to chart the changes
in ownership of a cultural item as we seek to identify the most recent legitimate
owner or owners.
7.1. Tradition
According to T.S. Eliot, writing in his essay Tradition and the Individual Talent,
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His
significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the
dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him,
for contrast and comparison, among the dead. (Eliot, 1920, p. 44)
Discussion of what is required in order to value a cultural item as such must
await the following chapters, but notice that while Eliot's characterisation of the
artist's æsthetic-historical role appears at first glance to fit easily into my model
of culture as networked, his decision to employ the idea of a `tradition' creates a
difficulty. For to speak of tradition implies at least a moderately strict continuity
(albeit not necessarily a perfect continuity of uninterrupted changelessness), and this
in turn implies a determinable phenomenon with persistent (we might even venture
to suggest, essential) features, accumulating a regular series of routine layers.
When it came to cultures at large and what it might mean for one to persist
over time, I suggested a conceptual model of cultures as concentrations in a
`network' of interrelated cultural items: by avoiding a way of thinking about cultural
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development in which each instant in a culture's existence forms another successive
layer in an open-ended series, I hoped to avoid any awkward implication of cultural
essentialism, since there would be no such series, and hence no clearly persistent
structure for a culture essentially to possess. On such an understanding as this,
little could be easier than to place a present-day artist among the dead, for there is
no need to regard their respective epochs as stages in the development of a sort of
palimpsest; the artistries of past eras are already present and accessible to us (and we
should indeed be hard pressed to shake off the modern-day background assumptions
which we bring to their interpretation). Tradition is therefore a potential source of
difficulty for me, for it is plain enough that people do participate in and therefore
presumably value various cultural traditions, and it is implicit in the very nature of
a tradition that it is temporally extended, so that what particularly matters is not
just this year's festival but the whole series of recurrent festivals of which it forms an
instance. (Another similarity between traditions and cultures is that traditions too
can decay and dwindle into nonexistence, and if anyone should try to revive them,
or persist with them in considerably changed contexts, we may end up wondering
whether that is something that can be done `authentically'. It may be, too, that
traditions, like cultures, are capable of splitting or merging.) A tradition, in short,
is exactly what I hoped to find a culture need not be.
There is probably no flawless conceptual model for anything as nebulously defined
as culture, and so it need not shock me that my favoured model is not one with
which the phenomenon of tradition looks ideally compatible; besides, if we consider
a tradition to be a (composite) cultural item, it should hardly surprise us at all
that such a cultural item, perhaps unlike the culture which contains it, should
endure and sometimes change over the course of time while exhibiting fairly definite
and persistent features. Traditions would not, indeed, demand so much of my
attention if it were not for the distinctively normative aspect of their continuity:
a tradition demands continuation and is valued (at least in part) on account of
its continuity. Among our contemporaries, I suggest, we frequently look upon
difference and variety as grounds for preservation: for example, people seeking to
preserve or at least document endangered languages may aim not just to preserve
one or another particular language, but over and above that to preserve the world's
linguistic diversity. Between generations, on the other hand, difference amounts to
rupture: historical studies of mediæval worldviews may be interesting, certainly, but
even firm believers in society's moral progress will not necessarily find it a happy
thought that our own ancestors of even a few generations back had somewhat alien
ways of getting to grips with the world. The thought puts us in the uncanny position
of having to acknowledge our intellectual (and biological) debt to them while at the
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same time having to recognise this kind of estrangement from our own recent kin.
What then is it that we have in common with our ancestors, apart from the things
we inherit from them in the biological and legal senses of the word? We also inherit
customs, and most obviously we share participation in traditions, which may help
to account for the concern we often have for them; we may not have quite the same
understanding of just why we do things one way or the other, but perhaps no one
generation can have an exhaustive understanding of a tradition. What we share is
not so much the understanding that things shall be done in a certain customary
way, but more the understanding that the way in which we customarily do things
shall be sensitive to what we do inherit and pass on. This is not to say that we
maintain traditions for the sake of past generations, although there may indeed be
an element of remembrance, perhaps most clearly evident in such a tradition as the
annual commemoration of the fallen soldiers of the World Wars. Since it is with past
generations that we share participation in traditions, cultivation of those traditions,
including the recognition of whatever value and cultural roles they possess, is a
transgenerational project.
Alas, it would be fair to suspect that not every commentator has a uniform
conception of `tradition' in mind. Like `culture', the term is slippery. Appiah writes
that a tradition is `not so much a body of doctrine as a set of debates' (Appiah, 2001,
p. 235) (although when this description appears again in The Ethics of Identity, he
qualifies it and speaks specifically of `intellectual traditions' (Appiah, 2005, p. ix)).
Scruton identifies tradition with a `tacit understanding' which `mediates between
the individual and society', adding that it `involves a willing submission to what
is socially established' (Scruton, 1991, p. 6). Alasdair MacIntyre seems to mean by
`tradition' something about as broad as `historical narrative': `What I am... is in
key part what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in my present.
I find myself part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or
not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition.' (MacIntyre,
1982, p. 221) More specifically, however, he thinks that there are `vital' traditions
which embody `continuities of conflict' (perhaps akin to Appiah's `sets of debates'),
contrasted with others which are `dying or dead': a living tradition `is an historically
extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the
goods which constitute that tradition' (ibid., p. 222).
For David Lowenthal, the type of significance which is attached to tradition
depends on whether persistent historical sources are available to a cultural group:
The earliest common use of the past was to validate the present.
This practice is still habitual in `traditional' societies lacking a written
language and wholly reliant on folk memory. In such societies empirical
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enquiry seldom revises received views, and tradition is the pre-eminent
guide for behaviour...
Societies that have written and printed records remain attached to
tradition, but not in the same way or to the same degree. They continue
to validate many attitudes and actions by reference to former practices...
But to believe tradition perpetuated unbroken from remotest antiquity
they would have to deny historical changes implicit in their annals...
In most history-conscious societies, `tradition' denotes not total or
unswerving stability but the value of particular precedents, the unfolding
of practice from immemorial specific instances. English common law
reflects such a use of tradition. (Lowenthal, 1985, p. 369)
On the other hand, Shirley Robin Letwin suggests that tradition need not have a
great deal to do with the past at all:
[Matthew Arnold] appears to be defending tradition because he seems
to teach a reverence for the past. But reverence for the past is incidental
to what is central to the idea of tradition. And the clue to that is
the literal meaning of the word, which is `handing down.' A tradition
is a practice that remains coherent not through changelessness but
through continuity. What constitutes a tradition is a conception of
how things should be done, a manner of understanding and dealing
with certain matters, a complicated cluster of criteria and skills that
cannot be captured in simple formulas of [sic] diagrams. A tradition,
in other words, is a practice perpetuated without formal definitions
of standards, without formal acknowledgment of anyone's authority to
set and maintain standards. That is why the personal association of
parent and child, teacher and pupil, has been considered essential to the
transmission of a tradition. (Letwin, 1982, p. 337)
Edward Shils, meanwhile, asserts that tradition `means many things. In its
barest, most elementary sense, it means simply a traditum; it is anything which is
transmitted or handed down from the past to the present... The decisive criterion is
that, having been created through human actions, through thought and imagination,
it is handed down from one generation to the next.' (Shils, 1981, p. 12) (To `be
regarded as a tradition in the sense of an enduring entity' a `pattern' must `last over
at least three generations' (ibid., p. 15).) There appears to be a fairly lively tradition
of thinking about tradition, and not at all a univocal one; for my present purposes,
the predominant object of interest is the perpetuation of a tradition through time
as a series of more-or-less similar events or practices, and the potential which this
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creates for a tradition to be deliberately conserved or (wilfully or accidentally)
allowed to die away. There may be people for whom the entire phenomenon of
reverence for traditions conjures up deadening images of the gloom of Gormenghast;
but there will be others who make nicer distinctions (and perhaps even some who
might wish to invoke flexible traditions of change and progress and reinvention).
Not every practice, at any rate, can be extended into the modern day through the
medium of a tradition: a set of conceptual structures for categorising and organising
the world can be remembered, in a kind of intellectual and even scholarly cold
storage, long after falling out of conventional use (the ideas and practices that
made up the alchemical tradition being in this situation), but a living tradition
is impossible wherever taking it in any manner seriously would depend on accepting
the ways of understanding the world within which it emerged and developed, and
these are ways which have proved themselves susceptible to decay and abandonment.
In the case of alchemy there is no obvious loss when we have gained its further
development into chemistry,1 and to keep up the practices of alchemical enquiry
for the sake of tradition would be at best a playful performance of `living history',
at worst deluded and ridiculous (and perhaps, recalling 6.1, inauthentic). It is
not (of course) impossible to be an alchemist in Britain in the modern day, but
few of us, perhaps, could adopt the practice with sincerity. Yet there are other
traditions which it seems possible we do value, not only for instrumental reasons (as
for example in Edmund Burke's defence of tradition as a means of maintaining public
freedoms), but by virtue of the fact that they are our traditions, from swan-upping
on the Thames to patterns of intercollegiate rivalry. The former, at least, has (like
alchemy) a practical purpose, but it is also a recurring occasion, and is permeated by
a sense of occasion grounded in a long-established pattern. Institutional rivalries,
on the other hand, tend to be embodied in neither pomp nor circumstance, but
they have a certain momentum of their own; it is not, after all, as though each new
generation of Durham undergraduates spontaneously adopts certain characteristic
attitudes towards Hatfield College which just happen to resemble those of their
predecessors.
1Of course, it is a matter of judgment to what extent we should speak of a single tradition
of scientific chemistry: certainly scientific enquiry incorporates a great many abandoned
ideas of its own, such as phlogiston theory, but we are typically happy enough to treat
these abandoned theories as part of a narrative of scientific progress, indicating that
abandonment is not the sole reason why we commonly regard alchemy as a precursor to
the narrative.
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Eliot writes that tradition `cannot be inherited,2 and if you want it you must
obtain it by great labour' (Eliot, 1920, p. 43). Sir Karl Popper strikes similar
notes: `Certain types of tradition of great importance are local, and cannot easily be
transplanted. These traditions are precious things, and it is very difficult to restore
them once they are lost.' (Popper, 1963, p. 163) Traditions are capable of decaying
and becoming lostalthough their capacity for transformation makes it contestable
whether, for example, the alchemical tradition is in some sense preserved by the
practice of scientific chemistry, or whether the discontinuity constitutes the loss of
the former (Shils, 1981, p. 14). I suspect that it depends on our chosen emphasis in
making the judgment: if we regard alchemy as a practice of investigating how the
kinds of matter that make up the world may be manipulated, then we are likely to
be most impressed by its continuity with chemistry, whereas if our emphasis is on
the place of self-purification in alchemical practice, we are equally likely to note the
absence of a comparable role for the professional or academic ethos of a scientist of
the present day. In neither case is it apparent that we have grasped the true essence
of the alchemical traditionwhatever such a thing might be.
Must it arouse our concern, then, that a tradition may dwindle and disappear, or
is this, ceteris paribus, simply a feature of routine cultural change and intellectual
progress? It is of course interesting to note that a tradition, being characterised
by continuity, and not only past- but also future-oriented, is a thing aiming at
preservation and self-perpetuationeven more so than human beings, with our less
extensible lifespans. (Arguably the very practice of siring and rearing children is
itself a tradition.) Yet it does not clearly follow that the proper lifespan of a tradition
is infinite as well as indefinite, any more than this is true of ours. Traditions
of alchemical practice faded away in an environment which simply ceased to be
intellectually hospitable to alchemy, and there is no obvious reason to mourn their
passing; we retain, after all, a measure of historical knowledge about them. If we
have reason to care about cultural items then we have reason to care about traditions
insofar as they are themselves cultural items, but must we care not only about the
cultural item `this year's festival' (which of course draws on the cultural resources
offered up by memories of previous years'), but additionally about the continuity
into which it falls? Depending on our conceptions of what a tradition is, there may
be a case for allegations of double counting.
Not that a tradition is merely a sequence of indefinite extent. A tradition is
an inescapably normative phenomenon, whether overtly so or not (ibid., pp. 23-
5), in light of what it excludes as well as what it perpetuates: to say that a
2I think that by this he means that tradition cannot be passively inherited like a right
of possession, i.e. the only way to have it is to participate in it with the right kind of
`historical sense'.
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practice or proposal is alien to our traditions (or more generally, to our established
customs) can be not merely an observation but an objection. Traditions provide
contexts for meaningful activity which can be ruptured, so that a philosopher who
veers far enough away from the Analytic and towards the Continental traditions,
for example, will be withdrawing from one conversation in favour of another by
becoming progressively less readily intelligible to his former colleagues, and sharing
less in their understanding of what philosophy is and how one conducts it. Traditions
constrain us, not by limiting what we can think (for after all it is possible to
change one's opinions about what it is and should be to do philosophy, to draw on
intellectual resources which initially were alien to oneself), but because we cannot
very well escape participating in and influencing their development in ways that
get out of our control, so that as soon as one opens one's mouth and expounds
one's ideas in public they become mixed up into the ebb and flow of `the great
conversation'. From what I can gather the process goes something like this: in
year one you come up with an argument that x, in year two someone else voices
agreement that x, and by year three the x ites are defending their shared position
against others who would like to advance their careers through refutations of the new
x ist movement; some years later x ites have ceased to seem radically exciting, but
several people have built parts of their careers on x 's supportability or lack thereof,
and the tribal conferences are always convivial; and eventually, once the x question
is a familiar feature on undergraduate courses and the original generation of x ites
has largely passed away, someone will begin an exegetical debate by analysing your
initial paper afresh and contending that what you had in mind at the time bore
practically no relation to how the great x debates ended up.
The practical methodological upshot for a philosopher such as myself, unlikely
to found a school of thought on any significant scale with the present work but
wandering through the territory of quite a number of them, is that a tradition is
not something one can quarrel over the ownership of like an object in a museum.3
Participation in traditions is to a great extent unlike possession of objects, or even
participation in discrete events: it involves the assertion of one's place in a living
continuity, whether as inheritor or merely as admitted guest, and it likewise involves
participation in this continuity in specific contradistinction to any competing or alien
ones. All of which creates a bit of a complication for my conception of culture as
network-like: whether we consider a tradition to constitute a cultural item in its own
3Another matter of methodological diversion for me is the observation that when I set out
to talk about cultural heritage, of course I include intellectual heritage, including the
very intellectual traditions within which I stand and on whose resources I draw in order
to talk about heritage ethics.
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right,4 or whether we think that it amounts to a special form of interaction between
cultural items, the forward-pointing, cumulative, sometimes contrastive nature of
tradition makes it look as though there is rather more to the constitution of cultures
than normatively neutral interrelations between normatively inert cultural items.
Of course, no metaphysicalised conceptual model of culture is ever going to
offer an adequate insight into what culture means to us, and a dry and objective
characterisation of what a tradition is inevitably falls short of accounting for what
it means to participate in a tradition and to be tasked with either perpetuating it or
letting it fall away. (I think that MacIntyre, for example, would reject my account
of tradition as too much concerned with bare sequentiality over narrative; I have
tried to be somewhat minimalist, and to avoid requiring anything comparable to
his wider concern with virtue.) Given that I have been taking as a paradigmatic
example of a cultural item the kind of artefact which finds itself subject to ownership
disputes between governments, museums and other bodies, it is hardly surprising
that `the cultural item' has tended to appear in my theorising as an object of my
philosophical inspection, a thing to examine and evaluate. Yet perhaps recognition
of even our intellectual heritage for what it is entails that the proper relation to
heritage should be one of engaging with it in something more closely resembling
a dialogue, or at least a hermeneutic process. Heritage would then emerge less
as an object for my theories to act upon, lying still on the slab for examination
and appraisal, and more as something persistently able to talk back (as it were)
and demand reappraisal even at an abstracted, theoretical level; and as such, to
engage in philosophising about heritage would not be to aim at parcelling up a neat,
completed package of methods for generating prescriptions in normative ethics, but
would itself constitute standing within a tradition of thinking philosophically about
heritage, and not necessarily expecting to arrive at conclusive solutions.5
For the moment, however, I shall leave methodological reflections aside in order to
consider an aspect of the temporality of cultural heritage which looks very different
from the indefinitude of tradition.
4See Chapter 10.
5Need all this present a problem? One might respond, after all, that if we aspire to
assess tradition philosophically it is a positive boon that nobody could do so with
greater experiential authority than we can; and in any case similar situations arise across
the philosophical board, as you would expect from a discipline purporting to examine
the fundamental questions of being human, and as it happens logicians go on thinking
logically, moral philosophers endure not being amoral creatures, and phenomenologists
working on embodiment are seldom heard complaining about a lack of experience of
being disembodied. Nevertheless, I take the matter to invite caution.
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With respect to the ways in which we talk about the temporal aspects of heritage
(that is, how the nature of things as heritage, and often as overtly inherited, relates
to their existence across different times and changing circumstances), traditions and
origins seem in some respects to be in opposition to one another. In the case of
traditions, sequential continuity is the critical defining aspect (and that continuity
may be fairly loose in some cases): recall that for Shils, we have a tradition wherever
we have a `pattern' passed down between three or more successive generations (Shils,
1981, p. 15). So long as we can identify some sort of continuity between the stages
of its existence in which we are presently interested, a tradition need not have any
point of origin which is clearly recalled or identifiable; if anything, a tradition that
stretches back into time immemorial may carry a certain attractive mystique (on
which see also Chapter 13).
In contrast, sometimes we want to talk very definitely about origins; sometimes a
great deal in the ethics and politics of cultural heritage depends on the possibility
of tracing objects, ideas and practices back to their roots. Most obviously, acts of
restitution and repatriation are grounded in the notion that (1) the object being
returned has a place or people which is demonstrably its source, and from which it
has been displaced; (2) some desirable end is served by returning it to this source;
and (3) such a return is possible, i.e. there exists a place or a people which can be
reliably identified with the source place or source people, even after the passage of
however much time. In many cases the demand for return is grounded in a claim
about what is due to the source peoples: a demand of justice where the removal was
such as to wrong them, or a demand for the cessation of harm where the continued
estrangement of the displaced item is in some respect harmful to the cultural group
from which it was taken. At other times the aim is oriented towards the future,
towards discouraging those obliged to make the return from further participation in
the market for looted antiquities. Yet in addition to these themes one sometimes
sees it suggested that there is something about the original setting of a cultural
item which is especially fitting for it, and hence that there simply are ceteris paribus
grounds for favouring an item's source nation, city, &c. as its proper place of repose.
In what sense, if any, is it good for cultural objects to be situated in their places or
communities of origin? Writing in a recent issue of Museum International, George
Anastassopoulos, the Permanent Delegate of Greece to UNESCO, advances what
we might call a symbolistic objection to universal museums: their very accessibility,
he claims, `has unfortunately led numerous objects to acquire a status not of
universality but of familiarity, which progressively erodes the singularity and
inherent symbolic value of cultural objects'. In consequence, `if we do not anchor
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these objects in their original environment and history, we run the risk of depriving
them of their universal quality and beauty by making them familiar objects of
consumption' (Anastassopoulos, 2009, p. 9).
Whatever could it mean to anchor museum pieces in their `original environment
and history'? Anastassopoulos speaks of a `vision of culture, as a series of concentric
circles with at the centre the community of origin, [which] challenges traditional
conceptions of universalism. It emphasizes the organic bond that links the work
of art or artefact and the location where it was created.' (ibid., p. 9) I am decidedly
unsure whether anyone else actually does think of culture in such terms (perhaps
I lack adequate knowledge of the Hellenophone literature on the subject), but the
idea of an environment of origin as an especially fitting site for a cultural item has
certainly underpinned much of the official Greek rhetoric concerning the Parthenon
Marbles, culminating in the New Acropolis Museum, a building in physical proximity
to the Parthenon but nevertheless removed from it. The Marbles cannot be replaced
on the monument of which they `were conceived and designed from the outset
as integral parts' (Papazoi, 2000, p. 2), but the Greek government has contended
that nevertheless `the cultural, historical, archaeological and aesthetic values of the
Parthenon are most closely interwoven with the city in which it was created, Athens'
(ibid., p. 2).
But what do we mean by the origin of an object, or a practice? Or rather
(since I doubt much in heritage ethics is going to be settled by appeals to Kripke),
what sense can we make of the various things we might mean which will prove
morally illuminating? In part, of course, we mean a more-or-less specific point
in time (`1832'; `the Renaissance'; `the Neolithic period') and space, where our
geographical points of reference may be both physical (`the Shetlands'; `Australia')
and sociopolitical (`the U.S.S.R.'; `rural England'). Some familiar difficulties have
a lot to do with the frequent disinclination of our familiar sociopolitical ways of
dividing up the world to line up conveniently with the era in question, as in Appiah's
example of the Nok sculptures which were made in a geographical area we now call
Nigeria, but long before the nation-state of Nigeria came into being (Appiah, 2009,
p. 74).
We need not, however, be speaking only of the time and place at which some
item came into being: when we say that Western philosophy began with Thales
of Miletus, we clearly do not mean that Western philosophy happened to pop into
existence at the point which was then occupied by Thales. In speaking of the origins
of manmade things (as we are when we find ourselves concerned with any item of
non-natural cultural heritage) we are dealing with agency, and sometimes we shall
have to deal with the involvement of multiple agents through multiple acts in making
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a thing what it is.
What sort of origins, then, do we mean to speak of when we ask where some
cultural item came from? Where physical objects are concerned, we might mean
the sources of the object's constituent material(s). I doubt this very often is what's
meant, but it might be suggested by some Peruvians' suggestion that Peru has
a claim on coins found with the shipwrecked Black Swan, a wreck discovered on
the seabed near Portugal, because Peruvian metal, taken during the colonial era,
was used to mint them (Jones, 2008). Spain's claim is based on the form imposed
on the material, Peru's on the source of the material itself. However, attempting
to draw any general rule out of this line of thinking seems likely to lead us to
the novel conclusion that the best setting for parts of Stonehenge would be the
Preseli Mountains in Wales, despite the fact that the original builders of Stonehenge
evidently reached a different conclusion.
We might mean the place or people among whom the idea of an item arose, before
the item itself was brought into being in consequence; after all, it would be natural
enough to say of some project that it had its origins in its preparatory planning,
and specifically in the formation of the earliest plans and suggestions. I have trouble
coming up with cases where such a thing has clearly been meant, however, unless
perhaps we suppose that some of the broader kinds of appropriation, such as that of
styles and motifs (Young, 2008, pp. 6-7), can be brought under this heading, where
there is a reasonable enough sense in which the token may be thought to originate
with an already established type.
Certainly, when we talk of origins we have to recognise what connections the
objects and practices under consideration have to previous and contemporary
cultural milieux. However, at the same time we must acknowledge that the origin of
an object is not simply that of the ideas which it embodies: the origins of rocketry
may be in ancient China, but this hardly invalidates our calling the Soyuz launcher
a Russian rocket. The difficulty in appealing to the ideas which give rise to items'
creation, then, is that it is hard to identify a principled stopping point at which
we can say that we have found the idea Let's make an x , and therefore found the
origins of that x, while clipping away as strictly irrelevant all the preceding thinking
about x -style items which served to create the context within which this plan in
particular was able to take shape. If we want to talk about origins in terms of plans
and ideas, we are likely to arrive at the conclusion that the notion of an origin is in
fact not a crisply delineated one at all; and probably there is something in that, but
it would be rash to reject so soon the starting expectation that there would be some
noteworthy distinction between the temporality of origins and that of traditions.
The Soyuz launcher is of Russian origin.
101
7. Origins and Traditions
We might mean the environment in which an object was first constructed, sculpted
or otherwise given form  in the case of abstract objects we might think of the setting
in which a document was written, a festival first held, &c.  but then, a lot of objects
begin their existence in a workshop or studio with the intention that they should be
moved elsewhere on completion. For example, a ship is supposed to sail from port
to port, not stay in the dockyard. In these cases, even if we consider the place of
creation an important aspect of an item's history it is unlikely to figure significantly
and automatically in our judgments about what should happen to the item now.
We might mean the setting for which an object was made, or for which a practice
was devised: the Parthenon Marbles, for example, were non-trivially integrated into
the structure of the Parthenon.6 The performances involved in the State Opening of
Parliament were overtly devised for the Palace of Westminster, with its spatial and
constitutional division into Houses of Lords and Commons. This cannot very well
apply in every case, however, simply because many things are devised without an
intended setting very much in mind, while others acquire such very different histories
from those intended for them that one has to doubt the significance of those initial
intentions in any deliberation about their fate. (The Antikythera Mechanism, a
piece of ancient technology now held by the National Archæological Museum in
Athens, was perhaps en route to Rome when its ship sank; we cannot know whether
that was what its maker first envisaged for it, and nobody has suggested that what
little we can guess of its intended destination after manufacture should determine
who has a legitimate claim on it in the present day.) Again, then, it would be
excessively hasty to conclude that this criterion is never relevant, but it seems very
doubtful that it consistently is.
We might mean the setting in which an object was discovered; recall Renfrew's
emphasis on the archæological site as the setting of epistemic significance which gives
artefacts their meaning. This cannot be the only origin of which we might wish to
speak, however, since archæologists clearly take an interest not only in where an
object was found but in questions of how it came to be there.
Becoming somewhat sceptical about the prospects for a straightforward general
criterion of origin-possession, then, we might seek to introduce more socially
determined elements: perhaps we should say that origins of the kind we are
interested in, for the purposes of developing an ethics of cultural heritage, are not
the origins of an item per se, i.e. the environments and conditions within which it
was brought into being as the thing that it (physically) is, but rather its roots as an
6Some of the Marbles, but not others, are presently situated within their city of origin; and
here we observe a related problem, that of when buildings, cities, countries of origin, &c.
should be seen as salient. Perhaps this question was what animated Anastassopoulos's
concentric circles.
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item of somebody's specifically cultural interest. (By way of comparison: what are
the interesting origins of a signed first edition of a book? There are at least two: the
occasion of printing that makes it a first edition instead of a later one, and the act of
signing by the author after the book was printed, which turns the first edition into
a signed first edition.) We need perhaps concern ourselves, then, merely with the
question of when and by whom the item in question first began to be appreciated
in some manner relevant to its status as cultural heritage. That it may previously
have emerged from some anonymous workshop, for example, and lain for a while in
a shop window is a matter of merely historical interest; if the item of interest is,
let us say, the typewriter which was used by Cormac McCarthy to write his novels
and which was sold at auction in December 2009,7 then of course our interest in it
as cultural heritage will have everything to do with what we think of McCarthy's
writing as (someone's) cultural heritage, and nothing to do with its existence before
he even purchased it.8
Unfortunately, this again leaves us obliged to wonder whether origins really can be
tied down to reasonably discrete events in time and space. `Man acquires typewriter'
describes an act, but not an especially exciting one. `Man acquires typewriter in
order to pursue a career as a novelist' is perhaps an improvement, if the ensuing
career is one of interest to us; but even supposing we have reliable grounds for
thinking that this was his intention at the time of the acquisition, there is no obvious
improvement over `Man acquires typewriter in order to write neater shopping lists;
as it happens, later on he uses it to pursue a career as a novelist'. Our interest,
clearly, is not in the act of acquisition itself, even given what we know about how
the typewriter was subsequently used, but in the gradual and cumulative process
of writing with which the typewriter was involved; there was no baptismal moment
at which it was suddenly transformed from an everyday typewriter into a piece of
literary history.9
Perhaps, however, my choice of example has led me to be excessively demanding;
in many cases, notably when dealing with antiquities, when we ask about the origins
7I assume that, being auctioned as a piece of literary memorabilia, the typewriter may
fairly be considered of cultural interest and hence suitable as an example, although
no concern for it under the heading of cultural heritage has interfered with its being
disposed of as an item of private property.
8Or almost nothing, since as an example of a certain model it may hold some interest for
people who find themselves diverted by the history of typewriter manufacture. However,
the importance then attached to it as an example would depend on how many other such
examples were in existence, whereas, since McCarthy used one typewriter continuously
throughout many years of work, we are considering a particular item, the very typewriter
used to write certain literary creations.
9Wemay, indeed, be reminded of traditions at this point, there typically being no baptismal
moment at which sombody says, `Let's start a tradition!'
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of some item of cultural heritage we should be thrilled to obtain an answer so precise
as to have been pinned down to the span of a specific person's life. Frequently we
must be content to learn merely the approximate era, region and societal context
in which an object was made. Similarly, the historical record may give us only a
general idea of the era across which an item came to possess cultural import; but
at this level of precision, maybe that is all we need. So long as we have some (even
vaguely delineated) portion of time and place to point to, we can talk about origins
to a degree of precision that depending on our needs may be good enough.
With this in mind, then, can we say that the origins of an item of heritage are
to be found in those circumstances which made it an object of cultural interest and
appreciation (somewhat as we might say that someone's schooldays `were the making
of him', when in a physical sense they clearly were not)? Once again, there is no
doubt something in this that does capture what we are frequently concerned with,
and the difficulties arise when we try to draw out a general guiding rule concerning
origins.
If our requirement is that members of a cultural group must recognise an item
as the possessor of some appropriate kind of status within their culture, and not
retrospectively but at the time at which the item has its origin qua item of whatever
kind of (more than ordinarily interesting) cultural heritage, then we have created
a criterion which turns out to be remarkably exacting. Suppose some other well-
known writer, McDarthy, also uses a typewriter, but this fact happens never to
become public during his lifetime. Many years later, when his descendants have
finally finished squabbling over the larger details of his estate and the existence of
this typewriter comes to public light, then we may say that the cultural item we
know as `the very typewriter used by McDarthy to write his famous novels' has
originatedyears after his life and career finished and his novels became widely
read in the first place. The origin of this, the typewriter as a cultural item, would
therefore come after the very events which made it of greater interest to the reading
public than an everyday typewriter.
However  you might object  we are quibbling over a mere epistemic inconve-
nience: the reading public, we may reasonably believe, would most certainly have
acknowledged a cultural interest in what they could have known (had they thought
of it) under the definite description `the implement used by McDarthy to write
his novels'. That they did not even know he used a typewriter, rather than a
pen or pencil or computer, and that they did not know which typewriter, prevents
them merely from knowing which object in the world answers to the description in
question. Since the typewriter does and did answer to it, however, nothing requires
us to locate the typewriter's origin as a cultural item of literary significance only at
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the moment of its public identification.
This point is correct, but too limited: we have become dependent on a
counterfactual assumption, the judgment that members of the reading public during
McDarthy's life, or at least as soon as he became famous, probably would have
taken an interest in the implement he used had its identity ever arisen as a topic of
commentary. Sometimes we can make reasonable counterfactual judgments about
what people might have thought and done, but even if we admit this into our
thinking about cultural heritage ethics (and there are of course reasons to be wary
of doing so, given the epistemic uncertainties which invariably attach themselves
to counterfactual judgments of any historical complexity), can we seriously claim
that the origin of an item qua item of recognised cultural interest is to be found
at the (earliest possible?) temporal point at which people in different (ideal?)
circumstances would have shown suitable interest in it? Surely not its origin within
the world we do in fact inhabit.
Enough: by this point it seems reasonably plain that an understanding of origins
which both reflects our interests when enquiring into cultural heritage ethics and
looks reliably applicable across the various diverse cases that might concern us
is not within our ready grasp. (No wonder, when it can become so tricky to
distinguish between questions of fact and questions of value: we find ourselves in
difficulties precisely because the question of which sort of origin best reflects our
priorities cannot escape the question of what our priorities ought to be, but the
question of what we should prioritise in our deliberations cannot readily do without
a substantive conception of what cultural items we are dealing withand whence
they came.) Need we worry about that, or should we merely endorse renewed
wariness when faced with claims concerning the origins of a cultural item?
What I actually want to do here is shift focus away from the question of where
exactly we might locate the origins of an item of cultural heritage, and back towards
the question of why it might seem important to identify them in the first place:
specifically, my suspicion here is that underlying some of the disputes over heritage
is a kind of conceptual difference of judgment about how heritage should be conceived
of as subject to the passage of time, so that (drawing the divisions loosely) a
traditionalistic tendency regards the status of an item of heritage as cumulative,
its identity as cultural heritage a matter of open-ended development; whereas an
originalistic tendency conversely tries to pin down a definite starting point and assess
all subsequent events in light of it. The latter inclination is manifest in restitution
cases in the claim that, from a given starting point, an object's history ought to
have been different, and the timeline it ought to have had is the one towards which
its future history should be brought as close as possible. The former is indicated
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by Cuno's narrative tactic of tracking the changing uses of an artefact through
time, destabilising the notion that any one of them has strict priority in order to
advance the cause of the universal museum as an environment suited to housing and
comparing artefacts in all their multiform status.
Now if it is the case that (even assuming standard Western conceptions of linear
time, &c.) we can perceive possible roots of disagreement in basically different
conceptions of a given object10 as a temporal thing, then we cannot very well
avoid the question of which, if any, is `right' or `best' in any given case; and
possibly some movement in the direction of picking favourites could be made, by
means of linking into my emphasis on thinking about cultural items in holistic
terms, and asking how a best fit might be attained: does it best accord with the
place which a given item has received within wider human culture to regard it
traditionalistically or originalistically? (I wonder, though, whether appealing to an
item's prior reception would tend excessively towards conservatism not only as a
matter of moral prescription, which I suppose is at least unsurprising where cultural
heritage is concerned, but moreover as a matter of conceptual favouritism, giving
unbalanced favour to just one way of conceiving of an object in temporal terms, to
the exclusion of whatever others there might be. I should be nervous of bringing
about the latter as a side-effect.) Yet I am inclined to think that it makes more
sense to be neutral between different ways of construing the temporality of heritage:
clearly things do have origins, but it would be rash to expect these to imply strict
limits on what can rightfully be done with them. The question of present interest,
therefore, is whether such low-level conceptions of temporality are reconciliable, or
whether we shall find ourselves obliged to be pluralistic about them.
To make further, progress, however, I think that I had better expand the discussion
from considering what cultures and cultural heritage are like to directly trying to
understand what kind of morally salient roles they play for us.
10A physical object, of course, cannot itself be a tradition, but it can be associated with
traditions, or just with changing uses which may be without a clear point of origin, and
therefore it can be subject to what I have styled `traditionalistic' thinking.
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Contours of a Moral Landscape

To say, `I had whooping cough when I was four years old' supposes a
thousand projects, in particular the adoption of the calendar as a
system of reference...
Jean-Paul Sartre
(2003, p. 519)

8. `Value'?
The legal scholar Sarah Harding has written,
The monetary value of cultural heritage encourages preservation rather
than destruction. But despite the physical survival of cultural heritage,
we frequently destroy much of its intrinsic value by reconstituting it
in radically limited and instrumental terms. We tend to focus on its
scientific, educational, political, and market value, to the exclusion of its
more fundamental value. The problem lies not in the existence of these
instrumental forms of value but in their domination over other forms of
value. (Harding, 1999, p. 293)
Conceptions of value seem to have become, if not necessarily the supremely
dominant currency in thinking about the ethics of cultural heritage and the various
forms of significance which items thereof might possess, at least a widely recognised
coin. No doubt UNESCO is in large part responsible for this state of affairs, with the
formula of `outstanding universal value' forming a critical element of the Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO,
1972); `value' is also a term employed repeatedly in the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property (UNESCO, 1970). Philosophers, however, have adopted it largely
with approval. For Janna Thompson, value of a certain sort (or values; in the
following quotation the two words seem to be employed with a purely grammatical
distinction) offers a starting point for further reflection:
Appeals to rights of cultural property support some restitution claims
but not others. However many of those who think that museums ought
to resist demands for restitution are claiming that there are values at
stake that can justify refusing demands for restitution even when they
are legitimate. They are not pitting the claims of one collectivity against
another. They are not claiming that the acquisitions of a museum have
become over time the cultural property of the museum or the people
of their countrythat, for example, the [Elgin] Marbles are by now
truly British. They are insisting that museums are the protectors of
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values that transcend rights of cultural property, including the right to
restitution.
The values mentioned in the Declaration [sc. on the Importance and
Value of Universal Museums] of the museum directors are education
and the advancement of knowledge, and to this we can presumably add
æsthetic worth. These values are assumed to be of significance to all
of humankind and I will call them `values for humanity' (or in short,
`human values'). Æsthetic worth is a notoriously contested concept and
not every society believes in the value of scholarship or values the kind
of education that the museum directors have in mind. But I will assume
that these values can be given an adequate defencethat differences in
æsthetic taste do not prevent considerable agreement about what is of
æsthetic worth and that education and advancement of knowledge are
things that people ought to value.
The argument advanced by those who think that museums are within
their rights to resist restitution claims is that some artefacts are of such
great value for humanity that it is justified to restrict or override rights of
cultural property in order to promote or protect this value. (Thompson,
2003, p. 257)
`When cultural property is central to a collectivity's practices,' she concludes, `its
rights are not trumped by appeals on behalf of human values. But not all cultural
property is central to a collectivity's practices. If artefacts have only a marginal
importance to the collectivity and their human value is considerable, then its rights
become more difficult to defend.' (ibid., p. 260) The term `values for humanity' is an
overtly anthropocentric one, and it seems fair to take it that Thompson understands
the value of items of cultural heritage to be a type of instrumental value (of which
more later), at least insofar as æsthetic value, say, is instantiated in a particular
cultural item: what makes the item valuable are its æsthetic properties, and what
makes those valuable is the role they play `for humanity' as a whole.
Whereas Thompson emphasises cases in which she believes that `human values'
should be understood to override ownership rights, James O. Young has defended
the claim `that cultures sometimes are the rightful owners of cultural property, even
when they have not inherited, made, purchased or been given the property.' He
believes `that the basis of a culture's claim on cultural property can simply be the
great value that some property has for members of a culture.' (Young, 2007, p. 120)
According to such a view, the value of a cultural item (and specifically the value
it holds for a certain cultural group) may sometimes serve to give that group a
particular claim on the item (though theirs will typically not be the only rights
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which ought to be considered (ibid., p. 122)). The lesson which Young draws from
this is summarised in his `cultural significance principle' (otherwise the `cultural
property principle'; see p. 45): `When an item of cultural property has æsthetic,
historical or other value to the members of some culture, then the culture has some
claim to the ownership of the property in question. The strength of the claim will
be proportional to the value the property has for members of the culture.' (ibid.,
p. 122)
Thompson and Young thus both recognise value of a relevant sort which can be
of multiple types: æsthetic value is the sole example which they both employ in
the quotations above. Each seems to acknowledge relations of some complication
between such value and rights (principally, rights of some sort of ownership of
`cultural property'); Thompson, however, tends to emphasise the potential of `values
for humanity' at large to mitigate the particular rights and associated claims of
particular cultural groups, whereas Young has taken an interest in the potential of
value for particular groups to be a source of rights for them. These positions are
not necessarily incompatible, and neither philosopher presents the implications for
normative decision-making as uncomplicated. Nevertheless, when we notice that
value apparently can play so flexible a role in our thinking about what claims may
be made on cultural items and by whom, it seems a suitable moment to pause and
ask once again what might have made this term `value' appear a helpful or important
one to introduce to the conversation.
I suspect that some of the appeal lies in the resolutely anthropocentric ground
upon which debates about the moral questions concerning cultural heritage, not
only its nature but by implication its value too, tend to be conducted. Since the
very status of an item as a cultural item depends upon its having acquired a place
within some form of culture, and since culture (whatever else it is) is a phenomenon
of our existence in human collectivities, it seems entirely natural to construe the
very nature of cultural heritage in terms of relationships between a given cultural
item and some or all of the human species, and no less natural to expect that our
ethical involvement with cultural heritage must be somehow grounded in, or at least
involved with, these relations. Yet the mere fact that cultural items originate with
human collectives implies and explains little; a great many flakes of dead skin have
originated with my very body, but nobody would take me seriously if I tried to make
them the objects of personal restitution claims. It cannot follow simply from the fact
of their origins that (some or all) cultural items play or ought to play any interesting
part in anybody's moral life. Neither can it straightforwardly be said that we have
need of them, since biologically speaking we have no such needs. There are points
of view according to which culture ought to be considered a human good (Appiah,
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2005, pp. 120-30), either basically or in the necessary service of such other goods as
autonomy or a sense of identity, and according to which without culture the good
life is unattainable or only arduously so; but it is likely to prove to be no trivial task
to advance from any such claim about culture in general to conclusions about the
proper fate of a given cultural item, should anybody aspire to make the attempt.
It would not be a trivially mistaken account of the life worth living for a man of
Athens which claimed that among its constituent aspects would be the unification
of the Parthenon Marbles, but scholars of other conceptions of the eudaimon life
might well be taken aback by it.
What then can we minimally say about our involvement with cultural items which
might help us to think about them in ethical terms? A blunt and observable matter
of fact about the way in which some of them animate our concern is just that: they do
animate our concern. We care about some cultural items; or, reversing the formula,
they (apparently) matter to us. The word `value' captures both formulations, for to
say that something has value is to imply that it is such that there is reason to give
it some form of special treatment, while to say that something is valued is to imply
that someone responds to it by judging that it commands some special treatment.
It is not plain that we need commit ourselves to deploying the language of value in
just one way or the other (although we can, of course, be outright projectivists if
our doctrine is that this value has its source in human sentiment), and so we can
be comfortably anthropocentric in casting human beings as the party actively doing
the valuing, while remaining open to the possibility that there is much more than an
appeal to sheer human caprice to be said about which items warrant being valued,
and why some might warrant it more than others. Hence the putative taxonomies
of value which appear in the quotations above: this `value' is not the counterpart
of some blind, romantically impulsive act of valuing, but value of sorts which are
particularly capable of manifesting themselves in such a phenomenon as cultural
heritage.
8.1. Intrinsic and Nonintrinsic Value
What then could be the nature of this value? A familiar distinction for moral
philosophers is that between intrinsic and nonintrinsic value. Shelly Kagan identifies
two general ways of construing such a distinction (Kagan, 1998, pp. 278-9). One
(which I suspect is loosely a counterpart to Kant's distinction between categorical
and hypothetical imperatives) considers the relations which a thing has with other
things: if the value it has is dependent on a relation to something else, this value is
nonintrinsic (and most of us would probably call it extrinsic), whilst if the thing in
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question would retain its value even if it were the only thing in the universe, then the
value is intrinsic. The other way of framing the distinction (which is reminiscent of
Aristotle) is concerned with means and ends: what has value as an end in itself has
intrinsic value, and what is valuable as a means to some other end has nonintrinsic
value which would typically be called instrumental value. Kagan's conclusion is
that it is a dubious intellectual move to unite these ideas under the single label
`intrinsic value' (ibid., p. 280), and in fact one of the examples he cites in the course
of building his argument could easily be recast in the language of cultural heritage:
`the pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing
the slaves'. If this has intrinsic value by virtue of being what it is, it has it as a result
of having played a certain causal part in history, in turn as a result of being one of
many items which possess instrumental value for signing documents. Thus, Kagan
suggests, we have a case in which an object's intrinsic value plausibly depends on
its instrumental value (ibid., pp. 285-6).
The critic of established conceptions of intrinsic value whose work is most
pertinent to my own is not Kagan, however, but the legal theorist Sarah Harding,
who has defended `a way to think about cultural heritage that focuses on its intrinsic
value' (Harding, 1999, p. 295) (or at least, a way to think about `important cultural
heritage, heritage that we could classify as nearly indispensable' (ibid., p. 343)); like
me, she has drawn inspiration from environmental ethics (ibid., p. 316, note 109),
although unlike me she distinguishes her points of inspiration from those which
concern themselves with human-independent ecological ethics (ibid., p. 329, note
159). Where we most obviously differ is in what we take to be the role of human
beings in grounding this intrinsic value: Harding associates herself firmly with the
anthropocentric mould which associates value with the satisfaction of the needs and
wants of minded human beings (although my use of the label is, though fitting,
in another respect unfortunate: it is Harding, in criticising R.M. Hare's contention
that `only those things capable of valuing and capable of having interests can have
morally relevant value', who calls it `an excessively anthropocentric view of value'
(ibid., p. 317)). In her judgment, any `suggestion that a potlatch dance or [a] da
Vinci manuscript has value independent of human valuing or human experience is
incoherent; cultural heritage is valuable precisely because it is an expression or an
intimate part of human experience' (ibid., p. 317). Accordingly, she sets out to
`explore the possibility of isolating a category of intrinsic value that is embedded
in, rather than distanced from, human experience, without being limited to human
experiences' (ibid., p. 321).
If Harding had wholly succeeded in ascribing some form of intrinsic value to
cultural heritage, then while my non-anthropocentric approach might remain a
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technically plausible alternative, its interest as a source of normative guidance
would be substantially diminished unless, perhaps, it turned out to imply strikingly
different conclusions. However, I do not believe that Harding's approach altogether
succeeds in its intended aims, although it does go some way towards showing how
such an approach might proceed.
Harding, like Kagan, is concerned to unpick the exact meaning, or meanings, of
the term `intrinsic value'. She takes note of suggestions that what has intrinsic value
is an end in itself; that (as in G.E. Moore's work) intrinsic value depends solely on
intrinsic properties; and that intrinsic value is simply `value which is independent of
the valuation of a valuer' (ibid., pp. 316-17).1 In her judgment, however, `it is not
clear that intrinsic value is restricted to these ideas' (Harding, 1999, p. 317); and if
they do not provide an exhaustive definition, then room may remain for alternatives
within `our shared understanding of intrinsic value' (ibid., p. 317).
The objective value theory holds that something has intrinsic value only
if it can be said to have value independent of our personal or collective
value assessments. Under such an approach, intrinsic value is completely
divorced from our inclinations to appreciate something. The test for
such an approach is often framed by the following question: would x
continue to have value even after the disappearance of humans (and any
other valuing agents)? Setting aside the difficulty of even imagining
the existence of value or inherent worth in the absence of all humans,
Vermeer's The Girl With a Pearl Earring, the Parthenon Marbles or a
Suyá song are clearly not valuable in such a situation. Thus, under the
objective value theory, cultural heritage cannot be intrinsically valuable.
(ibid., p. 318)
I should say that the second sentence is not necessarily true and the conclusion is
certainly false, but enough of me for the time being. Harding continues:
What happens if we take the opposite approach, that only those things
that are valuable because we think them so are capable of being
intrinsically valuable[?] In other words, intrinsic value is comprised of
only those things that are the subject of human assessment, a subjectivist
1Such a literature survey could be continued. Besides the distinctions made by Kagan and
Harding, there are also Christine Korsgaard's `two distinctions in goodness. One is the
distinction between things valued for their own sakes and things valued for the sake of
something elsebetween ends and means, or final and instrumental goods. The other
is the distinction between things which have their value in themselves and things which
derive their value from some other source: intrinsically good things versus extrinsically
good things.' (Korsgaard, 1996b, p. 250)
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approach. [R.M.] Hare would argue that if we reject the objectivist
argument and take a subjectivist approach, we are forced back into his
positionthat only humans have intrinsic or, in Hare's words, morally
relevant value... Needless to say, such a theory also makes it impossible
to view cultural heritage as intrinsically valuable.
But if we take a subjectivist approach as originally stated, that human
assessments are the only sources of value, are we committed to Hare's
position? That is, even if humans are the only sources of value, are
we then tied to the conclusion that only humans or human states
are intrinsically valuable? There is, as far as I can tell, no necessary
connection between these two statements. (ibid., pp. 318-19)
Reacting next to conceptions of intrinsic value which define it wholly in terms of its
dependency only on intrinsic properties, Harding suggests a counterexample: what
is ascribed to the Zuni War Gods, fetishes created by the Zuni people and ritually
left exposed to the elements to decay, is a value `dependent on their situation with
respect to humans', but `given the God-like status granted to these fetishes, the
Zuni believe their value extends beyond their usefulness or ability to satisfy human
desires', making it a non-instrumental form of value (ibid., p. 320). Cultural heritage
is also cited as a counterexample to the idea that what has intrinsic value must be
an end in itself, for the `idea of an end invokes abstraction and conclusion..., and
yet the value of cultural heritage, not unlike the value of the environment, exists in
its embeddedness in our lives.' (ibid., p. 321) Items of cultural heritage are `things
that may not have self-justifying value but nonetheless resist being reduced to mere
means.' (ibid., p. 321)
Drawing on work by Joseph Raz, Harding suggests that we can additionally
construe intrinsic (as opposed to instrumental) value in terms of independence of
consequences (while still allowing that some things may alternatively be intrinsically
valuable on account of, say, being ends in themselves): a thing has intrinsic value
if the value it has is not possessed solely on account of what the thing can be used
to bring about. Thereby, she says, we `broaden the concept' of intrinsic value2 `to
include an entirely different category of goods' (Harding, 1999, p. 322). These goods
are characterised by constituency, or embeddedness, within other goodsultimately,
within a good life.
The value of goods that are deeply and fundamentally embedded in other
2This, incidentally, makes Harding's approach to the taxonomy of value actually opposed
to Kagan's, the latter's 1998 paper having concluded that we would be better off not
trying to use the term `intrinsic value' to cover two distinguishable concepts (or perhaps,
we should now say, at least two).
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intrinsically valuable goods goes well beyond any consequences they
might produce and thus they can be considered intrinsically valuable.
So, anything which is an element of something which is intrinsically
valuable in the first few senses  objectively or non-relationally as an
`end'  is itself intrinsically valuable albeit relational and contingent.
(ibid., p. 322)
8.2. Harding On Value and Experiences
We are invited to presume `that the least controversial of intrinsic goods is a
flourishing human life' (ibid., p. 322); it then follows, the argument runs, that
the constituents of this also have intrinsic value. Harding contends that certain
kinds of experience, which she identifies as `æsthetic' and `cultural' experiences, are
among these constituents of the flourishing life; that cultural heritage, or at any rate
important cultural heritage, is in turn one of the constituents of these experiences;
and accordingly that cultural heritage is intrinsically valuable. Cultural heritage,
then, is supposed to inherit intrinsic value from the cultural and æsthetic experiences
in which it features as a constituent, which in turn inherit their intrinsic value from
the flourishing life by virtue of being constituents of it.
I have no wish to disagree that a flourishing human life will involve cultural
heritage; although I suspect that this has at least as much to do with its being a
recognisably human life as with its being eudaimon, and of course I cannot help
recalling the Aristotelian observation that everyone agrees that the goal of life is
eudaimonia, yet there is ample disagreement about exactly what it is. (No doubt
a great many vandals and iconoclasts have believed themselves to be acting for the
furtherance of living the good human life as they understood it.) Clearly, however,
a great deal will depend on how exactly we are to understand these relations of
constituency or embeddedness or elementality. Harding does not, I think, intend us
to be convinced that if x has intrinsic value, then whatever is a part of x also has
intrinsic value.3 That would certainly be an unlikely claim. Imagine that I have
fallen swooningly in love with some woman on account of her charming character,
her intellectual fascination, her physical beauty, and so on. Only the occasional
minor demerit detracts from the overall vision of loveliness: her fondness for trashy
breakfast television, perhaps, or the flatness of her singing in the shower. Assume
that mine is not the blind love of poetic fancy in which I am unable to perceive
these deficiencies; it is not, indeed, even the kind in which I am intellectually aware
3Nevertheless, Korsgaard observes that `it is common to identify a part of an intrinsically
valuable whole as having contributive value' (Korsgaard, 1996b, p. 252).
118
8.2. Harding On Value and Experiences
of them but my experience is so constituted that they do not matter to me. When
she sings, we shall suppose, I lunge for my earplugsbut I love her nonetheless.
Since in this sketch I truly love her, no doubt I value her, and no doubt as an end in
herselfbut does it follow from my valuing the whole that I must value each aspect
of her after the same fashion, including that awful singing? I see no reason to think
so, and I doubt that Harding expects me to.
The most obvious interpretative move to make at this point is, I think, to note that
we can perfectly well imagine my imaginary love cured of her imperfection (by means
of some singing lessons, perhaps) without her having in any way lost her already
existing merits or undergone a change in identity. If the attachment of her singing
to her overall person is disanalogous to the embeddedness of cultural heritage in a
flourishing human life, then, we shall suspect that this is because cultural heritage is
necessarily or essentially a component of the flourishing life, something which it must
contain in order effectively to qualify as the flourishing life. (At one point Harding
calls cultural heritage `the essence of cultural experience' (Harding, 1999, p. 338),
and shortly thereafter she asserts that the `rich context provided by cultural heritage
is essential to a continuous and meaningful cultural experience' (ibid., p. 339)  with
`cultural experience or a stable cultural context' (ibid., p. 340) in turn featuring,
along with æsthetic experience, as an aspect of the flourishing life  but I cannot tell
whether she intends this talk of essence to be taken at all metaphysically. Elsewhere
she calls cultural heritage `an indispensable aspect of cultural experience and the
evolution of cultures' (ibid., p. 340), where `indispensable' probably implies some
sort of necessity.) Perhaps it is for this reason, then, that in valuing the flourishing
life intrinsically we are supposed also to value cultural heritage intrinsically.
This has a ring of some plausibility about it, but I think that the complications
involved in talking about `a flourishing human life' may be obscuring something.
Let's return to Kagan's example of Lincoln's pen, and note that it is introduced
to us under a definite description: `the pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the
Emancipation Proclamation, freeing the slaves' (Kagan, 1998, p. 285). Since `any
of a large number of other pens near Lincoln could have done just as well' (ibid.,
p. 286), it is manifestly a matter of historical as well as metaphysical contingency
that this particular pen answers to the description. In this case, then, not only
each part of it separately but even the collective whole is only contingently to be
identified with the pen as it interests us and as Kagan invites us to consider it to
have intrinsic value.
This should give us pause. It seems that if a thing may have value specifically
under a certain description  and here let us note that `the flourishing life for human
beings' is a description  then in making any attempt to construct a mereology of
119
8. `Value'?
valuables we are at considerable risk of becoming entangled in complications ideally
left to metaphysicians and logicians. There may indeed be a sense in which cultural
heritage is necessarily part of the flourishing life, but I should imagine that this
would prove to be more a practical than a metaphysical necessitywhich may, in
all fairness to Harding, be precisely why she opted for the rather differently evocative
language of embeddedness in the first place. She called, after all, for a subjectivist
approach, although I am not certain whether she had in mind something along the
exact lines of Christine Korsgaard's definition of subjectivism: that it `identifies good
ends by or with reference to some psychological state' (Korsgaard, 1996a, p. 225).
If a more practical interpretation of this embeddedness is required, then what
exactly might it be? What manner of embodiment is Harding speaking of when she
refers to cultural heritage's `essential, irreducible value that rests in its embodiment
of æsthetic and cultural experiences' (Harding, 1999, p. 340)? The mere existence of
cultural items will not do. (Admittedly there can be cases in which something can be
of quite literally vital benefit to us without our necessarily happening to know about
it, as in the case of vitamins or even oxygen, but in these examples there are clearly
causal mechanisms at work, and accordingly the value we ascribe to these substances
will be instrumental; the embeddedness we need to understand must be of a different
nature.) It is consequently unsurprising that Harding concerns herself with cultural
and æsthetic experience as aspects of the flourishing life. On her account, items
of cultural heritage can be constituents of cultural and æsthetic experiences, and
these experiences in turn are constituents of the flourishing life. `Although it is
possible for some cultural objects to have no æsthetic value, all artistic objects have
some cultural value. We might in fact say the æsthetic is a personal experience of
the cultural' (ibid., p. 330), whereas cultural experiences emphasise collectivity and
social interrelations.
Considering æsthetic experiences first, Harding writes:
The real controversy in æsthetic theory appears to focus on whether
æsthetic experience is the ultimate experience not whether it is an
intrinsically valuable experience. In either case, it is intrinsically valuable
and art or artistic objects are a constituent of this experience. As a
constitutive component, art is itself intrinsically valuable. Thus, that
part of cultural heritage that can be called art and that evokes wonder,
is thus [sic] intrinsically valuable... (ibid., p. 333)
The focus then shifts to the role of cultural experiences in the flourishing life.
`Although æsthetic experience is determined by culture, it is an intensely personal
experience, one infused with wonder, whereas cultural experience is social, reflecting
our need for shared experiences and values.' (ibid., p. 340) Harding commences with
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a discussion of Will Kymlicka's brand of post-Rawlsian liberalism, in which culture
provides a `context of choice' within which we are able to pursue our life-plans.
As Harding reads him, when Kymlicka writes about the importance of cultural
structures he might as well be saying that cultural experience is intrinsically valuable
because `it is a constituent of something that is foundational, human well-being'
(ibid., p. 335). When Kymlicka writes that liberals `should be concerned with the
fate of cultural structures,4 not because they have some moral status of their own,'
but because of the choices they make us aware of (quoted in Harding, 1999, p. 335;
italics Harding's), this is taken to imply that cultural experience lacks `independent
moral status', but lacking this status does not reduce its significance to our `sense of
worth' (ibid., p. 335). I have to say that to me it sounds more like an endorsement of
cultural heritage as instrumentally valuable, but Harding in any case does not take
all her cues from Kymlicka; after discussing the ideas of other theorists about the
benefits of culture, including Charles Taylor's emphasis on `the dialogic nature of
the relationship between individuals and culture' (ibid., p. 336), Harding concludes
that culture, `whether as a context or as a dialogic counterpart, is of fundamental
significance to our identities and individual well-being. It is through culture that
we find expression and give meaning to our lives.' (ibid., p. 338)
Experiences, whatever they precisely are, are things which happen to minded
beings in the course of their lives; accordingly I agree that whatever the flourishing
life for human beings precisely is, it will involve experiences of certain kinds.
Presumably we are to take it that items of cultural heritage not only cause
certain kinds of experience, but feature within them in some manner. In trying
to understand what precisely is meant by `experience' as Harding employs the term,
and what it would then mean for an item of heritage to feature as a constituent
of such an experience, I find myself initially tempted to suppose that perceptual or
sensory experiences will be the paradigmatic case: when I stand in an art gallery and
gaze at a painting, then, my perceptual experience of the painting will constitute
both my æsthetic and my cultural experience of the painting, which presumably
features as the (intentional) object of those experiences. So far, so plausible: few of
us, I think, would wish to say that when I gaze at the White Cliffs of Dover, say,
the Cliffs themselves merely cause certain sensations in me,5 and that there is no
interesting sense in which I behold the Cliffs. Sightseeing would be very odd if we
thought of our perceptual practices in such a way.
4The published text of Harding's article incorrectly turns `structures' into `structure' here;
while this technically changes the meaning, by making `liberals' the only possible subject
of `have', I have no reason to think Harding ever misread Kymlicka's statement in this
way.
5More precisely, the Cliffs reflect photons of white light, which stimulate my retinæ..., &c.
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Harding's borrowing of Kymlicka's idea of culture as context makes me pause,
however. A context is something that lurks in the background of our experiences:
a context for something else which manifests itself in the foreground. Perhaps,
then, it is a mistake to take so much inspiration from the case of perceptual
experiences with direct intentional objects (whatever the role of æsthetic experiences
might suggest). Such cases may be too episodic for our needs: Harding appears
to be thinking of far more gradual roles for culture when she says that the `rich
context provided by cultural heritage is essential to a continuous and meaningful
cultural experience' (Harding, 1999, p. 339; emphasis mine), and when she asserts
that `cultural experience or a stable cultural context is intrinsically valuable' (ibid.,
p. 340; emphasis mine). If at least some cultural experiences are more diachronic
and less directly concerned with encountering cultural items as their objects, then
an alternative example might perhaps be, say, that of the experience of life within
the Church of England: an ongoing experiential process (indeed, an aggregate of
many episodic experiences) within a certain cultural environment.
Yet if this is so, then what could it mean for the Church (or the Church-as-
environment) to feature as a constituent of the experience? There is an everyday
sense in which the experience is `of' the Church, but we must be able to say
something more exact about such a very vaguely defined environment if we are
to be confident that it can inherit intrinsic value from experiences of it. In the
first place, such an example risks proving too much: why delineate anything as
specific as experience of life within the Church of England, when we could simply
speak with even greater holism of the experience of living the flourishing life? There
must be some meaningful criteria by which experiences are to be individuated. In
the second place, we are going to be left wondering how we are to bridge the gap
between these sweeping and indistinct experiences and whatever more discrete items
of cultural heritage we are interested in: how we get from ascribing intrinsic value
to the Church of England (as someone experiences life within it) to evaluating, say,
the Sanctuary Knocker of Durham Cathedral.
I suspect, therefore, that we cannot afford to get too strongly carried away with
this sort of sweepingly diachronic line of interpretation: if we are anxious to speak of
the value of discrete and often concrete cultural items, and if we make experiences
central to our account of how they acquire this value, then insofar as we would like
to appeal to notions of context and dialogue our best hope might be to employ
some form of idea that such experiences can have complex objects of which the
cultural context is one aspect. (Since I do not know whether Harding would endorse
a solution of this sort, I do not intend to develop it further.)
Still, the question remains: does the type of value which we ascribe to an
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experience surely transfer to the object of that experience? This is certainly a
tempting line of inference, when after all the experience is itself of the object; but I
am hesitant to ascribe powers of value-transfer to anything like intentionality in this
fashion. Subjectivism in the Humean mould, with its famous gilding and staining of
the world, has no obvious need to complicate itself with talk of embeddedness and
intrinsic value. Since intrinsic value under Harding's conception of it is not supposed
to attach itself to items considered in isolation from the rest of the universe, and since
indeed it apparently does attach itself specifically to items inasmuch as they play
roles in certain kinds of experience, I am not sure that there is a great deal of scope
for saying that each such item itself inherits intrinsic value from the intrinsically
valuable experiences, when it is only insofar as it plays a role within those experiences
that the item comes to be considered as a candidate for the inheritance of this value.
We should have, I suppose, to invoke some form of dispositional characterisation:
such-and-such an item is such that it is apt to feature in our æsthetic or cultural
experiences, and if we ascribe intrinsic value to it on the occasion of actually having
those experiences then we ought to ascribe such value to it outright. Once we start
talking about aptness and potentialities in this sort of fashion, however, I am not sure
how much still significantly separates us from talking about causes and consequences
(which threaten to lead us back to the territory of instrumental value). In either
case we find ourselves saying something to the effect that if some item is present in a
given set of circumstances then something (such as an experience) will come about.
The matter is complicated by the fact that, as Harding notes, while the `rich
context provided by cultural heritage is essential to a continuous and meaningful
cultural experience' (ibid., p. 339), her `argument does not entail the existence of any
specific objects of cultural heritage, but rather the assurance that there will in fact be
some cultural heritage' (ibid., pp. 330-31) (and that `it would make sense to ensure
the existence of the best forms of cultural heritage' (ibid., p. 331)). Now of course we
should be asking too much if we demanded a list of exactly those cultural items which
the flourishing life requires. The mind which cannot imagine the universe without
the Bateau ivre or the Ancient Mariner belongs to the imagination of Borges; while
we do of course hear the Parthenon Marbles (for example) described as `the soul
of the Greek people' (quoted in Evans, 2001, p. 218), and while I certainly do not
seek to downplay the ways in which the loss of cultural items may in some cases be
genuinely and grievously detrimental to a people, I am not out (and so far as I am
aware nobody else is) to defend the idea that some particular cultural item could
be so irreplaceably crucial that with it the flourishing life could be lost forever. Yet
it is not the bare abstract category `cultural heritage' that features as the object of
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our cultural experiences,6 and neither is it `some cultural heritage', as though some
kind of transcendental existential quantifier stood interposed between mind and
world. Whatever cultural experiences we have, they will involve particular items,
be these concrete or abstract: a poem by Basho or the constellation of Orion or the
conventions for telling a `knock, knock' joke.
Is there some manner in which we can experience each of these various and
particular things under the aspect of cultural heritage (contrasted with simply
having, say, perceptual experiences of an item combined with believing that it
qualifies as cultural heritage)? Certainly my earlier suggestion that cultural
experiences might have complex objects could point in this general direction. I
think Harding may intend the idea of a cultural experience to have the implication
that there is some delineable manner of having experiences which so frames our
involvement in the world that it makes items manifest themselves as salient qua
cultural heritage, although her use alongside cultural of æsthetic experience makes
me doubtful. (If it is strictly the defining characteristic of cultural experiences
that they lend items salience as cultural heritage, then it is unclear why we should
want to consider a distinct class of æsthetic experiences in this context. Whatever
cultural experiences can be like, presumably they are not necessarily supposed just
to be sensuous in the fashion that æsthetic experiences may be said to be.) Since a
given item may have a great many relational properties besides those we identify as
pertaining to culture, the mere fact of its being a cultural item will not make any
experience of it a cultural experience; if there are `cultural experiences', it is not
sufficient to make them so that they are experiences and that the items of which
they are experiences qualify as cultural heritage (or are believed to qualify as cultural
heritage by the person having the experience).
Yet Harding cannot be concerned solely with what it is to experience an item in a
certain light, for she declares herself concerned with important cultural heritage in
particular. Cultural experiences of pencil shavings and bubble wrap, then, will not
do; the cultural experiences in which we are interested are supposed to be cultural
experiences of certain kinds of cultural heritage and not of others (or not to the same
extent). Accordingly, our role cannot be to project cultural salience onto things in
the world; it must be to pick out those features of certain things in the world which
make them particularly fitted to play roles within our cultural experiences. This,
however, returns us to my recent comments about the workability of a dispositional
analysis.
Insofar as our intrinsically valuable cultural experiences simply require some
6Excepting perhaps experiences within the sort of culture in which people think abstractly
about cultural heritage: that is to say, mine.
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cultural heritage to be experiences of, these items of heritage look so interchangeable
that no particular item of cultural heritage looks like a candidate for inheriting
intrinsic value from the experiences in which it happens to play a part. Insofar
as it is certain noteworthily particular items that play their parts in our cultural
experiences, such that it is in culturally experiencing King Lear or the Venus de Milo
or Westminster Abbey that we are distinctively interested, it is doubtful that we can
consider them intrinsically valuable by simple virtue of their being included in the
flourishing life, because there is no such particular item without which the flourishing
life is impossible. At most we can say something to the effect that certain items of
cultural heritage are especially well suited to featuring in the cultural experiences
which the flourishing life requires; but it is not at all obvious that this shows more
than that these particular items are useful means to having experiences of `some
cultural heritage'.
8.3. The Search for Alternatives
There are surely further strategies which might be employed in defence of a position
like Harding's, but (having already done some speculatively reconstructive work in
order to imagine how she might clarify her position in response to objections) I
hope to have persuaded you that it is at least by no means redundant to look for
alternatives. I should like to conclude this chapter by briefly asking what, if we find
the idea that cultural heritage may possess intrinsic value at all attractive (or for
that matter, if we treat the idea with scepticism but wish to ensure that we have
given it the fairest possible hearing), we might consider doing differently. What do
I have to learn from the approach taken in Harding's argument?
Harding's subjectivist conception of intrinsic value was supposed to enable her to
avoid having to entertain the idea that an item of cultural heritage could possess
intrinsic value without its consequently needing any form of dependence on the
humans to whose cultures it belongs. Since what it is to be cultural heritage is by
definition bound up with human practices and inventions, such a line of thinking
tends to run, the same must be true of any value which we might ascribe to items
of cultural heritage as such; and consequently the value of heritage qua heritage
must depend on human interactions with it, or at least on the possibility of such
interactions. It is true, of course, that cultural heritage is unimaginable other than
by reference to beings like us, who inhabit cultures;7 and it is likewise true that
value of any sort which is possessed by anything must not be altogether alien to our
7We may, however, be able to imagine cultural heritage which outlasts the existence of the
human race, and I imagine we should still be content to call it (an absent someone's)
cultural heritage in such circumstances.
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species if it is to feature in our moral lives. Yet there is a gap between saying that
the existence of cultural heritage depends on human activity, and saying that its
continuing value depends on the same.
For all the reasons given above, I am reluctant to let an argument for the intrinsic
value of cultural heritage depend so crucially on a taxonomy of human experiences,
or on the exact nature of the flourishing life for the human species. Yet I can
nevertheless appreciate all too well why the flourishing life seemed to offer the
attractions of (as Bernard Williams might have put it) an Archimedian point: a
secure and uncontroversial foundation from which to construct an argument to
more surprising or contentious conclusions. As one commentator in the tradition
of Aristotle rather tartly puts it: `Why is education valuable? Because it is the
principal necessary condition for freedom. Why is freedom valuable? It is part of
a good life. Why is a good life valuable? Don't ask ridiculous questions.' (Sharvy,
2007, p. 19) Or as P.H. Nowell-Smith observed, there is a certain manifest oddness
in saying, `You have told me what the Good Life is and I agree with everything
you say. Now tell me what I ought to do. ' (Quoted in Skorpen, 1968, p. 140)
For anybody hoping to reach conclusions at all similar to Harding's by alternative
means, it would certainly be nice to have a comparably persuasive starting point.
It is also easy enough to see why Harding found it appealing to involve the value
of experiences in her argument, given both the centrality of experience to our lives
as (among other things) moral agents and deliberators, and the ways in which items
of cultural heritage are so often praised for the effects they are capable of having on
human minds. Along these lines we might think of artworks and their stimulations of
sensuous experience; religious environments and the attitudes of prayerful devotion
they inspire in the faithful; historical sources and archæological artefacts, and the
illuminations of knowledge which they make possible. I doubted whether we were
entitled to say that such items possessed intrinsic value as Harding understands
it; but certainly it is not easy to envisage any way of ascribing value to cultural
heritage which makes no reference at all to the experiences and understanding which
various forms of heritage make possible. (Who would be mad enough to evaluate
literary heritage without reference to readers, or musical heritage without caring
about performances?) Experiences, therefore, cannot be dismissed as unwanted
traces of subjectivism; on the contrary, the myriad possible experiences which the
many forms of heritage excite collectively form a topic with which I must take great
care.
Another thing to which I shall have to attend is the distinction between showing
that cultural heritage as a collectivity or category has value and showing that any
given item has value on account of being cultural heritage. Unless we think (as I
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do not, and as far as I know nobody does) that every cultural item qua cultural
item is equally valuable, it will be necessary to say more than that items of cultural
heritage fall into a valuable category. Nice though it would be to conclude with a
simple syllogism (`Items of cultural heritage are valuable; this is an item of cultural
heritage; therefore this is valuable'), we shall of course have to recognise, as Harding
evidently does, that there is more to be said about the distribution of value among
the many things we call cultural heritage.
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9. A Topography of Value?
What is the value of value for my purposes? What is to be gained, that is, from
adopting the language of value in ethics as my own when asking how cultural heritage
might fit into our moral thinking? Elsewhere in this dissertation, after all, I am to
be found speaking of the moral patiency of cultural heritage, something which other
philosophers who have considered its value have not found it necessary to do in order
to support their normative advice about what should be done with cultural items of
various kinds; so if I want to talk about value then why bother with patiency, and
if I remain concerned about patiency then why say so much about value?
I think that part of the answer must be that it is one thing to show that cultural
heritage is the kind of thing that can be an object of concern for us, and another
thing besides that to show that at least some items of cultural heritage indeed ought
to animate our concern. At any given time only some of a doctor's patients will
need medical treatment and care, and only some cultural items will invite ethically
charged action on anybody's part. Patiency is a binary notion: something either has
it or does not, and so if not all patients of a given sort are to be treated equally then
something, such as a scale of value, is needed in order to explain why this should be
so. Value, conversely, can prove to be a very complicated bundle of notions indeed;
on top of the taxonomic questions considered in the previous chapter, we often
talk not of value simpliciter but of value for someone, or value in respect of certain
properties of an object (which may themselves be extrinsic). In this fashion, a family
heirloom may be valuable for me because it has the property of having been passed
down to me through previous generations of my family. When we are dealing with
all the complications which a concept like value can lay at our feet, there are ready
attractions in the prospect of being able to speak of cultural heritage collectively and
declare that items of cultural heritage possess moral patiency, in turn warranting
our concern at least to pause to consider the question of what value they might
have.
9.1. Valuable to Whom and for What?
A concept of value is relational, as concepts of moral patiency arguably are not,
not only in that it implies the potential for there to be a valuer (which is no doubt
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why Harding was sceptical about the coherence of thinking that an object could
retain intrinsic value if nothing else existed in the universe), but moreover in that we
routinely speak of value in a restricted fashion as value for someone or being valuable
to somebody. In some cases the implication is transparently one of instrumental
value (the value of medicine to the sick, for example), but the case of cultural
heritage offers us numerous instances in which it is less than obvious precisely which
purposes might be served when we talk about, say, the value of the Parthenon
Marbles to the Greeks, or of Noh drama to Japan. Where we are able to give
a name to the further goods which cultural items such as these are able to offer
their constituencies, it is sometimes difficult not to think that we have reduplicated
the mystery: what would Socrates have to ask us, we might wonder, about what
precisely we mean if we speak of senses of identity or the prevention of cultural
collapse? I do not (of course) pretend that these are questions which no philosopher
has seen fit to address; Kwame Anthony Appiah has reflected at some length on
questions of identity, for example (Appiah, 2005), while Jonathan Lear has written
on `ethics in the face of cultural devastation' (Lear, 2008). I note merely that even
where concern for some item of cultural heritage does seem to be in the service of
some further desired end, we may not be looking at the kind of exact ends which
heritage might serve exhaustively as means. In the case of sickness, the end is the
restoration of health, and a drug which accomplishes it exhausts the need for any
further medicines; in contrast, it is hard to imagine any cultural group deciding that
its artists, scholars and others have now produced enough reflections on its collective
identity, and that any further such meditations would be redundant.1 (No wonder
Harding sought to construe cultural heritage as something contributive to human
flourishing by being part of it rather than a means to it.)
In consequence, however satisfied we may be that talking about value for
somebody and for some good is axiomatically reasonable, it can prove difficult
to describe such relations precisely, let alone exhaustively. We cannot deploy the
category of instrumental value without finding ourselves called on to explain just
what kind of instruments these are which aim at such indefinite purposes without
ever conclusively satisfying them. If we suspect that the value which we have under
our microscope is of a nonintrinsic but not instrumental sort, then we shall have our
work cut out explaining what exactly it might be, and would be well advised to cast
about for alternatives first. If we think that we are dealing with intrinsic value (by
which I mean the traditional sort, insofar as such a thing is identifiable, rather than
Harding's additional, `constituent' value), whatever our preferences when it comes
1I do not claim here that no society could imaginably judge itself to have accumulated
a needless glut of memorials, or to have developed an excessive fixation with collective
introspection; but such cases suggest objections beyond sheer redundancy.
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to `the somewhat vacuous (something worth having for its own sake), circular
(something good in itself because of its own intrinsic properties), and negative
(something whose good is not a means to anything else) ways in which [sc. G.E.]
Moore and [sc. W.K.] Frankena define the concept of intrinsic value' (Skorpen, 1968,
p. 139), then we face the task of explaining how the intrinsic value of cultural items
could be relational in such a way that an item can enjoy a distinctive value for a
given culture. Under either of the first two definitions this is evidently problematic
because relational properties are explicitly ruled out as grounds for intrinsic value;
while under the third the `good' of the intrinsically valuable item presumably can
be good for somebody, but if it is a good which serves no further purpose then we
should expect not to be able, or required, to offer any further explanation for it (by
saying, for example, that a given item is important for a sense of cultural identity).
It may therefore seem tempting to doubt that there is any systematic way in
which value may attach itself to cultural items; or to suspect that if there is then we
are looking not at a single kind of value but at such a mixture that we should not
necessarily expect to be able to disentangle it. I agree, indeed, that cultural heritage
in its manifold forms may serve a wide variety of human purposes, from securing
the position of political regimes (as in James Cuno's critique of the use of the past
for propaganda) to increasing the footfall of tourists; and in Chapter 11 I shall
have more to say about the ways in which our evaluation of cultural heritage as a
matter of ethical concern ought to deal with human interests. However, much as the
many ways in which the natural world may serve human purposes (not least that of
tourism) have not prevented the development of distinctively ecological approaches
to ethics such as Holmes Rolston's (recall Chapter 1), it need not deter us to note
that cultural heritage can be put to many purposes. Still, from the premise that
many items of cultural heritage possess value which depends on their status as
heritage, it does not trivially follow that cultural heritage in all its forms has value
of a uniform kind. In non-moral terms it is plain that some cultural items are
valuable for the tourist trade, some for the perpetuation of national pride, and so
forth (and we may in turn ascribe various valuables and disvaluables to tourism and
national pride). When heritage is put to so many diverse purposes, why should an
ethics of cultural heritage do any more with them than acknowledge their diversity?
I propose to address this line of potential criticism by agreeing with itafter a
fashion. There are indeed many and various ways in which we can ascribe value to
items which fall under the umbrella of cultural heritage. What we do not necessarily
need to do, however, is try to assign value (of whatever sorts and whatever degree)
to each discrete and separate item in turn, and thereafter look at the results and
ask ourselves what the point might be of tying all the individual valuations together
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into an overarching judgment about the value of cultural heritage and a single scale
of value for cultural items. There is an alternative, and it arises from the very web
of interrelations which may incline us to say that an item belongs to some culture
in the first place.
9.2. Value Taxonomy
Let me first say a little more about the variety of forms of value with which we
shall have to deal. According to the UNESCO Conventions there is such a thing as
(outstanding) universal value, and presumably this is to be contrasted with one or
more other, parochial forms of value. What might be the nature of the distinction?
It is, I suppose, possible that there are things which are valued by every (sentient
and adequately rational) being in existence, along the lines of Rawlsian `primary
goods'; but even if Will Kymlicka is correct in injecting culture into the Rawlsian
model as a fundamental requirement for our wellbeing (see p. 121 above), it may be
a little optimistic to expect that a given cultural item, no matter what its merits,
will be valued by all who are aware of its existence and have rationally considered the
matter. We should have to help ourselves to some rather contentious presuppositions
if we wanted to contend that a person disvaluing the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle as
uninteresting or the Mona Lisa as ugly was aicted by an outright failure of reason.
What makes such valuations `universal' is instead, I think, at a minimum that
it is open to anyone to judge one way or the other. In contrast, an example of
parochial value might be that implied by the phenomenon of ancestral pride (with
a corresponding disvalue implied by ancestral shame): it makes no sense for me
to take ancestral pride in someone from whom I do not claim descent.2 Parochial
value, attached to family or hometown or nation or other familiar things, depends
on who one is, and it is only gradually that one can become naturalised into a new
climate and acquire a new web of associations, while some associations, such as the
identity of one's own biological parents, can never be changed at all. The Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle no doubt has considerable and distinctive parochial value for the
English, but one does not have to be English to ask whether it holds interest as a
historical document; the Chronicle is a potential repository of universal value in the
sense that it is open to anyone at all to take an interest in the history of England. A
Tibetan or Egyptian who finds the English fascinating is hardly making a mistake.
Someone inclined to link concepts of heritage to those of inheritance might be
2I can, however, both recognise and respect as a matter of general principle that ancestral
connections of their own are things which may matter to people generally. Anyone
might value there being a world in which such ancestral connections are possible, and
by extension value such connections generally as manifestations of the possibility.
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forgiven for expecting that whatever made cultural heritage valuable would make
it parochially so; but to sustain such a point of view it would be necessary to
explain away the ways in which some cultural items address themselves to a universal
audience. Perhaps the clearest example of what I mean is offered by missionary
religions such as Christianity, whose doctrines are supposed to concern not only the
faithful but all those yet unconverted. A secular example might be suggested by
the verse inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, `Mother of Exiles': `Keep, ancient
lands, your storied pomp! cries she / With silent lips. Give me your tired, your
poor... ' Here the message is addressed not to those who are (already) American
but to the foreigner and the potential immigrant. To say in cases such as this that
we are dealing with a heritage which is of (potential) value only to those within
a certain church or nation or other group in question sits ill with the missionary
implications of such messages (which is not, of course, to say that anybody must
endorse Christianity or the U.S.A., or even approve of their existence). It would,
I suppose, be dimly possible to draw a distinction between those whose heritage
the trappings of the Church or of life in America are and those to whom they are
being offered (making them potential heritage), but the very notion of offering or
advertisement implies some potential recognition of value on the part of the audience.
So we must find some room for universal value, if we seek to talk about the
value of cultural heritage; but what exactly might give something universal value
qua item of cultural heritage? Universal value must be value for no culture in
particular in a world in which any cultural differences, any more cultures than a
single monoculture, exist at all. Can we discover such value? Someone might wish
(though not uncontroversially) to say that certain, scientific discoveries transcend
cultural particularity in that they concern themselves with the measurement and
prediction of natural phenomena; and someone might wish to add that it is precisely
for this reason that they count universally as human achievements, without cultural
circumscription. At any rate it is not instantly obvious that we add anything of
great import when we say that something is outstandingly artistic and beautiful,
or of outstanding historical interest, and immediately thereafter add that for this
reason it is an outstandingly important part of everybody's cultural heritage. Why
should we not be content with praising things for their beauty and historical interest
and whatever else?
The answer, I think, is that it is frequently only within an artificial sort of isolation
that we are able to pick out a certain sort of value as it manifests itself in a certain
particular item and speak of this value without any explicit reference to the context
in which we have found it. As a matter of linguistic convenience, we might say of a
certain object that it is historically interesting; but of course this is quite different
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from saying that it is white or solid. By implication we are asserting that we stand
in a certain relation to the object, and not to it alone but to a vast range of other
objects, along with historical practices, concerns, projects, and so on, which in
combination form the backdrop against which it is possible for us to judge that an
object is historically interesting. (Why might we care about Magna Carta, with its
list of feudal grievances, and only three articles still in statutory force (Hansard H.C.
17th March 2011, Vol. 525, Col. 140W.H.)? For its illumination of and symbolic
importance within the broader narratives of the political history of England.) A
piece of historical source material might be interesting not even for what it confirms
but for what it confounds, by undermining influential theories about the past and
thereby plunging us back into a feeling of acknowledged ignorance; the interest
which we find in this source will come about as a consequence of the intellectual
predicament into which we have got ourselves, rather than because the source has
the property of being interesting simpliciter.
What then of æsthetic value, for example, where the matter is less obvious?
Historical or historic value is meaningless without history, and our knowledge of
history involves practices of investigation; but while many forms of æsthetic appre-
ciation clearly do involve knowledge of one sort or another (in our understanding
of allegorical literature, for example, or of caricatures), when it comes to their
evaluation one might recall Hume's dictum that `to enable a critic the more fully
to execute this undertaking, he must preserve his mind free from all prejudice, and
allow nothing to enter into his consideration, but the very object which is submitted
to his examination' (Hume, 1757, 21): `considering myself as a man in general,'
I am to `forget, if possible, my individual being and my peculiar circumstances'
(ibid.). Where then is the cultural backdrop which might inform our evaluations? I
am, Hume writes, to let my judgments be informed by awareness that a given work
was perhaps executed for `persons of a different age or nation' (ibid.), but this is as
close as the Humean critic comes to anything akin to James Cuno's delight in the
complex histories of ancient works of craftsmanship.
This is not the place to chart the changes and debates in æsthetic thought since
Hume, or to remark except in passing on his own cultural particularities. All I need
really note is that, while it might be the case that sensuous æsthetic experiences
are possible without enculturation (for newborns, perhaps), the matter need not
concern us, because all those whom I might find myself addressing (i.e. people
who communicate in some formalised language and are acquainted with at least
one culture) will have cultivated whatever tastes they possess within some cultural
environment. Hume presumably urges his readers to judge art objects in isolation
precisely because he knows that this requires deliberate effort. I am, indeed, entirely
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willing to countenance the possibility that not all of what can be said about æsthetic
value need have reference to culture; the question is settled quite adequately in favour
of (sometimes) talking about æsthetic value in relation to cultural heritage if we can
be satisfied that much æsthetic value falls under the cultural umbrella.
Our need to understand some forms and manifestations of value by reference
to culture, then, is one which arises out of the myriad ways in which items can
be associated with one another. Perhaps the most striking examples, to which
I shall give special attention in the following chapter, are those implied by such
grand categories as the artistic movement, the literary genre, and the historical
epoch; but the building blocks of these sweeping categories are binary relations
of influence between cultural items and their creators: a inspires b; c contains
criticism of d ; e is based on a suggestion by the author of f. In 6.1 I suggested that
our understanding of what cultures are and how we as moral philosophers might
profitably view them might be enhanced by emphasising the ways in which the
interplay of cultural phenomena can be construed in terms of the interconnections
between nodes within a vast and vastly complex network. What I should now like to
suggest is that by invoking this image of the network we may better understand not
only the nature of cultural phenomena but also (and of more immediate importance
for moral philosophy) the place of value amongst them.
9.3. Network and Value
In order to illustrate what I envisage, let me begin with an artificially simplified
model. Set aside for the moment the complexities of life and production in which
creators inspire and lampoon and compete with and otherwise react to one another
in their works, and suppose that our interest is strictly and uniformly in the spatial
and temporal relations between the items they create. Suppose, further, that we are
interested in these items exclusively at (what we can least implausibly make out to
be) their moments of creation.
We could represent these relations abstractly, by cartographic means for relations
of geography and with the familiar device of a timeline for the temporal. Now
let us begin by plotting the genesis of a few cultural items. St. Paul's Cathedral
in London, to start with: the first stone is said to have been laid in 1675, giving
the Cathedral an early position on a timeline starting (let us say) in 1600. On a
map of the world we shall find the Cathedral conveniently close to Greenwich. The
Palace of Westminster will occupy practically the same position on the map owing
to its geographical proximity, but since almost all of the present Palace dates from
after the fire of 1834 which destroyed the earlier one, we have reason to position
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it much further along the timelinenot far, in fact, from the Arc de Triomphe in
Paris, which will be a little further along the timeline but still much less so than,
for example, the Sydney Opera House.
In selecting space and time for this preliminary exposition (while carefully
ignoring all the questions of shifting natural and political boundaries, among a
great many other things, which complicate the actual cultural affinities of anything
and anywhere we might care to mention), I have sought to recall, however crudely,
suggestions that a cultural item may have a place to which it properly belongs (and
that some such items perhaps ought to be repatriated), and controversies over the
impact of time and change on an item's cultural affinities now that (for example)
the Egypt of the Ptolemies, and even of Napoleon, is no more. The results of so
simplified an abstraction are, I confess, apt to raise more eyebrows than spirits,
since what they reveal is that neither geography nor time alone discloses a great
deal about an item's cultural affinities. Thus the Palace of Westminster, home of
British parliamentary sovereignty, ends up visibly closer on the timeline to a French
monument commissioned by the Emperor Napoleon than to the geographically
neighbouring and equally British St. Paul's. Meanwhile, on the map both British
icons are practically next door to Paris, while the Sydney Opera House of Australia,
which shares among other things a language and a monarch with the United
Kingdom, is decidedly geographically remote from London. Neither the succession
of the eras nor the confines of geography might seem to reveal very much about
cultural connections.
Things should get more enlightening, however, with the addition of more cultural
items; the timeline will indicate that Britain and France have indeed been uneasy
neighbours since long before the colonisation of Australia, and on the map it will
turn out that St. Paul's and the Palace of Westminster not only happen to be
proximate but form parts of a single and major conurbation. This state of affairs
has come about, of course, precisely because spatiotemporal proximity is only part
of the story; if, during certain periods as indicated by our timeline, we notice dense
clusters of little dots at the points on the map corresponding to Bloomsbury or the
Parisian Left Bank, we shall in no way mistake these phenomena for the products of
random chance. Cultural items are created by people, and likeminded people mingle
together.
Overleaf: The Flowering Staircase: 1435-1935, courtesy of Timothy Stotz.
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9.3. Network and Value
The mingling of minds can also be charted: such a possibility is exemplified by
The Flowering Staircase, a visual representation of master-apprentice and teacher-
student relationships between artists which is reproduced opposite by the kind
permission of Timothy Stotz (and first published in Stotz, 2006). This chart of
who worked with whom over a period of five centuries traces some of the historical
connections by means of which each figure may be placed among the others (recalling
T.S. Eliot's remarks on tradition from p. 91); if we are interested in any one of them,
we shall naturally be interested in the surrounding structure of the lines of influence.
If our interest is in Goya, for example, we shall note the line of pedagogical descent
from Francesco Albani and before; or if our focus is on the art of the 1600s, our
attention might fall on the confluence of lines linking Simon Vouet to other figures.
Above all, the visual impression is of the sheer intricate interconnection of the history
of art, even when only certain specific kinds of association are charted.
Suppose then that we take such a chart as this as our inspiration when we imagine
plotting out a collection of cultural items, arranging them spatiotemporally or by
whatever other rule we might please, and drawing lines between them representing
not only pedagogy and collaboration but still more generally association in its
manifold forms: thus on such a chart Nietzsche's Zarathustra would be connected
to that of Strauss as the inspiration for the latter, and Proudhon's The Philosophy
of Poverty would be linked to Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy. The result, if
the sheer number and variety of interconnections between cultural items of any
appreciable number did not leave us with an impenetrably tangled mess of ink
(as it surely would if we tried to chart all the items and interconnections that
might capture our interest), should be that certain clusters emerge. The works of
Shakespeare, for example, will be linked by virtue of their shared authorship, and to
them in turn will be linked every one of the numerous pieces of scholarly literature
on Shakespeare, every item of criticism of every performance of one of the plays,
and in turn even commentaries on the phenomenon of what is sometimes called the
Shakespeare industry. When we enquire after the role of Shakespeare in culture, the
structure of this cluster will await our notice.
Put aside for one moment any niggling suspicion that not all associations are
created equal.3 Insofar as we can declare ourselves interested in certain ways in
which one cultural item is associated with another, so that we concern ourselves
with an author's entire oeuvre or with a whole body of scholarship, we shall expect
3I discovered recently that Friedrich Nietzsche was an intellectual cousin of the visionary
engineer R. Buckminster Fuller: `Bucky' was influenced by the legacy of his aunt
Margaret Fuller, a friend and collaborator of her fellow Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo
Emerson, whose works were read enthusiastically by Nietzsche. Whether this remotely
illuminates the thought of either man is, I confess, doubtful.
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to discover that certain identifiable clusters of interconnection emerge. There exists
a topography of cultural interchange, if you like: where the cumulative mutual
reinforcement of related cultural items is frequent, the `elevation' will be noticeably
greater. When we turn to questions of the value of cultural items, then, it would
be a remarkable turn of affairs if we suddenly brushed aside all thought of the
associations between items which contribute to making them interesting; and in
practice, of course, we do not do this: recall Cuno's emphasis on the cross-cultural
interplay which can be brought to light in the universal museum, or Renfrew's
concern with the contribution made by archæological artefacts to the sites in which
they are found in offering us contextualised information about past epochs.
My suggestion, therefore, is that instead of taking each item singly as a repository
of value, and then seeking to explain this value in light of the item's participation in
a wider contextual network, we have available to us the alternative option of taking
the contextual cluster to be the primary value-bearer, and judging individual items
to be derivatively valuable. Recalling the idea of ecosystems as repositories of value,
as discussed in Chapter 1, we would then understand ourselves to be investigating
a sort of topography of value, in which we certainly should remain able to say that
certain cultural items possess more value than others, but we should do so in the
light of the structure and interconnectedness of the cultural environments within
which discrete cultural items exist. This, I suggest, would better equip us to deal
with the roles which might be played in our evaluative thought by the historical
collection, archæological context, traditional festivities, and so on: these structures
of association would constitute some of the ways in which items can come together
in mutual involvement to form cultural heritage.
In the next chapter I shall refine this suggestion by drawing on the roles of
categorisation within our involvement with cultural heritage; but first I should like
to anticipate some initial objections.
9.4. Some Possible Objections
To begin with, there is the fairly obvious rejoinder that it may be foolhardy to expect
that, having lumped together the numerous forms of interconnection that can exist
between cultural items under the vague heading `association', we are going to find
ourselves in any promising position when it comes to actually assigning value to any
given case of association between items. Firstly, because the myriad individual cases
with which we should have to deal (if we consider, for example, the size of the index
of this text alone, not to mention all the references in the texts which it references,
and so on without manageable limit) will be too varied and too particular to reduce
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to any helpfully algorithmic means of evaluation. Secondly, because it remains to
be shown that in fact they consistently imply the presence of value at all; perhaps
we shall find ourselves more inclined to say that some associations imply disvalue,
and that others are simply neutral.
The only response to the first objection is to be a thoroughgoing holist: my aim,
indeed, cannot be to replace the aggregation of cultural items A, B, C, &c. in my
reckonings of value with aggregation of A-B associations, B-C associations, A-C
associations, and so on. I agree that evaluating associations between items is at
best no easier than evaluating those items themselves, and it is of course no more
my proposal that we ought to chart a value topography in so impracticably laborious
a fashion than it could be anyone's suggestion that we should judge the worth of a
tapestry by first establishing that of each individual thread (or, indeed, each point
of contact between threads). Again, recall Rolston's discussion of ecological value at
differing levels: there is indeed the level of the plant, but the value of an ecosystem
cannot be discovered by simply adding together the value of the organisms that
compose it. Still, merely declaring myself a holist about the value of cultural heritage
does not go so far as to explain how this is to be accomplished when it comes to
making practical evaluative judgments; some matters of moral epistemology I want
to defer to Chapter 12, but I accept that I presently owe the reader some explanation
of how it is possible to make judgments about the value of cultural heritage at the
level of the genre or the tradition or the local custom.
I accept, moreover, that I cannot get away with simply implying that associations
between cultural items, as a rule, are positively contributive to the value of anyone's
cultural heritage. There are perhaps few more brazenly direct forms of association
than that of actual reduplication in the form of plagiarism; who among us would
say the plagiarist was making a positive contribution to his culture? At best
such imitation is culturally worthless, we might say; at worst, by introducing
misinformation it renders itself disvaluable. Meanwhile, what are we to say about
a graffito scrawled one night on the surface of a historic statue? Such a thing
is very materially associated with the surface which it defaces, and we can quite
easily imagine that the scrawler may have employed the graffito precisely in order
to express his opinion of the sculpture whose appearance he has undertaken to
transform; but whether we find ourselves the better for his contribution will be
doubtful. By way of a less unhappy example, consider the case of two books, with
different authors, publishers and subject matter, which happen to find themselves
reviewed (by different people) in the same periodical: undoubtedly there is an
association there, albeit a decidedly weak one, but are we therefore to conclude that
the two books now reinforce each other's position within literate culture, or shall we
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say simply that we are dealing with a case of evaluatorily neutral coincidence?
Such thoughts carry some weight. We cannot make lazy assumptions about what
our conclusions will be when we do come to evaluate some cultural item against
the background which contextualises it; the immediate question for would-be holists
is, how are we to fathom the shape of that background, if not through a process
of iterative aggregation? Here I think that our moral epistemology had better
take advantage of one very helpful feature of human cultures: the way in which
they already help us think about who we are, tell stories about ourselves, and
orient ourselves within a shared social world containing people who think sometimes
similarly to ourselves and sometimes less so. We will not, after all, begin from
first principles and discover the prominence of Shakespeare and the abundance
of scholarship that surrounds his creations; the appreciation of literature has an
established heritage of its own within our culture, meaning that for the purposes of
a putative philosophical framework this is one wheel which we certainly need not
reinvent. It is in these resources for reflective and reflexive thinking that I hope to
find the raw materials for a potential moral epistemology to suit the framework of
moral philosophy I need, and it is on this that I shall expand in subsequent chapters.
Merely insisting that it is not for me to become a critic of the arts or any other
branch of culture does not, of course, remove the nagging suspicion that not all works
of criticism are insightful and not every popular legend has the ring of utter truth;
the resources which cultures make available for their own self-reflection, though as
cultural items themselves they must be taken into account, are not necessarily so
definitive that they cannot find themselves revised or even rejected in the light of
new evidence or new thinking from within or without the culture that created them
(Midgley, 1991, p. 81ff.). Not all such critique, however, will be the business of moral
philosophy, and much of what is will fall outside the purview of an ethics of cultural
heritage. What is left to me is, in substantial part, to account for the ascription of
any moral salience to judgments, be these `universal' or `parochial', about æsthetic
value or historical value or value of some other ostensibly non-moral kind, and to
do so in a suitably holistic manner.
It is not, in fact, immediately obvious that these requirements are mutually
compatible, and it is here that I face another potential objection: for whilst we
ascribe value of such kinds to discrete items all the time, might we not often be
inclined to hesitate to apply judgments of a similar sort to an entire genre or corpus
or body of local customs? The person who says, `I like high fantasy novels' may well
be ready to agree that many examples of the genre are poorly written, and may not
even wish to contend that most are of readable quality; and so such a person may
readily say of a favourite book that it is imaginative, moving, &c. without being
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remotely so willing to extrapolate any judgment of this sort to apply to the overall
genre into which the book falls. We have some reason to doubt, therefore, that
evaluative judgments pertaining to cultural topography will be qualitatively similar
to those which concern individual cultural items; if we can arrive at a holistic account
of the former which we can fit into moral philosophy, we may still be left some way
from being able to account for the latter.
At the root of such a line of objection, I think, will tend to be a thought to the
effect that there is something methodologically and perhaps even ontologically odd
about attempting to shift from the categorical to the particular, rather than vice
versa. Must we not, after all, conceive of individual cultural items as more basic
than associations between them? Of course I can react by flying the flag of holism;
but then it will no doubt be pointed out to me that although we certainly make
reference to the context in which we discover something when we call it valuable qua
cultural heritage, nevertheless we do not necessarily want to say that the value of
this something is to be explained in terms of a wider whole. Perhaps, for example, we
find ourselves enquiring into the nature of Shakespeare's acknowledged importance
within the canon of English literature: it would be an outcome worthy of a raised
eyebrow if we did not conclude that this is in substantial part explained by his skill
as a playwright. The countless acts of quotation and reinterpretation and reverence
which Shakespeare enjoys are at root to be accounted for, one might say, by the fact
that he was a great playwright whose works shed tremendous light on the human
condition; and consequently it gets things back to front to insinuate that the value
of his corpus is to be accounted for by the fruit it has borne.
This is another point which I must acknowledge to be forceful; yet at the same
time we must note that greatness is entirely compatible with obscurity, and while of
course the forgotten work of genius has value as something which can potentially be
discovered, read and brought to light, until that happens it remains tucked away in
an unswept corner of culture instead of enjoying the responses of an audience either
as an object of experience or as a fruitful source of new creativity. I do not mean to
say that an object can become a cultural item only once it comes under the gaze of
some sort of public; it would ascribe a remarkably great significance to the moment
of discovery to suggest, for example, that a hitherto unknown archæological object
becomes part of anyone's cultural heritage just at the point of being unearthed,
when the features which make it scientifically interesting in the first place did not
spring into being at that moment. Yet on the other hand I think it would be no
less rash to suppose that there is no relevant difference between fame and obscurity.
Whatever culture is, it is something to be shared among the members of a cultural
group; a given cultural item certainly need not be shared among or even known
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to every member of any such group, but nevertheless `culture' has connotations of
publicity and community which cannot be smoothly disregarded when we come to
consider the most obscure and overlooked of cultural items.
It would be both trite and implausible to suggest that fame consistently goes to
the things that deserve it, especially when our conception of desert is being employed
in the course of doing moral philosophy; I am unaware of anyone who equates sheer
popularity with moral worth. No doubt many cultural items are more obscure than
they deserve to be (in a non-moral sense of desert), and others less; no doubt many
could have been immensely fruitful and have inspired many derivative creations
in different circumstances. Yet such counterfactual fates of cultural items are no
more part of our history (until those which survive are unearthed and appreciated)
than those of any number of mute, inglorious Miltons; a counterfactual culture and
heritage make no more apparent sense than a counterfactual heirloom handed down
by ancestors we never had.
This places me in a troublesome position. In assessing the value of an item qua
cultural heritage, I cannot straightforwardly appeal to the attention which it merits,
since it may not have the role within a culture which it merits. There will then be a
case for the critic or the historical scholar or someone else to make that it ought to
be dragged out of obscurity and better appreciated, and from this it will follow fairly
readily that in order for such things to happen the item had better be preserved and
cared for; but we remain some way from being able without complication to import
talk of æsthetic value or historical value or religious value or whatever else our value
taxonomy may contain into our thoughts about cultural heritage. Yet it would
result in a curiously pared-down understanding of the nature of cultural heritage
and human interest in it, and one of doubtful assistance for debates about the fate
of cultural items, if we concluded that we as moral philosophers would have to take
no account of a given item's being appreciated because of its outstanding beauty and
artistry, or because of its tremendous historic significance, and that instead we have
little left to do besides acting as cheerleaders for what has already enjoyed popular
acclaim. It would also have troublesome repercussions for any distinction between
universal and parochial value, for if we are doing little besides counting heads, how
much significance is going to attach itself to the question of whose heads to count?
In the next chapter I shall explain how attending to the role of categorisation in our
understanding of cultural heritage can prevent a `network' approach to evaluation
from descending into a populist free-for-all.
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In the previous chapter I suggested that we should primarily look for the value of
cultural heritage in the intricate network of manifold associations which bind cultural
items together within and into cultures, and that we should only secondarily and
derivatively attempt evaluation of discrete and individual cultural items. Moreover,
I suggested, closely associated groups of cultural items may be said to cluster
together in a way which lets us talk about something akin to a topography of
value. Yet it is plain enough that I have explained `association' only vaguely and
sketchily: the problem is not so much imprecision in explanation, which if the idea
is sound would require only additional detail to address, but a more profound worry
that our judgments in taking an interest in one kind of association over another
may themselves presuppose certain conceptions of what is valuable; and if these
judgments are not evaluatively neutral in their foundations, then `value' threatens
quite to run away from us.
Perhaps we think that the common authorship of two texts is an important
connection between them; perhaps we judge it to be interesting that one sculptor
trained under the guidance of another; perhaps we think that an object takes on
a special significance if it has passed through the ownership of a famous person,
making it an item of `memorabilia'. Why do we think these things? Must we
think these things? The former question we must leave to the human sciences; the
latter we cannot very well ignore, since if our judgments about what constitutes an
important association between cultural items are themselves artefacts of our cultural
backgrounds, then we are at risk of finding ourselves in a terrible tangle.
I take it to be plausibly false that we must take an interest in, say, shared
authorship in order to live a recognisably human life, or indeed at least a minimally
good life (even assuming that `authorship' is not a culture-specific concept). So my
question is more along the lines of this: are there objective criteria, with rationally
persuasive grounds, for deciding which forms of association between cultural items
we ought to consider to be of interest? At once it becomes clear that this is not a
question which I shall be answering in the course of everything else I am trying to
do. It would involve trying to gauge the importance of entire intellectual disciplines.
Fortunately, however, I believe that it will prove possible to make a virtue out of
necessity and accept the conventions of evaluative practice which we find, not as
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foundationally grounded and correct everywhere and for all time, but as cultural
items in their own right, and consequently as objects of evaluation themselves.
How then are they to be evaluated? Or, if we prefer to think more holistically: how
are we to discover any topography of value to begin with if even familiar standards
of evaluation are admitted to be part of what invites evaluative scrutiny? If anyone
hopes for some sort of vantage point of neutrality which exists outside any culture,
then disappointment is going to be the most likely outcome. As I shall explain in
Chapter 12, I doubt that we can expect to find ourselves in any position not to
take the testimony of a cultural group as our starting point in trying to discover
the value of its heritage; and when we enquire after `world heritage' and `universal
value', the number of contrasting voices is likely to be greater rather than smaller.
It would be a poor state of affairs, however, if in the end we had nothing to offer
but the most unsophisticated sort of subjectivism; to conclude that the evaluation
of cultural heritage amounts to little more than a cacophony of opinions, besides
implying that philosophy turns out to be startlingly helpless to assist, would involve
a curious insensitivity to the depth of the reflection in which people may actually
engage when making judgments about the value of cultural items.
What makes it possible in the first place to make judgments about cultural heritage
and the value thereof? It is probably asking rather too much to demand that
such judgments must be made in the light of some concept denoted by the English
term `cultural heritage'; as I have noted before, especially in 3.2, it is uncertain
that there is any one concept to which the term straightforwardly applies. At a
minimum, however, I think we can reasonably demand that judgments should be
made in some sort of contextual light in order to qualify as judgments about items
qua cultural heritage. An item must be judged against some sort of socio-historical
backdrop, rather than in an artificial isolation and strictly as a disconnected physical
or abstract object, if what we call culture is to make its presence felt at all.
What sort of backdrop, exactly? A backdrop, at its most basic, against which one
cultural item may be compared to others: one which enables us to make judgments of
similarity (The stonework of this building resembles that of nearby contemporary
architecture...) and difference (...and is unique to its period and geographical
region). In order to be interested in any form of association (or lack thereof)
between items, we must have the basic conceptual resources to put them into groups;
and so from asking how judgments about cultural items are possible we come (though
not in a terribly Kantian fashion) to think about categorisation.
Our thinking about cultural heritage is full of categories, starting with the
category of the cultural itself. Our culture; their culture; high and popular culture.
Traditional cultures. Local and national cultures. Indigenous cultures. Oral culture;
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literary culture. Zoom in on one of these and you find yourself working with
categories again: myths, legends, Arthurian romances; folklore, folk tales, folk
heroes, tales about Robin Hood. We divide literature and cinema into genres,
painting (among other arts) into movements, and the year into seasons which we
speckle with festivals. Our history we divide into epochs and eras, which a suitably
venerable tradition may in turn unite by spanning the divisions, making us feel
somehow connected to its past practitioners when we partake in it. Our more
informal practices become customs and manners, whilst our languages encompass
the accents and dialects by means of which one spots a Geordie or a Brummie or a
toff.
In all of these categorisations, of course, there is a great deal of cultural
contingency. People in a part of the world with a different climate and different
agricultural practices may have entirely different ideas about how the year should
be divided: thus India has its rainy season, the Monsoon, whereas Britain does not.
The sonnet is no more native to Japan than the haiku is to Europe. Naturally,
then, categories such as these themselves qualify as cultural items; but they are
nevertheless indispensable for making any sense of our human cultures and their
heritages. This is in particular because these categories themselves have histories:1
thus we point, for example, to the development of the sonnet through Petrarch,
Shakespeare, Spenser, Wordsworth and other poets. This gives us some early clues
about value: if we assume that a given object or practice has value of a sort that
seems to warrant our interest, then we have the makings of an argument to the effect
that we rationally ought to value the categories by means of which we comprehend
what this object or practice is and how it relates to the culture into which it falls.
(If we are interested in the history of the object or practice, moreover, we ought to
be similarly interested in the history of the ways in which it has been categorised.)
The value which the category inherits may prove to be of a complex sort, for it both
defines the cultural item which falls into the category (indicating intrinsic value) and
is employed by us in the service of understanding and appreciating the cultural item
(indicating instrumental value). Greater complication still is implied if we begin to
suspect that inheritance may operate in both directions: if valuing a category, which
grants us the possibility of thinking about things in a certain way, leads us to ascribe
new value to the things which fall into it. Nevertheless, in these observations about
categorisation we may perceive the beginnings of a typological hierarchy of cultural
items and a corresponding structure through which value possessed by one cultural
item may trigger value in another.
1Cf. Charles Taylor: `in the course of their slow development and ramification, a set of
practices gradually changed their meaning for people, and hence helped to constitute a
new social imaginary (the economy)' (Taylor, 2004, p. 30).
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10.1. Some Complications: Arbitrariness and Bias
Let me deal at once with certain difficulties. In the first place, someone might
reasonably doubt that all categories are created equal. Are we interested only in
those categories which arise within a given culture in order to describe its own fruits,
or does value also routinely attach itself to the categories employed by a neighbouring
cultural group, or a visiting foreign anthropologist? (A cultural group is usually
likely to know something of how others think of it, but within its own culture it
may accord limited respect to their opinions.) As for history, are the categorisations
which the modern historian may employ to examine an event of the same status,
considered as cultural items, as those of the contemporary chronicler? We may
very well harbour doubts, for example, about exhibiting no preferences between the
categories of the colonised and those of the colonial, or where we sense that history is
being written as propaganda; categorisation is done with purposes in mind, whether
deliberately or subconsciously, and as such it may reflect partisan interests which
hold doubtful value for those of different parties. Even where the motivation is in
no way sinister, we may expect to witness more of conflicting perspectives than of
whole, unvarnished truths.
This leads me to the second difficulty: there is no obvious limit to the variety of
ways in which humans can contrive to divide up the world and creatively manipulate
it. Even someone sympathetic to pluralism in ethics might raise an eyebrow at the
explosion of emergent value which is implied if every new circumscription of items
within a category implies even the merest and most minimal addition of new value to
the world. If on a whim I take a sudden interest in the category of `objects on the left
side of my desk', and play at shuing objects into and out of this category, are we
supposed to think that I have created new value with these acts of categorisation,2
or even that I have added value to objects which I have so categorised?
One should note at once that a biased or somewhat arbitrary category is not
necessarily without value. We should hardly be able to understand the operations
and the histories of human societies without investigating both the schemes of
categorisation which people have employed and the motivations which lay behind
them; and while it is certainly improbable that anyone will ever think with interest
2We might, depending on our philosophical commitments, take the view that the category
of `objects on the left side of my desk' exists eternally (or at least that there is a non-
indexical reformulation of it that does), and that all my playfulness has accomplished is
to recategorise certain objects from and to the category of `objects not on the left side of
my desk'. When I make reference to creativity I have in mind intellectual development in
human history: there is certainly a point in history, for example, at which the category
`ecosystem' came into use, and it need not derail a discussion of its role in the ethics of
cultural heritage, or indeed those of environmental ethics, if we have not resolved the
question of whether, strictly speaking, it was invented or discovered.
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about divisions of the top of my desk (unless, of course, my use of such a division as
an example in this chapter has caused it to become a minimally interesting part of
our cultural heritage), the fact that people play a game called Trivial Pursuit, and
have been known to purchase books with such titles as Schott's Original Miscellany,
indicates that arbitrariness and triviality are not problems in and of themselves. If
there is a problem with bias, it is that some biases become dominant enough to
blinker us; if there is a problem with arbitrariness, it is that without some limiting
principle it threatens to run out of control, until an infinity of possible divisions of
my desktop starts to imply, if each of these is permitted to be even infinitesimally
valuable, an infinity of value in the corner of my room alone.
If we are not to find our heads swimming as we contemplate indefinite infinities
of value, then some principle must be found to distinguish those categories which
rightly fall under the grand category of `cultural heritage' from all the other
categorisations which pass through our minds in the light of momentary interests.
The solution, I think, is to be found nowhere other than in the ostensible problem of
bias: the conceptual divisions which we draw embed themselves within our cultures
precisely where they enter into the struggles and narratives of human history and
enable or even force us to see things differently. The border between two nations,
for example, may follow principles of geography (rivers are convenient markers of
borders) or applied geometry (straight lines are straightforward), but it is the border
as a concrete geopolitical fact, and perhaps even as an object of contention and
outright warfare, that will contribute to the national identities of people living on
either side of it, and hence to their cultural development. More abstractly and more
peacefully, the category `citizen' is part of the conceptual apparatus which makes
it possible to construct certain forms of society and political community (indeed,
certain ways of civic life), and the category `website' forms part of a whole collection
of ideas, norms and technological standards by means of which we communicate
electronically.
Each of these examples serves certain interests, sometimes conflicting interests.
A national border can be a source of great contention, particularly if the state on
either side has, or has had, expansionist tendencies; or if some of the people encircled
by the borders of a nation had not historically thought of themselves as nationals
of such a political body. Competing political doctrines have made citizenship as
much an ideal as a description, most obviously in the use of `Citizen' as a title in
revolutionary and post-revolutionary France. The Internet, meanwhile, has already
been the focus of at least one economic bubble in which there were very definitely
winners and losers. These categories' connection with contests, however, if anything
reinforces their claim to be important pieces of our cultural heritage. When we
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parcel up land into dominions, or promulgate ideas of the individual as citizen, or
begin to put pages online in order to make them accessible across the globe, we make
history and we change culture: national cultures, civic cultures, online community
cultures. The invention of these categories was part of learning to see the world in
new ways.3
From the fact that some categories are contested and nonetheless historically
important it does not of course follow that there is no problem of bias. This
problem may, indeed, take on deeply unpleasant forms. The categories of schemes
of `scientific' racism (as employed, for example, by the Nazi race theorists who
had to work out what degrees of Jewish ancestry implied Jewishness, with all the
legal, political and eventually mortal implications which that carried under the Nazi
regime) are undoubtedly of historical importance; equally undoubtedly they enabled
people to see the world in a new way; but the way of seeing which they enabled was
misguided and perverted, helpful in our own society only as a horrible warning.
I want to defer discussion of these unpalatable cultural phenomena, and the ways
in which we might and might not be willing to call them valuable, to the next
chapter, in which I consider the ways in which the value of cultural heritage may not
always sit neatly alongside other values and priorities in human life. In this chapter
I am concerned, in part, with less drastic, but nevertheless sometimes potentially
harmful, consequences of insufficiently nuanced categorisation. Young has expressed
concern at least since 1994 about what he calls `distortion' as an aspect of cultural
appropriation (Young, 1994, p. 416); recall my discussion in 6.1 above. By and
large he has in mind the risk that a cultural group may be poorly served by the
ways in which outsiders represent its culture and cultural stylings in their own
creative works; but another source of what we might reasonably call distortion may
arise from the ways in which cultures and cultural items find themselves categorised,
particularly where the power of bureaucratic indifference is involved. I have in mind
such cases as the following:
[A]n institutional arts policy generated in Britain in the last quarter of
the twentieth century... establish[ed] a separate category and public-
funding structure that seemed to define the role of the black artist from
outside. Such terms as `ethnic arts', `ethnic minority arts', `non-British
arts' and `multi-ethnic arts' were used... (Rhodes, 2000, p. 216)
Here we have categorisation gone bad in such a way that it threatens to sully the
integrity of the `ethnic' artist who, out of an understandable desire not to accept
starvation as the cost of creativity, follows the money. The problem is not simply
3I shall return to this point in 12.5, following some discussion of moral epistemology.
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that these categories fail to classify anything. Even completely arbitrary ones, like
`pastel works by European or Sri Lankan artists featuring a cat and at least two
persons, one of them clad partly in blue', do pick things out, assuming that anything
exists to fall into them. The potential problem is that they assist the bureaucratic
tail in wagging the artistic and culturally illuminating dog.
Where categories are not misguided they may still be awkwardly partial, and
indeed many of the debates over the proper fate of items of cultural heritage can
be characterised as classificatory disputes of a kind. Take for example the Codex
Gigas, a richly illustrated Bible and the largest manuscript in the world, which
began its existence in a Bohemian monastery and after changing hands several
times was eventually plundered by Swedish troops during the Thirty Years War.
A few years ago it was loaned to Prague's Klementium Gallery following a request
from the Czech Prime Minister. Our thoughts on what counts as the proper resting
place of the Codex, one of so many objects to have changed hands in questionable
circumstances during distant epochs, are going to be interwoven with what we take
to have the highest priority among the various ways in which it can be categorised:
shall we take it to be first and foremost a Czech creation, a Swedish possession (for
about 350 years), a Benedictine work, a Christian scriptural work, or something else
besides? It is precisely the fact that these are all reasonable categories under which
to consider the Codex that makes it difficult to reach any conclusion about what its
fate would optimally and ideally be. `The origin of ideas is not the kind of thing
to which purity happens easily' (Sen, 2006, p. 132), and the same is true of their
material manifestations.
The example of the Codex, then, implies that when asking ourselves how a cultural
item is to be evaluated, we ought frequently to be prepared to look to its membership
of a multiplicity of categories; but the example of `ethnic arts' implies that there
are limits to how pluralistic and ÷cumenical we should be prepared to be. Yet
the category of `ethnic arts' is itself a cultural item, an aspect of British creative
industry during a certain historical period which, indeed, has had a concrete impact
on the production of cultural items through its role in public funding mechanisms.
Is the problem simply that the use of this category, as Colin Rhodes has it, `seemed
to define the role of the black artist from outside'? We should have to dismiss a
great many inoffensive categories from our thoughts about the value of cultural items
if we permit this to count as a blanket objection. Thales of Miletus certainly did
not categorise himself as a pre-Socratic philosopher; we categorise him thus from
the outside. Jean-Paul Sartre did adopt the mantle of `Existentialist philosophy',
but neither he nor Simone de Beauvoir was initially enthusiastic; despite its not
beginning as a self-description in the work of Existentialist philosophers, however,
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the term has become part of our standard lexicon. Such examples could easily be
multiplied.
Is the problem then that a category of `ethnic arts' is æsthetically stupid, an
invention of bureaucratic convenience and political expedience with no sensitivity
towards what artists are trying to do and what the art-viewing public gains from
experiencing? We are probably getting closer, but one of the things to which we are
getting closer is a lengthy debate about what art is for, and rather than get sucked
into it I had better note that one thing an account of the value of cultural heritage
had better be able to handle is the existence of influential opinions different from
our own, even when from our perspective there are clearly difficulties with them. It
may indeed be empty to talk about `ethnic arts'; and in some people's opinion it is
empty to talk about the visitations of angels; but there are aspects of our cultural
heritage which are certainly infused with the angelic as people have believed in it,
and if an account of the value of these cultural items must take the existence of their
originators' belief as a given then it is not obvious that the case of `ethnic arts' in
bureaucratic thinking warrants a different treatment.
I suspect, in fact, that at the root of what Rhodes objects to is not so much
the category of `ethnic arts' per se but the institutional dominance which was
unthinkingly bestowed upon it, so that in the thinking of the bureaucracy it
threatened to eclipse other ways of thinking about what black artists were creating.
The threat thereby comes to look like an epistemic one first and foremost: if I cannot
think about the art objects in front of me other than through this prism of `ethnic
arts', then it is only from that perspective that I shall be able to think about their
value under the broader category of cultural heritage. If I am blinkered in such a
fashion, then my search for the culturally valuable will be inhibited: much as seeing
environmental harms requires a conceptual ability to see the environment (if you
recall James Boyle's example from p. 25), seeing certain kinds of cultural harm, and
certain manifestations of cultural value, may require us not to be limited to certain
conceptual resources. When it comes to the conceptual categories into which we
place the items which make up culture and cultures, we may indeed wish to employ
a principle of plentitude, desiring not only a healthy supply of cultural items but to
devise the broadest possible suite of ways of appreciating them too, lest any value
possessed by any cultural item should go unnoticed.
The problem then will lie in dealing with a potentially infinite demand for
new tools of intellectual categorisation; but I want to deal with further epistemic
complications in later chapters.
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The chief worry hanging over Chapter 9 was that ultimately, if we locate the value
of cultural heritage not primarily in cultural items themselves but nebulously in the
presence of associations between them, then perhaps all that we are doing is crudely
measuring activity which may be called cultural and then simply ascribing morally
salient value to whatever turns out to enjoy popularity. However, whilst society
as we know it certainly does take a great interest in popularity and its possessors,
nevertheless the ways in which cultural items may enter into popular culture or
niche subcultures, or into mass culture or highbrow culture, are more nuanced than
an outright game of numbers. Economies grow; cultures flourish.
It is this possibility of flourishing that catches my eye. Not necessarily the
flourishing of any person (although it is entirely conceivable that the two may go
hand in hand), but in the sense in which we talk about the flourishing of the arts.4
One thinks of the Golden Age of Hollywood, or the Augustan Age, or the Jazz Age,
or La Belle Époque; of the Harlem Renaissance, or the Scottish Enlightenment, or
the Latin American Boom.
The thing to note at once is that one thinks of cultural flourishing (and decline)
in the light of certain categories: in these examples, categories of geographical
space and historical duration. A limitation of a `network' model of culture on its
own is that it is heavily quantitative, inviting us to reckon the number of cultural
items which form each loose cluster: insofar as we can meaningfully bring anything
from a painting to a turn of phrase, to a tacit convention about what constitutes
personal space, together under such a very generic label as `cultural item', we can say
some interesting things about the distribution of these cultural items once we have
(somehow) individuated them, but one could be forgiven for thinking that in so doing
we have set aside what makes culture important to begin with. Can there be so little
to comparing cultural items that we need only consider where clusters of cultural
productivity may be found and how cultural items are abstractly associated? Are
we to get excited at the notion that cultural item x inspired cultural item y without
even asking whether x and y were novels or philosophical theories or doomsday cults
or whatever else they might be? No wonder the previous chapter ended facing the
worry that there might be little to be said for the value of cultural items besides
commentary on an unedifying popularity contest.
4Entering the query flourishing of the arts into the search engine Google
(http://www.google.co.uk/) on 29th May 2011 produced about 132,000 results. For
example, a `future flourishing of the arts and heritage' is a stated desideratum in written
evidence submitted by the Local Government Association to the Culture, Media and
Sport Select Committee (`Funding of the Arts and Heritage: Vol. II' H.C. (2010-11)
464-II Ev 191).
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Once we acknowledge that some of these cultural items are the very conceptual
categories by means of which we individuate cultural items and navigate the cultures
that contain them, we have the makings of a less artificial and more familiarly diverse
and colourful model of culture which nevertheless retains the attractions of holism.
Instead of a barely differentiated mass of cultural stuff which undergoes unqualified
changes, we see artistic movements develop, political ideas take hold, fashions pass
in and out of vogue; we witness technological advancements enable wider travel and
faster communications, in turn enabling accelerated interchange of ideas; and we
behold the development of new words, new ideas and new disciplines of study as
humanity tries to keep up with the task of making sense of itself. We can use the stuff
of culture itself to see culture in a more dynamic light: less like the shifting of dunes
in a sea of featureless sands, and more like what is sometimes called a creative
ecosystem. A culture cannot but be dynamic, whether its strongest tendency is
towards change and development or towards continuity and conservation, simply
because it is people that live with their cultures, and new generations of people who
inherit them.
The pressing question for moral philosophy is still, of course, that of where
amongst this cultural verdure we might hope to uncover ethically salient value.
If we are not setting out to measure sheer cultural activity, or the sheer popularity
of cultural items, what then can we hope to assess in order to discover where the
peaks and troughs of value lie in the cultural topography?
One thing we can say with confidence is that our assessment will not be conducted
from some ideally distanced and culturally neutral vantage point; we, indeed, must
find ourselves excellently placed to concur with Thomas Nagel's observation in The
View From Nowhere that
when we take up the objective standpoint, the problem is not that values
seem to disappear but that there seem to be too many of them, coming
from every life and drowning out those that arise from our own. (Nagel,
1986, p. 147)
To think about cultures is not to transcend culture but to appreciate how
saturated with it we are. `Culture' is itself a grand and sweeping category, one with
its own history of development through usage and one not trivially naturalised; any
conceptual model of it which we might develop would inevitably bear the traces
of its (and our) own cultural influences. As such, it is not strictly correct to say
that it can affect the value of cultural items to bring them under one category or
another, since we have no epistemology free of cultural trappings and therefore no
way of already having individuated and evaluated these items.5 I do not mean
5Arguably the most apposite label for this point would be that of `perspectivism', but I am
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that we have to be cultural relativists in either epistemology or ethics. We can
be realists about science or moral facts or whatever else; we can agree that in
these domains of knowledge there are phenomena which are discovered rather than
invented; but discoveries as much as inventions may qualify as cultural items. The
history of science is full of them: some even bear the names of the discoverers, such
as Kepler's Laws or the Planck constant. Moreover, in addition to having a scientific
heritage we encounter science as a creative theme in the production of new cultural
items: the stock character of the mad scientist in works of fiction, or the endless and
artificial `science versus religion' debates, or the dissemination of tabloid `Scientists
say' stories about what may or may not cause cancer. The most robust cases of our
having knowledge about the world may thereby exhibit the trappings of the cultural.
Categories, then, do not merely contain other cultural items but partly constitute
them. When it comes to evaluation, how does this help us avoid an awkward and
unedifying popularity contest? One might very well object (with a weary sigh,
recalling just how readily new categories may be devised and disseminated) that the
contest has merely shifted, and that now we shall have to concern ourselves with
the question of which categories, which manners of thinking, are most thoroughly
pandemic. Perhaps the hour has finally come for the `Superphilosophy... with
the greatest philosopher being the one who can contain the greatest number of
other people's personal philosophies' (Pessoa, 2001, p. 83), as we struggle to distill
a multitude of categorical insights into a single evaluative conclusion.
Perhaps; and it would be remarkable if we gave no thought at all to how
widespread a reception a category has enjoyed; but this need not mean taking a static
snapshot of some culture at a given moment and reckoning the breadth of influence
of a given category within it. There is limited scope for an ahistorical treatment
of cultures (see p. 73 above), and especially so if we want to acknowledge the
possibility of a flourishing of culture, which is inescapably a temporal phenomenon.
The same is true of cultural decline; it is true, as well, of the sheer continuity which
we call tradition. In 10.1 I suggested that unenlightened categorisation, suitably
combined with bureaucratic dominance, might inhibit the creative expression of a
cultural group; the corollary, then, is that less narrowly artificial categorisation has
a role to play in allowing such expression to flourish.
Temporality, of course, is itself not uncomplicated and culturally neutral. I
concluded Chapter 7 by noting that in thought about cultural heritage we
can identify at least two tendencies, which I styled traditionalistic (emphasising
continuity and potential perduration) and originalistic (emphasising fidelity to a
not satisfied that its usage is sufficiently straightforward, and I am hardly attempting
to ally myself with Nietzsche.
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definite point of creation); it is not obvious, I added, that these two ways of
approaching a cultural item are reconciliable when it may not be evident which
would (in typical circumstances) better suit a given item. If we now identify these
as forms of categorical thinking then we need not be hugely worried, since a single
item may be brought under many categories; but this observation on its own will
hardly dissolve or resolve the matter and move us closer to knowing whether origins
or continuity ought to be emphasised in deciding the fate of one or another cultural
item. That would require a grasp of which understanding of the item's often various
roles in a developing cultural history best allows us to appraise them, and that in
turn requires our approach to appraisal to take account of cultures' dynamism both
in creating new cultural items and in finding new roles for old ones.
Just what, then, are we talking about when we speak of cultural flourishing,
or decline, or progress? (What precisely might it mean, for example, to observe
that it `is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and flourishing of
French culture in Quebec is a good' (Taylor, 1992, p. 58)?) This, troublesomely,
is not a question whose answer can fall entirely within my present purview. It
implies judgments not merely of temporality but of teleology: not only of what
has value qua cultural heritage but of what is the right and proper direction in
which a given cultural group might take its collective life. This necessarily involves
a wide range of ethical, political and other questions. One person may judge that
a progressive culture is one that secularises itself, while another may work for a
revival of popular religiosity; one may be a defender of `high' culture, whilst another
regards its trappings as a rightful target of class warfare; one may defend freedom of
expression in the most liberal of terms where another will favour tighter regulation
of the press in the interests of public morals.
Even where debate concerns the nature of a culture itself at a fairly abstract
level, the focus will inevitably be wide. Reflections on cultural heritage certainly
ought to have something to contribute to discussions about the trajectories, the
intersections and the mingling of cultures (and philosophy can certainly help to
clarify and refine concepts of cultural purity, dilution, and so on; recall 6.1 on
`authenticity' and `distortion'), but such discussions are seldom conducted in strict
isolation from other social and political questions. We find ourselves concerned with
immigration patterns and the reception of refugees, and with whether policies of
multiculturalism worked in practice as well as in theory; we ponder `Americanisation'
as an aspect of geopolitics as well as in the media; we keep one eye on the politics of
propaganda and popular influence when we consider the power of the media barons,
or the costs and benefits of state patronage for the arts. It would be difficult,
and perhaps artificial, not only to reify `culture' as we conceive of it but moreover
156
10.2. Continuing the Search for Value
to attempt a complete and comprehensive account of what it means for cultures
to flourish without extensive reference both to the many forms of vitality which
cultures may enjoy and to the range of questions about what, ultimately, counts as
a healthily enduring culture (though admittedly it may be more clearly apparent
when a culture, or for that matter an ecosystem, is endangered, and flourishing
is altogether conspicuous by its absence). We should no more expect to develop
universal and abstract criteria for cultural flourishing than we should anticipate the
unveiling of an account of what it is for ecosystems to flourish which easily manages
to encompass both the wilderness and the cottage garden.
In the next chapter I shall have some more to say about interconnections
between the value of cultural heritage and other human values; but nothing in
this dissertation can conclusively tell anyone whether a culture of the wilderness or
of the garden is the more fitting aim. (Some cultures may even incorporate their
own teleologies or narratives of progress, or even eschatologies. The Kuhnian model
of scientific culture, for example, might be said to take it to flourish through crises.)
What then is there left to say about the value of items of cultural heritage, if enquiry
into what it means for a culture to flourish threatens to slip through our fingers?
What is left, I think, is the observation that cultural heritage offers the resources
by means of which such reflection can occur; to decide what to become you must first
know who you are, and for a cultural group that means both having an understanding
of the shared culture which defines it as a collectivity, and making use of the
categories which have emerged within its culture for the purposes of collective self-
reflection (along, perhaps, with some new tricks learnt from foreigners). Put like
that, this may sound as though the value which I ascribe to cultural heritage is
in the end strictly instrumental, a means to human autonomy and communal self-
determination; but that need not be all there is to the value of culture. It is not, after
all, as though there is Culture, standing apart from those whose culture it is like
some vast warehouse of resources awaiting retrieval, and then there is Reflection,
to be conducted by a grand committee somewhere else. No act of cultural self-
reflection can stand outside culture, and no altogether adequate understanding of
culture can exclude the possibility of reflection as an aspect of the life of a cultural
group. Cultural dynamism finds itself interwoven with implicit cultural reflection
(little or none of which particularly requires an explicit concept of culture): Wouldn't
it be nice if there were such a thing as well dressing? 6 Do you think many people
would buy pictorial postage stamps? Isn't it a shame that fewer people go to church
nowadays?
6The traditional practice, especially in the Peak District, of decorating wells with murals
made of petals.
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Thoughts such as these, as much as the acts which sometimes flow from them, are
part of the life of cultures, and it is in the light of this that we must approach the
question of their value. Enquiring after the value of reflection to culture, I suggest,
is similar (not thoroughly analogous, but close enough) to asking after the value of
health for the body, or the value of currents to the ocean. Such a question is not
wholly without meaning, if we understand the human body or an aquatic ecosystem
to be an intricate system which may in reasonable senses be pure or polluted, and be
vibrant or in decline; but we shall not get very far at all if we imagine that in reifying
any such phenomenon we are talking about something sufficiently dissociable from
its medium to possess independently instrumental value. Tides in the affairs of men,
as with those of the seas, invite a more holistic understanding.
What does this imply for the value of cultural heritage at large? (I have been
singing the praises of holism and fuzzily distributed value for quite a lot of pages
now, after all, and conclusions helpful to people arguing over what should be the
fate of this artefact or that traditional practice are still not obviously in the offing.)
Something quite dialectical, I think, in a sense which is indebted more to Plato than
to Hegel: we cannot hope to sidestep or cut short a process of reflection which is
neither individual nor wholly scholarly nor entirely philosophical, since it would be
a mistake, as it turns out, to approach the moral epistemology of cultural heritage
as though what an item was  its place within a culture  could have been already
pristinely established, and evaluation of its value for ethical purposes could be a
completely distinct second stage. What philosophy can offer, however, is aid in
navigation of the moral landscape which emerges once we shift from expecting to
evaluate cultural items strictly in the light of human purposes and needs, to asking
ourselves what in a broader sense is good for (human) culture.
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We can of course hardly forget that humans do have purposes and needs, and it
would be a strangely worshipful approach to human culture which would never
countenance the sale of any family silverware in order to fill human mouths; however
much there is to be said about the value or even the patiency of cultural heritage,
nobody imagines that there are no other values or moral patients which we need to
take into account. In this, in some respects something of an intermezzo chapter but
nevertheless a necessary one, I want to pick up where I broke off within 10.1 and
consider some of the ways in which an enthusiasm for cultural heritage may collide
with other morally important concerns.
11.1. Biases and Bigotry
Among the complications which I discussed in the last chapter was the fact that
dividing the world up in categorical terms is always done for some purpose, and
sometimes the purposes are not altogether upstanding; sometimes, indeed, the biases
which embed themselves in categorical thinking can be downright unsavoury. More
generally, not everything which a cultural group brings about and which subsequent
generations inherit is necessarily a fitting object of reverence or even approval;
some things will be morally disvaluable, and some of those which are not may be
æsthetically ugly,1 or narrow-minded, or simply dull. To expunge these from what
we acknowledge as heritage, however, risks what is sometimes derogatively called a
whitewashing of history, or at least an excessive romanticism when we reflect upon
ourselves, our ancestors and relations with our neighbours. I shall not be attempting
to identify a golden mean between historical blindness and collective hand-wringing,
but I do have cause to worry about what this portends for talk of the value of items
qua cultural heritage.
1Here, too, the attitudes which different generations take towards their heritage may
complicate matters: it comes as news, for example, that Stanford students have been
exhibiting increasing preferences for music recordings containing barely audible MP3
compression artefacts. `All that sizzle is a cultural artifact and a tie that binds us. It's
mostly invisible to us but it is something future generations looking back might find
curious because these preferences won't be obvious to them.' (Dougherty, 2009)
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It is probably desirable to employ some principle of epistemic humility which
acknowledges that we will not always know for sure which of the items of conceptual
apparatus which are presently available to us will most closely fit reality; but we
are unlikely to wish to be so sceptical as to suppose that we have no grounds for
treating phlogiston and Ptolemaic epicycles as historically rather than scientifically
interesting. When we speak of value, we shall want to be mindful of such qualitative
distinctions; at the same time, when we are hoping to be able to make practical
normative decisions about what to save, what to repatriate and so on we are likely
to find ourselves hoping that some broadly unified scale of value is within our grasp.
Yet it does leave an unpleasant aftertaste in the mouth to find oneself suggesting,
for example, that the categories of segregation embodied in the Jim Crow laws are
culturally valuable. One perhaps wishes to say instead that the remembrance of
them is what has value.2 However, remembrance of a historical event is itself (in
whatever concrete form it may take) a historical event, and hence a (categorisable)
cultural item in its own right, so we face some risk of a troublesome demand that we
explain how there can be value in remembering x without its being implied thereby
that there is value in x, even though there could be no remembrance of x without a
history of x.
Conceptually, I think the difficulty is that it looks contradictory to say that (1)
something has positive value, and (2) the world would have been a better place
without it. We can readily agree, I think, that some items and some categories have
served the most pernicious of interests, and that these things have thereby proved
themselves to be instrumentally disvaluable for morally good agents. We might
add, in support of this conclusion, that we have in mind not necessarily categories
which have been perverted to some malign cause, as when religious or patriotic
fervour, or the simple and accurate observation that there exist differences between
men and women, have been manipulated in the service of ignoble ends, but rather
categories whose malignant teleology is implicit within them: it is one thing to
observe that racial variations exist within the human race, for example, and another
thing altogether to interpret this observation in hierarchical terms.
Admittedly, where the categories which we employ are as unashamedly con-
structed as legal fictions are it will be tricky to disentangle the benign from the
base. We shall hardly be content to follow in the footsteps of the legal arguments
2Thus, instead of saying that a history of involvement in slavery is valuable, one might say
that it is valuable to remember the slave trade, which sticks in the craw rather less. Yet
I suspect that in such an instance as this `valuable' will tend to be a word which might
helpfully be replaced either by one more obviously non-moral, such as `instructive', or
by one with a different moral flavour: It is our proper obligation to remember the slave
trade, one might alternatively wish to say. I shall have more to say about approaches
to history in Chapter 14.
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which just happened to construe the categories of private property in such a way
that Australian Aborigines could be said to possess no title to their land, because
they neither fenced nor cultivated it; at the same time we need not conclude that
property is indeed theft; but we can hardly underestimate the scholarly complexities
which face any jurist who would tease the good from the bad, and this will be true
not only of law but of other and less codified customs too.
Let us grant, however, that we have some ability to pinpoint where there is evident
instrumental disvalue built into a category, visible in light of the objectionable ends
to which it is far from accidentally fitted. What of instrumental value's counterpart,
intrinsic value? The immediate reaction is very properly likely to be repugnance at
the idea that anything so thoroughly corrupt and dangerous can be a repository
of any, let alone an intrinsic, sort of value; but it is here that I play my holism
card again. Recall that the (intrinsic) value of cultural heritage is on my account
supposed only secondarily to attach itself to discrete cultural items, including the
abstract cultural items which categories are; primarily it manifests itself diffusely
and non-specifically within sprawling cultural networks. Although I have begun to
indicate that there are discernible patterns of value-inheritance between abstract
categories and the cultural items which fall into them, in both cases this value is
derivative; cultural items (including categories) have value on account of clustering
together into the vaguely defined phenomena which we call cultures.
One of the implications of this is that malignity also need not be discretely
localised; where a moral cancer exists, it is unlikely to be restricted to a single
cultural item. There certainly are senses in which one malign item can be said to
possess value for the context in which it exists: one might meaningfully say that
their white hoods have value for the Ku Klux Klan, and whether one means by
this that they are instrumentally valuable for the Klan's purposes, or that they
play some sort of role within Klan culture which leads Klan members to value them
non-instrumentally, there is nothing particularly controversial in our ascribing value
to the hoods so long as we are talking about value for the Klan rather than what
we ourselves endorse as valuable. In doing this, however, we ascribe value to the
hoods (as discrete cultural items), or to `Klan hoods' as a type (of which individual
hoods are tokens), in light and by virtue (if the unfortunate turns of phrase are
pardonable) of the place which they occupy within a broader milieu. Once again,
the value of a cultural item is derived from its context; if we now wish to ascribe
disvalue to the Klan hoods, this likewise will be because of their disvaluable context
(i.e. one disvaluable from the point of view of a more enlightened moral vision than
is enjoyed within Klan culture itself).
How then are we to determine which cultural items should finally be judged to be
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valuable or disvaluable or simply neutral? Perhaps we find ourselves, in the end, in
comfortably familiar philosophical territory, asking ourselves what constitutes the
good life (including the morally good life) for human beings in general. Perhaps (we
might think) Harding did have an insight in making the value of cultural heritage
strictly subordinate to the value of the good human life. If we could merely solve
the problem of what that is to everybody's satisfaction (and I hope that you will
be understanding if I do not address it in the present work), then we might expect
to be able to proceed from the most general to the most particular of cases, and
derive the disvalue of the Klan, and that of all its aspects as anything other than
an unpalatable memory, from our most general understanding of what is good for
humanity.
11.2. A Unified Hierarchy of Value?
There is, however, a lingering problem. Suppose we generalise the suggestion that,
from the fact that their white hoods are valuable to Klan members, it in no way
follows that Klan hoods have value outside the context of Klan culture, even though
they play an important part in that culture and the Klan is evidently a cultural group
with a heritage.3 We might very reasonably expect it to follow that it is similarly
uninformative to observe that rock art has value for Australian Aborigines, or that
the Bible has value for Christians, or in any case at all that anything has parochial
value for anybody. If we arrive, in seeking to evade the implication that Klan hoods
might possess cultural value outside their immediate context, at the view that we can
comfortably avoid this outcome by noting that Klan culture (with the corresponding
category `Klan cultural items') itself makes a negative contribution to the good life
of humanity, then presumably consistency requires us to judge all cultures in terms
of this good of humanity, and then to work out the value of their cultural items in
light of this, proceeding always from the most general to the most particular (with
the network in terms of which I earlier described culture coming to look more like a
strict categorical hierarchy).
There are hopefully not that many who would dispute the counterfactual claim
that the world would have been better off without the Klan and its culture; but
there are plenty of other cultural phenomena which could not be so readily dealt
with. What is the net contribution to humanity of Australian Aboriginal cultures,
or Christian culture, or European culture? It is not difficult, for example, to find
3Note my shift from `white hoods' to `Klan hoods'; in other cultural contexts, a white
hood might be part of a ghost costume for Halloween. Another case in point would be
the Swastika, a symbol much older and with more uplifting import than the Nazi regime
which appropriated it and in connection to which it is best known in the West.
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people who turn to the Bible for revealed Truth and moral guidance, and other
people who regard `religion' as a class as something from which humans ought to
liberate themselves; and if we have to wait for these parties to conclude their debates
before we can judge the value of Christian cultural influence, and in turn evaluate
the myriad cultural items in which Christian influence manifests itself, then we had
better be prepared to wait perhaps literally until Doomsday. Not that we have much
genuine hope of somehow isolating `Christian culture' for evaluation. Even our hope
of isolating `Klan culture' may begin to evaporate once we realise that it participates
in the much wider and more various phenomena of `racist cultures' (being, of course,
more strongly and directly involved in some than in others), and that no simple
algorithm will unweave attitudes towards and conceptions of race from the broader
cultural contexts in which they sit; the subtlest scholar of literature could not tell
us how a pleasanter Shylock in a different Merchant of Venice might have featured
in a counterfactual history of the English theatre.
The headaches continue to multiply when we realise that among the things whose
contribution to the good of humanity we might wish to evaluate are the very
intellectual resources by means of which we come to know the human world as
we consequently do know it. I accept that there can be reasonable judgments,
in ethics and of other sorts, made across cultural boundaries (Midgley, 1991,
p. 81ff.); presumably, then, if I aspire to cast judgment on Indian approaches to
æsthetics, or conventions of political debate in the Philippines, I shall require only
an adequate intellectual grasp of the topics involved, and this may well not require
me to have undergone a thoroughgoing immersion in Indian or Filipino culture. To
some substantial degree, then, it is possible to judge culturally specific intellectual
categories `from the outside'. What must be involved, though, in making historically
counterfactual judgments about a way of construing some aspect of the world? What
does it take to determine whether the overall good of humanity would have been
better served or worse if nobody had ever had the ideas of `popular music', or
`management', or `utopian colonies', or any among innumerable others? Once we
have understood the question we shall find ourselves quite unable to forget the
category which we are expected to imagine out of the universe. We can no doubt
imagine histories in which no managers or pop acts or utopian communities ever
arose to create a need for the conceptual apparatus which we employ in talking
about them; but it is a separate question whether humanity gains or loses something
from our having devised these categories rather than others, and it is doubtful that
we have any prospect of returning, even in our most flexible of human imagination,
to more innocent conceptual pasts.
People certainly have thought that such gaps could be scrutinised, if not altogether
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bridged: the most familiar example for many philosophers might be Martin
Heidegger's fretting about the effects of scientific and technological thinking on
the ways in which we find ourselves in the world. He worried about the difficulty
of escaping from technological blinkers, the risk of becoming unable to see the
forest for the timber, even as he sought in his philosophical work to uncover
what he understood to be other forms of existential engagement with the world
and particularly with the natural world, distinguishing the `primordial' from the
`derivative' (Cooper, 2005a). Compared with his anxieties mine look almost mild: I
merely need to know, given the expectation that intellectual categories are cultural
items and that cultural items are subject to evaluation by moral philosophers, how it
might be that we can enquire after the value of any given categories within a culture
and receive an answer more nuanced than that they are presently indispensable.
There are, it is true, entire scholarly careers founded on projects of critiquing
conceptions of race, or gender, or class, or other categories through which we classify
and navigate our social environments; and while it is beyond my present task to
comment on either success rates or motivations, the existence of such projects, and
that of less politically charged enquiries down to the abstrusest reaches of ontological
theorising, indicates that humans are able to reflect critically on all manner of things.
(It also indicates that the process may be long and controversial.) Yet critique of
this sort, though it certainly may arise from moral concerns, is not moral evaluation
of quite the sort I have in mind; my present concern, after all, is with the cultural
heritage that we have, rather than with the future teleology of anyone's cultural or
social development.4 A critical reappraisal of, for example, literary representations
of class consciousness is itself a cultural item and part of at least one cultural
heritage; and this will be so, and we shall find ourselves faced with the question
of its value qua cultural heritage, whether or not it emancipates anybody from the
shackles of a prejudiced past.
As usual, there are no doubt many more points which could be raised and
challenged and defended in turn, but I hope that I have done enough to indicate that
it would be no straightforward matter to envisage some sort of unified hierarchy of
values, in which (1) Klan hoods are subordinate to (2) Klan culture in general, which
is subordinate to (3) racist culture more broadly, and since (3) makes a negative
contribution to (4) the good life for humanity it follows that (2) and (1) are likewise
to be negatively appraised. I am still left, then, with the problem of how to integrate
value qua cultural heritage into our wider moral economy in such a way that it will
4Technically my interest in the flourishing of cultures blurs this line: in particular, there are
political questions about who in a given culture is in a ready position to make influential
contributions to the culture and its recorded heritage. I maintain, however, that there
is a meaningful division of intellectual labour in the examination of cultures.
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neatly fit alongside our other ethical concerns, so that we can talk about the value
of cultural heritage while accepting that some aspects of some heritages are, in
straightforward moral terms, nasty.
I want to make what I fear may initially appear to be a sophistical distinction, or
at least one which will perhaps be more readily accepted in academic circles than
in the wider world in which cultures exist and develop and occasionally clash, but
nevertheless a distinction which I think both fits sensibly into my earlier sketches
of valuation and categorisation, and offers some reasonable hope of acknowledging
how certain cultural items may at once be valuable (qua cultural heritage) and so
thoroughly disvaluable that we should prefer that they had never been.
We frequently make evaluations which depend on the contribution of some aspect
of a thing to what it is as a whole, and sometimes these judgments are not
straightforwardly obvious: thus a rip in the canvas of a painting will be reckoned
to reduce its value on the art market, while a rare blemish in a run of stamps may
increase their value for philatelists. When it comes to our moral judgments, where
our own cultural resources have long suggested the possibility of a felix culpa and of
narratives of redemption, matters may become more nuanced still. We certainly do
not see it suggested that the ugliness which they confront should count against either
the æsthetic or the moral merits of To Kill a Mockingbird or Mississippi Burning,
or that the horrors which it records serve to blemish Anne Frank's Diary of a Young
Girl, even though these cultural items could not have come into existence but as a
response to awful circumstances.
Neither will we necessarily be eager, when we turn to consider the kind of human
interests with which we deal in our lives, to judge that the value of a human
life is established strictly by its cleavage to saintliness; a hierarchical ranking of
value, so tempting and tantalising a prospect when we try to extend our ethics to
encompass the whole panoply of cultural items, from the most exquisite artworks
to the advertising flyers that daily make their rapid way from letterbox to bin, may
meet with far more hesitation when we are confronted byWilliam Godwin's infamous
choice between the Archbishop's rescue and the chambermaid's. When it comes to
moral patients among our own species, suddenly a rigid scale of value becomes a
less attractive prospect. We presumably agree that both the Archbishop and the
chambermaid must be taken into account as moral patients; it may nevertheless
be unremarkable if we hold one of them dearer on account of personal ties, but
it might well take a long and harrowing history of unrepentant evildoing on the
chambermaid's part for us to have no qualms whatsoever about preferring to save
the life of Archbishop Fénelon.
The distinction which I wish to make is between value simpliciter (or as simplex
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as accounts of value ever get in moral philosophy) and value considered as a
contribution to a broader moral patiency. I suggested in 9.0 that patiency, in
contrast with value, is a binary notion, something which an entity either has or
lacks; no wonder, then, that we may be reluctant to discard any human moral
patient, even in favour of another. If we are to approach cultural heritage with the
thought that it may count as a moral patient  and if we are prepared to accept
that it is collectively possessed of a morally salient value which does not ultimately
amount to the service of human ends, then that is a conclusion which we shall find
ourselves with no trivial grounds for evading  then heritage, too, may be tarnished
without thereby being debased. Consider a physician who undertakes to save the life
of a patient in the medical sense of the word, knowing that the person undergoing
treatment is one who harbours some defect of moral character: a hooligan, say, or a
serial adulterer. In order to save the person as a whole, the doctor must salvage this
defect along with all other traits of the surviving patient's character; it is regrettable
to prolong a career of hooliganism or unfaithfulness, but we hold it noble nonetheless
to save the life of a human being.
There is of course no direct analogy with culture, because culture and cultures
resist ready individuation where human beings do not: one cannot easily say what
it would mean to preserve a culture as a whole. Insofar as we find ourselves capable
of confidently pointing to some local or national or otherwise delineable culture,
however, we may well find that so interwoven and interdependent are its constituent
aspects that it is no simple business to tease apart those deserving our approval
and those not. It will be helpful, therefore, to distinguish between an active moral
cancer and the scars which may linger after its removal; a culture of any antiquity is
likely to have borne witness to many unlovely deeds, some mercifully far removed, so
that we can look upon slavery in Roman Britain, for example, with disinterestedly
historical curiosity.
What must happen, then, when wrongful currents are still manifest and active
in a culture? The cultural group ought to reform itself, much as the hooligan or
the adulterer ought; and in order to do this it must tease out and expel, however
painfully and awkwardly, those aspects of itself which are morally condemnable.
It is subject to an overriding moral imperative to change itself into something for
which its malignant aspects have no value of any kind and in any sense. That there
presently is some sense in which they have value for their cultural setting will be
no effective argument against reform; cultures, after all, are dynamic in many ways.
There are cases in which appeals to culture may be supposed to act as a defence
in morally charged disagreements: for example, in controversies involving practices
of circumcision or other genital mutilation. However, I doubt that the logic in such
166
11.2. A Unified Hierarchy of Value?
cases is often imagined to boil down simply to `It's morally wrong, but it's part of our
culture, therefore it's not morally wrong', or even to a not much less contradictory
version, `It would be morally wrong, if it weren't part of our culture'. Where those
involved are agreed that a practice is unethical, then, its persistence within some
culture will not count as an effective argument for allowing it to fester.
Not every trace of human vice within a culture is a dangerously active cancer
and an impending moral horror, however; humans and human cultures being what
they are, we shall inevitably encounter cultural items which reflect divergence from
utopia, but we shall not necessarily have grounds for judging that they are wholly
without value qua cultural heritage. We need not and perhaps should not be
comfortable with any echoes of anti-Semitism we discern in The Merchant of Venice,
but here and elsewhere to have a culture, to preserve it, to let it flourish through
the creativity of those whose culture it is, will sometimes bring reminders of human
moral frailty.
The doctor who saves the life of the hooligan or adulterer thereby preserves certain
unwholesome traits; we should not call these valuable dispositions to possess, but
in spite of this they make a contribution to the patient's personality as a whole, to
who this person is. It is not a happy contribution, to be sure, and we may rightly
hope for future repentance and reform; but if we wish to say (and presumably we
do) that persons have value of a kind of which moral philosophy ought to take
account, then it would involve a crude approach to the complexities of human lives
and personalities to add as a disclaimer `...but not the nasty bits'. If we approach
the human moral patient as a repository of value, then in valuing the whole we
value even the more unsavoury aspects which contribute to there being a whole
person to value; and when we look for value in cultural heritage, our predicament
is a similar one. If valuing a culture's heritage meant simply something close to
totting up its merits and deducting its demerits from the total, or scavenging within
a heap of accumulated cultural items and polishing up just those which seemed still
serviceable, then little would preclude our urging a cultural group to keep only the
straightforwardly good and abandon all traces of the bad; but the evaluation of
cultural items will seldom, if ever, be so neat.
There is, then, a sense in which even Klan hoods may be said to have value as
parts of the wider cultures (American, Anglophone, &c.) within which they have
their existence: they make a contribution (for which we need not be grateful) to
what, as a matter of historical fact, is the intricately interwoven heritage of these
cultures, and if the whole is to be valued then the parts will inherit some of that
value. Happily, however, an acceptance in this light of the less palatable items of a
culture's heritage need not prevent anyone's seeking to ensure that the only home
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in which their contributive value can be realised is a museum.
11.3. Questions of Priority
Less unpalatable than the foregoing, but still awkward when they arise, are the
questions which we must face when positive obligations towards other people
threaten to clash with obligations involving the treatment of cultural items.
Sometimes these involve the allocation of scarce resources: funds spent by a
government on public support for `the arts and culture' are funds not allocated to
health, road maintenance or other public goods.5 Sometimes they involve changing
circumstances, as when migrants find that not every aspect of their ancestral culture
is easily maintained among their new neighbours. Sometimes they involve clashes
not of `value' but of `values', including those of justice, in the sense that limits on
what may lawfully be done with listed buildings, for example, embody values of
conservation but at the cost of values of liberty, specifically the liberty to enjoy
one's own property without interference.6
I do not anticipate that in my search for a framework for thinking about the ethics
of cultural heritage I shall incidentally be generating a simple little formula which
neatly arbitrates between concern for culture and concern for every other important
aspect of life. Nevertheless, it would be helpful to have something to say about
where to start looking for normative guidance; and this, of course, will have to be
consonant with my statement a few paragraphs ago that our approach to the value
of cultural items will not look much like an accountancy of merits and demerits.
Certainly I cannot readily envisage weighing up Heritage against Traffic Safety in
some unified moral scales.7
What then are we to do? The amorphous nature of cultures and consequently
of their heritage threatens to sit ill with a concern for the interests of the human
individual, and in some cases may not sit a great deal better alongside the interests of
5Of course, other than under a narrow definition roadworks and the preservation of health
are aspects of culture. (See p. 67 above.) Indeed, some roads have an excellent claim to
be persistent items of cultural heritage: parts of the A2 and the A5 follow the route of
Watling Street, anciently paved by the occupying Romans. However, we can frequently
distinguish between actions performed in the deliberate service of what can be called
cultural interests, such as giving money to a museum of local history, and deeds done
in the service of other interests, such as the preservation of human life through medical
intervention or the prevention of traffic accidents.
6Here, of course, one might appeal to cultural traditions of liberty, including that of an
Englishman's home being his castle.
7Even a Utilitarian might well have difficulty adopting a straightforwardly Benthamite
stance when it comes to heritage; if anything is a `higher' pleasure, the satisfactions
arising from a secure sense of cultural identity are plausible candidates.
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human collectivities. Part of the problem is indeed epistemic, and the closing parts
of the next chapter will help to show how to avoid letting culture become an invisible
patient in our moral thinking, enveloping us with such inescapable omnipresence that
we become unable to perceive it when engrossed in the making of ethical judgments.
Even quite familiar and local cultures may slip easily into the background of our
thoughts when the house which forms part of a locality's history and landscape is
still more familiarly `my house'; construed as a cultural item, however, its boundaries
may be rather broader than the acreage attached to `my house'.
An ethics with its focus on stewardship, such as has become popular with
respect to archæology (Pantazatos, 2010, p. 96; Wylie, 2005; and see p. 54 above),
could help broaden the temporal horizons of our thinking to take into account a
transgenerational ethics which expands concerns from `my house, my property, for
as long as I hold onto it' to at least considering whether there might be lingering
interests of past inhabitants, and those of future ones, which should enter into our
judgments. So too might an `intergenerational social contract' (Thompson, 2000,
p. 253), or a view of cultural heritage as a focus of trustees' obligations (Dworkin,
1985, p. 233). Approaches of this sort, however, are incomplete at best unless they
are linked to an understanding of just what manner of thing it is which is entrusted
to the steward, or controlled by the contract or the obligations of trusteeship
(which perhaps partly explains why stewardship has found a particular niche in
archæological ethics); and the interconnectedness of cultural heritage implies that a
cultural item is a vaguely defined sort of thing insofar as it qualifies as a thing at
all.
Actually, the same is in many ways true of that deceptively simple-looking formula
`my house'. `House' is probably the easier part off the formula; there are various
diverting questions to be asked about what properties an enclosure must have in
order to be a house, but the architectural metaphysics is sufficiently free of mystery
for us to distinguish with adequate competence between house and not-house. How
often, however, do we approach a house with its properties as a material object
uppermost in our minds? To approach and enter our own, a friend's or even a
stranger's dwelling is another experience entirely. Does the garden maintain the
tone of the neighbourhood? Will guests think our wallpaper is tasteful? As soon as
we find ourselves at home with such questions of social convention, it becomes plain
that we have landed straight back within the sphere of the cultural; and this only
gets plainer when we turn to examine the `my' in `my house', part of the `system
of exchange, ownership, payment, debts... and in general... rights and obligations'
(Searle, 2007, p. 6) which gives rise, among other things, to the monetary price for
which the house could be sold on, part of the `important and objective class of
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entities that only exist because we think they exist' (ibid., p. 4).
Such reflections alone will not dissolve the frustrations of the homeowner who
wants to add a conservatory to a listed building; but they may encourage a shift
in perspective once one comes to acknowledge that both `sides' of the question are
suffused with culture, and hence that cultural heritage is not merely the persistence
of the past but presupposed by the meaningful social environments within which
we put down our own roots. I do not mean merely that culture is a good for us
 although in many cases and in many ways it is, and any attempted weighing
up of goods would have to take that into account  but that in setting priorities
where heritage and human interests are concerned, it is first of all necessary to have
reflected upon the complex mutual involvement of the two, and for this to happen
it is necessary that heritage should be understood as more than a collection of nice
(though luxurious) things.
Perspectives and shifts therein are all very well, of course, but will they bring us
genuine illumination and the prospect of acquiring ethical knowledge and profound
normative guidance? We had better wait no longer before turning to questions of
moral epistemology.
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Part III.
In Conversation With Cultures

[O]ur rampant nostalgia, our obsessive search for roots, our endemic
concern wih preservation, the potent appeal of national heritage show
how intensely the past is still felt. Yet new historical perspectives have
outmoded once customary ways of feeling and using it. Wholehearted
faith in tradition, the guidance of past examples, empathetic
communion with great figures of antiquity, the solaces of a golden age,
evocative ruminations over ruins and relicsthese modes of engaging
with bygone times have largely ceased to be credible. History has made
them obsolete.
David Lowenthal
(1985, p. xxiv)

12. Testimony and Authority
Who speaks for cultures? Who are the authorities in the quest to reckon the value
of cultural items? Any moral epistemology must somehow deal with the fact that
ethical disagreement is commonplace in human life; and any that claims the ability
to help us grapple with the modern world must offer some way of responding to
cultural difference. Cultures not only differ but sometimes clash, and not only over
the contrasting ways of life which they accommodate: now that law and politics
have taught philosophy to speak of `cultural property', and philosophical interest
has been growing in the moral ought which it seems to put to work, we shall naturally
find ourselves wondering how we are even to discover what significance an item has
for a culture before we begin to determine what actions ought to follow.
This is in part a problem of cross-cultural understanding, but disagreements may
and do arise within cultures as well as between them. When the former Afghan
(Taliban) government pursued the destruction of pre-Islamic artefacts, while Afghan
museum curators urged their preservation (Appiah, 2009, p. 80ff.), how were non-
Afghans to react, when neither party to the dispute could be reckoned by outsiders to
be more properly Afghan than the other? Henry Kissinger wanted to know whom to
call if he wanted to call Europe,1 but for the purposes of political communication he
at least had the ability to address national governments. Who speaks for European
culture, or (modern) Afghan culture, or any other culture that may have a heritage?
If we do not know whom to call, then we face an epistemological problem. Suppose
that we need to determine what should be done, or what permissibly may be done,
with some item, physical or abstract: a recently excavated ancient potsherd, let us
say. Suppose that we know that the culture within which it was created is a surviving
one,2 still the culture of some identifiable group of people, and we consequently find
ourselves with the thought that we have a piece of these people's cultural heritage
on our hands. In any case in which their culture is not ours, it will be natural for
us to suppose that they possess an epistemic authority which we inescapably lack
1Supposedly. According to http://blogs.ft.com/rachmanblog/2009/07/kissinger-never-
wanted-to-dial-europe/ (retrieved 22nd April 2010) the story is apocryphal, but it
remains nicely illustrative.
2For the purposes of this chapter I shall gloss over the vexed question of just what
conditions that might involve (having pondered some related difficulties in Chapter 6):
perhaps biological descent, continuity of practices or institutions, &c.
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when considering questions about what it is to inhabit this culture (particularly
where the questions are not of a sort which could be settled by appeal, for example,
to archæological evidence). It will be quite natural for us to think that this applies
to some questions of a normative sort: if we are of the view that an object can have
value for a culture, and value of such a nature that action-guiding moral conclusions
may follow from this, then we shall want to know what value (if any) our potsherd
holds for its originating culture and the people whose culture that is, and the obvious
next thought is: we should ask them.
But whom to call; and what to make of disagreement if it should arise? The mere
possibility of dispute should make us pause if we do not know how to deal with it;
a merely fortuitous consensus offers limited epistemic surety. Suppose then that we
were to hold a general ballot (wanting to be sure that we were not hearing only the
loudest or the most socially dominant voices): if our results resembled those of a
survey in which members of the Zuni people were asked for their views about `the
value of Zuni peach folk varieties and control over them' (Soleri et al., 1994, p. 29),
what should we make of it?
The first question asks `Is it important to make sure that old Zuni peach
varieties are not lost? Why?' Out of 25 answers, 24 were `yes' and 1
`don't know'... The second question is `Should non-Zunis be given seeds
of Zuni Peaches? Why?' Out of 24 answers, 17 said `no', 5 said `yes',
and 1 said `don't know'. (ibid., p. 29)3
On the one hand, we see clear majorities, and one case of near-unanimity. Yet we
also find not only that there is disagreement about the second topic, but moreover
that in each case someone is claiming not to know how to answer. In an opinion poll
this is understandable, but if we set out expecting to uncover the self-knowledge of
cultural insiders then the emergence of a `don't know' contingent is disappointing
at best.
`With care and attention,' James O. Young has written, `it will be possible
to determine how much value something has for a culture. Moreover, the
epistemological difficulties here are no greater than we normally confront in making
moral judgements.' (Young, 2007, p. 123) This may indeed be so, and in this chapter
I am not concerned to dispute the comparative scale of the challenge, but rather
to enquire after the distinctive features that emerge when we introduce this thing
called cultural heritage into our moral epistemology. The time seems ripe to flesh
out what exactly it is towards which our care and attention must be directed.
Predictably, in light of the content of recent chapters, I shall imagine that we are
out to ask a question about the value of some cultural item or other. I make this
3(17 + 5 + 1) does not total 24, but the error is in the original.
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choice partly in reaction to other philosophers who have employed the term before
me (including Young as quoted in the previous paragraph), partly because of the
use to which I have put it myself, and partly because I suspect that surveys asking
about patiency would result in rather more scratching of heads. In any case, in asking
an inescapably evaluative question, yet nevertheless one concerning how a cultural
group in fact relates to a cultural item, we cannot but keep the celebrated fact/value
distinction in view. (It is when we seek a moral epistemology for cultural heritage
that we are perhaps least able to draw a breezy line between knowing what we
ought to do and having knowledge of other kinds, and least entitled to confidence in
declining to submit to putative experts, even where different judgments (Hills, 2009)
might be made about more domesticated varieties of ethical problem, or where we
find ourselves receiving direct advice about what course of action we morally ought
to take.) Much of what I shall be saying need not, however, have a bearing only on
this particular view of how to go about doing heritage ethics; people who take, for
example, a more resolutely deontological approach, or a needs-based approach, may
find themselves grappling with quite similar difficulties.
I shall now proceed to flesh out the problem a little more, and to discuss and
cast doubt on various potential solutions; in the concluding section of the chapter
I shall return to developing an alternative line of thought, one of perspective shifts
and holism, which might lead our enquiries in a more profitable direction.
12.1. Whom Shall We Call?
If we are committed to the view that there is some fact of the matter to be sought,
i.e. that an item such as our potsherd does either have or lack value for its source
culture which we could and ought to take account of in our moral theorising, then
where we see disagreement arise among cultural insiders we must take the view that
at least one party to the dispute is mistaken. But which party? We hoped not only
to establish what the potsherd's worth might be as part of the heritage of mankind,
something which we as human beings presumably grasp at least as thoroughly as
the man on any street in the world, but furthermore to learn what value it might
hold for a culture in which we outsiders do not participate.4
4Assuming the predicament of the clear cultural outsider of course leads me to take an anti-
reductionist/credulist (Hopkins, 2007, p. 628; Pritchard, 2004, pp. 328 & 333ff.) stance
(of a presumption in favour of accepting testimony unless we find reasons to doubt its
efficacy), or at a minimum the view that ceteris paribus we are in no position to overrule
insiders' own testimony even when we have reasons for not actually accepting it: we
are in search of and will be dependent upon the particular knowledge of others, not
reasons for believing which we could adopt as our own. In Philip Nickel's taxonomy of
moral testimony, we are subject to substitutive dependence: `A's utterance of M gives B
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It may well be the case, where disagreement occurs, that some of those surveyed
simply have superior understanding to the others  I hardly want to suggest that
`culture' functions as some magic word that invites us to jettison what we know
about the ordinary epistemology of disagreement  but we cannot rest assured that
it will be a straightforward task to discover whose understanding of his culture is
best. Perhaps we might find ourselves tempted to adopt a sceptical position: that
even if there is a fact of the matter, not even cultural insiders can be relied upon
to know what it might be. We might even suspect that such a scenario as a `don't
know' vote could arise because there is in fact no common or cumulative insider
knowledge to be had: that if you thrust a piece of pottery at people, tell them
their ancestors made it and ask what cultural value it has for them, then no matter
how securely monocultural the group you question, what you will get is a range
of culturally influenced perspectives, not a window onto some kind of cultural hive-
mind or reservoir of collective self-knowledge. Or maybe the knowledge once existed,
but it is no good asking after it long after a cultural item has been estranged from its
source culture, especially if many such items have been thus estranged. In this light
it is suggested that `the absence of [certain] artifacts from Peru results in modern
Peruvians having less knowledge of and appreciation for their history and culture.
Likewise, the [Elgin] Marbles' presence in England deprives Greek citizens of their
cultural heritage and an ability to connect with their past.' (Chimento, 2008, p. 216;
emphasis mine)
Perhaps so; but if we are agreed that co-participants in the same culture possess
some shared understanding of it, then it would be rash to conclude so quickly that
it is not just our own epistemic practices that are at fault. If you want to know
what gift-giving practices are accepted in Cameroon, say, or which way one passes
the port at a formal dinner in England, it is obvious enough whom to ask; and
so unless the entire discipline of anthropology is mistaken, obtaining cross-cultural
information about matters of fact is possible. It is not clear (or at any rate not
yet) that we have positive grounds for thinking that questions of value must be
so very different. I suggested that we might favour a general ballot as a means of
discovering the vox populi across a cultural group; but a ballot, after all, is the kind
of process that typically gets employed when we already recognise that we aren't
going to get a consensus on some question, like `who should be in government?',
and yet as a practical matter we nevertheless have to reach some sort of broadly
acceptable conclusion. Such a process is geared predominantly towards procedural
political acceptability, rather than towards convergence on a consensus, or towards
a reason to believe M, which serves as a substitute for an independent (non-deferential)
justification' (Nickel, 2001, p. 255).
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uncovering the latent knowledge and insight of the general public.
In that case, we have a problem of practical epistemic procedure: we need to know
who can speak with epistemic authority on behalf of a group defined by its culture.
In fact, we face epistemic problems as soon as we set out to identify the members
of a cultural group, especially where the culture in question does not explicitly
incorporate strict or uncontested criteria for membership. If we accept a conception
of cultures in which there is `no watertight boundary' around one (Midgley, 1991,
p. 83), since cultures `do differ, but they differ in a way which is much more like
that of climatic regions or ecosystems than it is like the frontiers drawn with a
pen between nation states' (ibid., p. 84), then there is no obviously decisive way to
draw a distinction between members and non-members of a cultural group, between
insiders and the rest of us. Even among the categories of people a community is apt
to contain, Steven Lukes lists `identifiers (that is, those who identify themselves as
belonging to it), quasi-identifiers, uncertain identifiers, ex-identifiers, non-identifiers,
multi-identifiers and anti-identifiers' (Lukes, 2003, p. 20). Taking account of people's
own sense of belonging or not belonging is a tricky business, but it would nevertheless
be a risky one to ignore.
In this chapter I shall assume that such difficulties are surmountable; and similarly,
and pace my own concerns in 11.1, I shall assume we can ignore problems of bias
and ulterior motives (for example, claiming cultural value in something with the
actual motive of founding a tourism industry on it), awkward though it is that we
may find ourselves so reliant on self-reported claims which would be difficult to
prove false (Young, 2007, pp. 122-3). Likewise, I shall not dwell upon the possibility
that cultural knowledge might be unevenly distributed according to the differing
concerns of, for example, men and women, or subject to practices of initiation.5
Assuming good faith and competent understanding of our questions on the part of
our consultees, and that they possess whatever freedom and self-determination is
needed in order to engage in reflection of this sort, how shall we consult them once
we have identified them?
12.2. The Panel of Experts
We may, not unreasonably, worry that asking a member of a cultural group what
has value for his culture is not wholly like obtaining information about, say, the
material properties of tungsten by means of consulting an expert. In principle,
anyone of reasonable intelligence can become at least a knowledgeable if not a truly
expert chemist. Yet when we look in the direction of the arts, for example, we may
5For an anthropological discussion of themes of this sort see La Fontaine, 1986.
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already find ourselves suspecting that `whereas there may be no more to knowing
and understanding a given scientific theory than is involved in an intellectual grasp
of the inferentially connected body of propositions which comprises that theory... it
seems possible in the case of æsthetic knowledge to recognise some shortfall between
any grasp of discourse and æsthetic appreciation' (Carr, 1999, p. 243). An awkward
predicament for the moral philosopher seeking crisp knowledge of value for a culture;
Humean reassurances of critics' keen ability to converge on ranking the first- above
the fifth-rate may leave us still perplexed at what to do with our single potsherd.
Seeking knowledge across cultural boundaries only adds further complication. `In
its strong form,' Robert Merton wrote in 1972,
the claim is put forward as a matter of epistemological principle that
particular groups in each moment of history have monopolistic access to
particular kinds of knowledge. In the weaker, more empirical form, the
claim holds that some groups have privileged access, with other groups
also being able to acquire that knowledge for themselves but at greater
risk and cost. (Merton, 1972, p. 11)
Reacting in particular to the suggestion that `as a matter of social epistemology,
only black historians can truly understand black history, only black ethnologists can
understand black culture, only black sociologists can understand the social life of
blacks, and so on' (ibid., p. 13), he continues:
[I]t would appear to follow that if only black scholars can understand
blacks, then only white scholars can understand whites. Generalizing
further from race to nation, it would then appear, for example, that
only French scholars can understand French society..., the list of Insider
claims to a monopoly of knowledge becomes infinitely expansible... and
to halt the inventory of socially atomised claims to knowledge with a
limiting case that on its face would seem to have some merit, it would
then plainly follow that only sociologists are able to understand their
fellow sociologists. (ibid., p. 13)
A suspicion that people may possess a critical epistemic privilege concerning their
own cultures need not, however, be a radically exclusionary one,6 and it is towards
the weaker thesis of epistemic privilege that I propose to turn. No doubt there are
limits to the human ability to know what it is like to belong to some other people
and its way of life, and if we were conducting research in order to write a novel then
greater trepidation might well be in order (although see Young, 2008, pp. 34-41);
6We should be cautious, in any case, about any suggestion that cultures can be regarded
as hermetically sealed unities (Lukes, 2003, pp. 20 & 34).
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but knowledge that an item has such-and-such a value for a culture is hopefully
more open to translation. Are there, perhaps, certain classes of expert, members
of which could potentially even be drawn from the ranks of cultural insiders, to
whom we could turn for information about the value of cultural items?7 There are
certainly respects in which cultural items may be said to be distinctively valuable,8
and for these there are frequently corresponding domains of expertise which are not
obviously limited to cultural insiders, and in which most cultural insiders will not
themselves be expert. To determine whether an object is of historical interest, for
example, we might reasonably seek the opinion of a historian, and it takes suitable
methodological training rather than an insider's particular sensitivities to acquire
expertise qua historian. If we want to know about æsthetic importance, we may
turn to an art critic. And so on.
Appointing experts in the course of a cross-cultural enquiry has its additional
challenges, admittedly. Even amongst the experts of one cultural group, debate
may concern not only specific claims (e.g. among historians, the causes of this war
or that shift in population) but their conceptual underpinnings (e.g. in theories of
historiography); in extremis people have even resorted to doing philosophy. Cultures
other than ours may of course incorporate their own established theoretical stances
on what constitutes a historical account, a work of art, and so on, as I indicated
in Chapter 10; and enquiry into the value of an item for a culture can hardly be
expected to stand apart from these. The difficulty is not that we may hold these
frameworks misguided; we need not share the doctrines of a religious community,
say, in order to grasp that what it holds sacred will have value for its members as a
group. Sometimes we may even decide on the basis of inter-cultural encounters that,
for example, `we need to revise somewhat the fundamental conceptions of symbol,
signification, reference, and perhaps even art-object that are generally accepted
in Western æsthetics' (Deutsch, 1969, p. 349). Rather, our enquiry is complicated
7We would not, of course, necessarily acknowledge these people as `moral experts' from
whose general guidance in life we might expect to profit; it might indeed happen in
some instance that even after we had learnt what cultural items are valuable for their
group, further reflection would lead us to the conclusion that their whole culture was
a cesspit of moral horrors. (See 11.1 above.) We will not necessarily look upon them
as expert moral agents even with regard to the case at hand; what they know about
the value of a cultural item will be only one of the resources upon which subsequent
moral reflection must draw. (Contrast Jones, 1999, pp. 64-5 and Driver, 2006, p. 625ff.
on domain-specific moral expertise.) We may nevertheless wish to say, however, that
expertise of this kind amounts at least to insight of a sort that plays a moral role, and
that for this reason we are not in the presence simply of another kind of wholly non-moral
expertise.
8Some broadly systematic taxonomies of value have been developed for application to
cultural heritage (e.g. Carman, 2005, pp. 49-61 for archæological artefacts). Recall my
discussion of value in Chapter 8 above.
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when we ask our experts what value an item has for some culture, but having
selected them for their expert grasp of theoretical apparatus which may carry no such
qualification. Where such a framework stipulates, `this is what cuisine is', or `this is
what counts as a performance', and does not humbly append, `...for this particular
culture', we shall seem to be inviting, even demanding, a curious and sudden switch
from the universal to the parochial; and this tinge of universal prescription may be
present even where specific judgments are concerned, as in Kant's notorious dictum
that a judgment of beauty demands universal assent. Arguably such judgments may
nonetheless be called subjective (Makkai, 2010), but that leaves them still some way
from looking like judgments of value `for a culture'; and if, with Deutsch, we favour
the broadening of conceptual horizons in light of cultural interchange, it is unclear
where any acknowledgement of culturally parochial value is then supposed to fit.
There is of course an alternative possibility: Heikki Saari invites us (in an
exposition of Wittgenstein) to
assume that some tribesmen produce beautiful carvings and ritual masks
that the anthropologist describes as `works of art', although they neither
describe them as `works of art' nor respond to them in the manner we
respond to works of art (say, they destroy some of the best carvings
and ritual masks on some ritual occasions).9 We are inclined to say
that they do not share our concept of art, which derives its meaning
from the uses it has within our sophisticated æsthetic discourse. If
the anthropologist describes these native artefacts as `works of art', he
is being ethnocentric, because he attributes to them a concept which
they do not use, when they are talking about carvings and ritual masks
produced in their society. (Saari, 2005, p. 153)
Fair enough, we may decide: let us seek out experts in this culture's distinctive
practices of carving and mask-ritual. Yet now the risk is that we are getting too
parochial: that we demand to know the value of an item not only for its source
culture but for a particular purpose within that culture. Wherever cultural groups
have ingeniously declined to limit each item to some clearly defined and delineated
use, we may have cause to wish that we had been more flexible.
We must immediately take warning, moreover, that with heritage as with any
aspect of life, even experts with apparently similar domains of interest notoriously
may not form a unified chorus of agreement. As you may recall from 2.1, when
James Cuno tells us that antiquities `have much to teach us about the past, about
art, about material properties and manufacture, about human aspirations, and
9Compare Young, 2008, p. 19 on the Zuni `War God' sculptures, which are ritually left to
decay naturally.
182
12.2. The Panel of Experts
about distant cultures and times' (Cuno, 2009, p. 2), he is doing so in explicit
opposition to a view of antiquities according to which their value as a source of
information lies almost wholly in knowledge of the archæological context in which
they were discovered (Renfrew, 2000, pp. 19-20). We can have little confidence
that convening a panel of experts will be any more likely than consulting hoi polloi
to provide us with a consensus, or that balloting our experts will surely pool their
knowledge effectively (Sorensen, 1984). They may not even be able to tell us whether
we are asking about the right people; `[p]erfect ethnographic knowledge of the 18th
Century people of Toledo District, even direct observation with a time machine
would not tell us if they were the true cultural ancestors of the modern Kekchi or
Mopan' (Wilk, 1999, p. 372). Introducing a concept of `expertise' may indeed just
provide us with one more epistemic difficulty, for we have still to choose our experts,
and this too may prove epistemically tricky.
In some fields... objective evaluations of expertise are feasible. The
performance of weather forecasters, for example, is routinely evaluated
against observed weather during the forecast period... [However, in other
cases] an environmental criterion cannot be specified, even in theory.
Claims of expertise in fields such as philosophy, art, ethics, literature,
or mathematics, must necessarily be based on measures other than
the correspondence of the judgement with the environmental criterion
(e.g. consensus, coherence, or command of a factual knowledge base).
(Mumpower and Stewart, 1996, pp. 192-3)
Furthermore, it seems doubtful that any kind of specialist expertise confers the last
word when it comes to a judgment that such-and-such an object is æsthetically or
historically or religiously or otherwise valuable and moreover it therefore is culturally
valuable for a people (and as a matter of moral importance, at that). We may look
doubtfully upon, for example, `epistemic inclusion' in archæology  `the idea that
professional, trained archæologists have no privileged, let alone sole, authority in
establishing, interpreting and disseminating truths about the past that fall within
their discipline's compass' (Cooper, 2006b, p. 131)  and nevertheless think that
when we talk about valuable cultural heritage the privileged position of the expert
is less secure. Imagine some council of the great and the good proclaiming (if
they could ever combine their own areas of expertise to reach a unified conclusion):
`Dear people of England, after careful consideration in our experts' conclave we have
discovered that Stonehenge is not a valuable part of your heritage after all...' If the
masses should disagree with such an assessment, it will be difficult to insist that they
lack a sensitive enough finger on the pulse of their own culture, and not only because
considerations of justice perhaps demand that they receive their day in court.
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Education (in a narrow sense) is no doubt crucial for an appreciation of what
is sometimes called élite or `high' culture, but culture in the broader senses of the
word looks decidedly demotic, in that expert and layman may equally well be said
to participate fully in any culture they share. Culture, that is, resists appropriation
by expertise of the sort we have in mind: there are views from inside a culture as
well as from outside, and if it can be called expertise to have practical knowledge
of the ways of one's people then those living on the inside possess, in terminology
introduced by Bruce Weinstein, an expertise which is at least partly performative.
It is certainly possible to study a culture and thereby gain knowledge of it, and thus
attain some epistemic expertise; but it is not through setting out to accumulate
knowledge about it that one comes to belong to a culture, and a lack of epistemic
expertise need not usually be an impediment to so belonging.10
`Epistemic and performative expertise', in Weinstein's taxonomy, `parallel the
epistemological distinction between knowing that and knowing how..., and like those
two forms of knowing, they are conceptually and logically distinct from one another.'
(Weinstein, 1993, p. 58)11 The cultural insider as performative expert, then, would
(somewhat like an Aristotelian phronimos, or failing that a master of techne; cf.
Carr, 1999, p. 243ff.) be adept at acting in whatever manner is understood to befit
a member of the cultural group in question. If we stack our consultation panel with
epistemic experts (since we are, after all, in pursuit of received knowledge, albeit
hopefully action-guiding knowledge), then we rely on the assumption that this kind
of expertise is wholly sufficient for the epistemic authority we seek. Can that be
so? We had better err on the side of doubting it. The perspective of an epistemic
expert is one that opens up certain aspects of an object  for example, a historian
will have insight into how it fits into and challenges current historical theories and
topics of academic dispute  but if the people at large decide that some item is
historic irrespective of how much historical difference it makes, it would be rash to
expect that it is their perspective that misses out something crucial.
Moreover, for them and us alike beliefs about the value of an item for their culture
are liable to be action-guiding (and indeed, if we are successful, morally informative)
in a way which disinterested judgment concerning its æsthetic merits, for example,
will typically not be; and consequently we may reasonably doubt that the question
10The actual practices of anthropologists may blur the distinction, and of course the experts
you are being invited to contemplate might themselves be imagined to be insiders, i.e.
members of the cultural group being consulted; but the distinction remains possible to
draw.
11Given that Weinstein goes on to say that performative experts include `mathematical
prodigies who are unable to explain how they perform their astonishing calculations'
and `jugglers who cannot say precisely how they juggle' (Weinstein, 1993, p. 58), we had
better hope that knowledge about the value of heritage need not be wholly tacit.
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is wholly open to the (hopefully) cool and neutral authority of expert judgment.
Robert Pierson uses the example of expert medical advice to suggest that
any claim with respect to how `I' ought to govern `my' life can only be
rationally determined, assuming I am relatively sane, by `me'. It may be
that my heart needs professional attention, but surely the decision as to
whether it will get it should be mine, for only I can assess whether the
benefit in having my heart attended to is worth the cost of not fulfilling
any one of my other priorities. My priorities are mine, they are not
variables within the control of, or even accessible to, experts. (Pierson,
1994, p. 403)
Inasmuch as the normativity implied by a concept like `value' directs the actions of
agents inside or even outside an item's source culture, the layman who bears the risk
and responsibility of action has some reasonable room to exercise his own judgment;
he can and sometimes probably should consult, as we are imagining ourselves to be
doing, but consultation is not heteronomy. If a cultural group can have collective
autonomy (and whether this is a kind of group that can is a question outside this
dissertation's scope), then we may well think that we ought to respect it, even in
some epistemic matters.
If epistemic expertise is too limited (though perhaps part of any putative solution),
is performative competence in belonging to a culture something one can possess to
a greater or lesser extent? Might we convene a panel of performative experts?
Despite my remarks above about the demotic nature of cultures, there is some room
for thinking that there are degrees of belonging. If the borders of cultures are
indeed fuzzy, then presumably cultural groups may have partial members (Lukes's
`quasi-identifiers'?), or less engaged members, or comparatively estranged members,
or recently arrived probationary members, or people who in some other sense live
in the borderlands. Perhaps, then, there are also degrees of belonging which are
greater than is usually reached, although how we would judge who had attained
them is unclear. Therein lies the critical difficulty; even if we could assemble such
a panel, the justifiability of the panellists' claims to expertise would be determined
not by these excellent few themselves but by the very public from whose ranks we
plucked them. It is impossible to be (to give a trivial example) a performative
expert in middle class English table manners without reference to what is popularly
understood by the English middle classes to constitute good table manners; and so
once again the masses have the last word, and we are back where we started.
A potential further difficulty for any attempt to make use of other people's
performative knowledge lies in its precise relation to the sort of general claims that
might be made about the value of a cultural item. David Carr notes that `it would
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be clearly barking up the wrong tree to suppose that æsthetic knowledge provides a
theoretical basis for artistic expertise in the way that at least some scientific theory
might be said to inform technological practice' (Carr, 1999, p. 243). The artist works
with some broad theoretical knowledge (of perspective, for example), but the merits
of an individual artist's style resist capture in some general guideline. Expanding
from the case of practical expertise in art to that of performative expertise at
participating in one's culture at large, we may wonder whether performative experts
would be well placed to tell us, as a general claim, how much value for their culture
our potsherd has (in contrast with grasping its importance for certain particular
uses within their culture). They may very well know what to do with it in any given
situation. What they do may be, like a deft innovation by an artistic genius, `an
inspired touch'; but we cannot share in their inspiration except as appreciative
(or bewildered) observers, and if their inspired touches no more generalise into
broad claims about the role and hence the value of a cultural item than the deftest
brushwork of the genius generalises into guidelines about how to paint as though
by numbers, then it may remain unclear how we are supposed to respond to them
within our moral theorising.
12.3. Spokesmen and Leaders
If expertise fails to provide enough of the kind of epistemic authority we need,
then maybe in place of a messy plebiscite or hand-picked panel what we require
is a suitably representative spokesman or -woman. After all, when we hear about
disputes raging over the fate of cultural items, frequently we hear that a national
government, perhaps even a Minister for Culture, has claimed that some object is
part of the nation's cultural patrimony; or we hear that the leader of an indigenous
group has defended a practice as part of the group's culture. It would be nice if
appeal to representatives would work as an epistemic resource, because instead of
importing methods of consultation it would let us look to whatever means of selecting
leaders have come to be endorsed within a culture itself. Conrad Brunk observes
that cultures `have understood the concept of knowledge in a myriad of ways. All
of them have had to develop criteria for determining what counts as knowledge (and
its relationship to truth),12 and who in the community has the authority to apply
the criteria and say when they have been met (the priests, the shamans, the chiefs,
the judges, the scholars).' (Brunk, 2009, pp. 161-2)
Unfortunately, even overtly representative methods of selecting leaders do not
12This again suggests an even more uncomfortable view of disagreement among insiders:
disagreement about what they know and about what it is to know it.
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necessarily guarantee epistemic authority; I noted above that electoral practices most
readily suggest themselves precisely where we are resigned to disagreement. People
select their leaders, if indeed they do have a free choice in selecting their leaders,
for any number of reasons, and these may not include the candidates' familiarity
with the various currents of the culture within which they exist. (A state might
even voluntarily submit to the suzerainty of a foreign power with a quite different
culture, which would therefore wield politically legitimate power but not epistemic
authority with respect to the culture of the vassal state.) Where we can point to a
stable political identity, and even where we can associate it with a distinct culture,
we must remember that
[n]ations are created in the course of political struggles, or as the
result of deliberate political policies. Even members are likely to be
in disagreement about the properties that distinguish their nation from
others or in their reasons for valuing their national identity. (Thompson,
2003, p. 257)
Where politics becomes involved, then, we risk encountering two different yet
very closely related and sometimes barely distinguishable disputes: one about what
matters for a culture, and one about what matters for a political identity. We readily
speak of German, French and Italian `national culture', but the nations which we
designate with these same words were fully unified only in the Nineteenth Century
(Germany, Italy) or existed as monarchies of one form or another before they became
republics (all three). The cultures which we associate with them are (allowing for
gradual changes) in each case of much greater age. That cultures frequently are
intertwined with politics is a fact which we shall have to deal with; but we must
wonder how firm a grip politics can get on them, particularly under any remotely
liberal regime.
Even democratically representative leadership, much like consultation by direct
ballot, may not have the epistemic characteristics we seek. Elizabeth Anderson has
endorsed an understanding of democracy, drawn from the thought of John Dewey,
which emphasises its capacity for `pooling widely distributed information about
problems and policies of public interest' precisely `by engaging the participation
of epistemically diverse knowers' (Anderson, 2006, abstract). When we are in
search of the commonly held knowledge of a group defined by its shared culture
(albeit including different perspectives on that culture and perhaps even identifiable
subcultures), we do not necessarily want to emphasise `collective... learning from
the diverse experiences of different knowers' (ibid.) any more than is strictly
necessary, whether the democracy in question is direct or representative. According
to Anderson `an important part of the epistemic case for democracy rests on the
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epistemic diversity of voters' (ibid., p. 11); but while of course dissensus and some
epistemic diversity exist within nevertheless identifiable cultures, in looking for the
knowledge held in common within a culture and in trying to avoid having to deal
with conflicting answers we inevitably emphasise what is shared over what is open
to variation. Anderson even suggests that `culture' (not `a culture', but clearly not
an unrelated usage) may have to change in order for democracy to work in the first
place (ibid., p. 14): hostile to traditionalism, democracy is itself `a way of life' as
well as a collection of institutional and procedural mechanisms (ibid., p. 15).
We might say, possibly, that people aim to elect representatives likely to safeguard
the electors' interests, that if a cultural item possesses value as part of the electorate's
heritage then the electors have an interest in it, and therefore that those whom they
elect are likely to recognise the value of the item (or at least more likely than the
other candidates to have the necessary competence and attentiveness) as part of the
act of safeguarding the interests of their constituents. There are perhaps multiple
practical difficulties with this sunny picture of representative government, but one
drawback should be sufficient to note: a representative who sets out to safeguard
the interests of his entire constituency, not just the portion that voted him into
office, will find himself in a position very close to our own, unsure what to do when
disagreement breaks out among squabbling factions; worse, his political career may
depend on the continued support of some of those factions. Even for the most
thoroughly paid-up of cultural insiders, this would be an awkward predicament.
Even if we were to arrange a special election in which the electorate voted to select
those candidates whom they deemed most culturally knowledgeable to act as our
advisers (which presumably is how we should have had to go about appointing our
brace of performative experts), it is not clear that we should be doing any better
than if we asked them to vote on questions directly.
12.4. Observers and Organisers
If asking people questions still looks problematic, maybe we should observe their
actions instead. If we ask why, for example, J.R.R. Tolkien's legendarium might
be deemed an important part of the heritage of fantasy literature, we are probably
going to end up pointing to all the subsequent authors who thought his themes
were worth adopting and turning into cliché. Influence and popular familiarity are
matters of fact out there in the world: in our investigations, then, perhaps they
could function both as justification for claims about the value of cultural items, by
integrating items into cultural interaction, and as evidence of that value, by acting as
observable marks of cultural activity. If we want to know whether a group perceives
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value in some ancient potsherd, therefore, maybe we could find out how they usually
treat bits of ancient pottery dug up locally.
We should certainly have grounds to raise a dubious eyebrow aloft if what people
were telling us conspicuously did not coincide with how we saw them living. Yet
the difficulty which continues to beset us as cultural outsiders is that actions, to be
understood, have to be interpreted, with all due sensitivity to their cultural context...
and you can see that once again we are encumbered with a further epistemological
problem.
Might purely epistemic expertise be sufficient for this task, allowing us to convene
yet another panel of experts, this time to interpret other people's actions and
make inferences about what has value for them as cultural heritage? Besides the
complicating element that `purely' epistemic expertise will at some stage draw and
depend on the non-expert testimony of the cultural group under observation (if we
take it that our experts in this case will be, for example, anthropologists informed
by prior fieldwork), it is doubtful that we could reasonably accord these experts the
final word, for the reasons given previously. We should not assume, of course, that a
group's collective self-image is always a better fit with reality than the impressions
of even a non-expert disinterested observer, but neither can we outright discount
what a group's members believe about their collective selves when enquiring after
the value of a cultural item. Principles of charity require us to acknowledge people's
interpretations of their own actions; and even where we are convinced that word and
deed fail to coincide, it does not instantly and without complication follow that the
former (even if it reflects aspiration or optimistic preference more than it reliably
does action) is less really a part of a culture than the latter and less an indication
of what a people holds valuable.
Part of the difficulty seems to be that in asking people to make an appraisal under
the status of being members of a certain cultural group, we are effectively asking them
both to draw on personal experience and at the same time to make an impersonal
judgment, one in which they consider themselves as members of the cultural group
as a whole and lay aside any questions of whether as a matter of psychological
fact they find themselves individually doing something that might be called valuing.
Psephological enquiry leaves us with the problem of disagreement, and spokesmen
also have their drawbacks, but might there be other ways of organising the people
we are questioning so as to bring forth what they (may) collectively know? Social
epistemology routinely ascribes knowledge to collectives, as we do when, in Alvin
Goldman's example, we talk about what the C.I.A. did and didn't know about
terrorist plots before September 11th occurred (Goldman, 2004, p. 12). If what
we are interested in is the knowledge of a collectivity, rather than the aggregated
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knowledge of particular persons, then balloting individuals, or seeking representative
testimony from the leader backed by the dominant factions of a group, starts to look
insufficiently holistic.
Perhaps, then, we should concern ourselves not only with the composition of the
group in terms of who counts as a member, but also with its organisation. Margaret
Gilbert has argued that the collective belief of a group need not be an aggregate
of its members' beliefs: she gives the example of a court with a brace of judges on
the bench who happen to form a poetry discussion group in their spare time. If the
court had to consider the merits of a poem in connection with some legal action, she
says, the conclusion it reaches might be completely independent of the conclusions
of the poetry discussion group, even though the same people are deliberating in both
cases (Gilbert, 2004, p. 98). When in search of the knowledge of a cultural group
overall, then, perhaps we ought to look to the various forms the group can take and
to the kind of conversations that can go on within them.
Perhaps. An alternative inference would be that this, the horrifying possibility
that we can assemble our cultural constituency with the most scrupulous of vetting
procedures and still not be sure that the answer we get is not in some way an artefact
of the very practices of enquiry we artificially imposed, gives us nothing more than
another excellent reason to throw in the proverbial towel. Before we do so, however,
it may be worth seeing whether we can salvage something of the foregoing when we
look again at the epistemic practices already surrounding cultural heritage.
12.5. Plan B
In Invisible Cities Italo Calvino describes the anthropically named city of Clarice,
a mass of shifting objects where parts of the city's earliest architecture have been
preserved through being found convenient for new uses in new contexts:
And then the shards of the original splendour that had been saved,
by adapting them to more obscure needs, were again shifted. They
were now preserved under glass bells, locked in display cases, set on
velvet cushions, and not because they might still be used for anything,
but because people wanted to reconstruct through them a city of
which no one knew anything now... There is no knowing when the
Corinthian capitals stood on the top of their columns: only one of them
is remembered, since for many years, in a chicken run, it supported the
basket where the hens laid their eggs, and from there it was moved to the
Museum of Capitals, in line with other specimens of the collection. The
order of the eras' succession has been lost; that a first Clarice existed is
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a widespread belief, but there are no proofs to support it... (Calvino,
1997, pp. 96-7)
So much for origins, this rather Borgesian flourish says; so much for pristine
historical knowledge. Yet the patchiness of their historical record does not prevent
the fictional people of Clarice from appreciating that they have a heritage, any
more than gaps and uncertainties in the historical records of the real world prevent
us. Specimens are placed in this Museum of Capitals not after being held up for
appraisal one by one and receiving the approval of people already comfortably in
touch with their heritage as a whole, but because of what they offer through the
ways in which they can be organised in search of a faint and fragile history.13
When we hear about the preservation of cultural heritage, frequently what people
are concerned to preserve are not only objects but their organisation, at least until
this organisation can be recorded: thus the archæological site as an information
resource which can be damaged even if all the objects in it are individually preserved
(Renfrew, 2000, p. 19); thus the library of a person or an institution as more than
just some books in physical proximity and combined ownership. It is this kind of
organisation which Clarice has lost; but her citizens have responded by themselves
organising the artefacts in what we are invited to regard as a form of epistemic
practice: the exhibition, the very act of arranging objects for appreciation as (in
effect representative of) the city's heritage, is presented as an act of historical
reconstruction. Treatments of the museum or gallery as constructive sometimes
make the matter sound rather sinister, presenting exhibition as an `ideological
framework' that `influences the public perception of art and society' (Jeffers, 2003,
p. 108), but Calvino seems to be taking a more optimistic view of human agency.
Instead of recognising value in heritage objects and then, in consequence, elevating
them to the status of museum pieces, the people of Clarice make museum pieces of
them precisely in order to understand and appreciate their heritage.
This is a practice not only of observing and appraising but moreover of actively,
stipulatively and to a degree even creatively categorising objects, and for this it is
possible to discover parallels in the real world. Take the example of outsider art.
This is art created by people outside the artistic mainstream (i.e. cultural outsiders
of another sort), and sometimes so far removed from it that they may not even
possess the concept of `art' as a label for what they are doing. Among the first
to be identified as outsider artists (more precisely as creators of art brut, of `raw
13Meanwhile, much of what we do in the name of posterity reflects our concern to make a
contribution to the shared memory of our people which reduces that fragility: the point
of raising a monument of any kind is that it should stand as an enduring record.
191
12. Testimony and Authority
art' unconditioned by cultural currents and traditions) were psychiatric patients
(Rhodes, 2000, p. 7).
This categorisation is a normative judgment: it affirms that what the outsider
artist has created is not just symptomatic of personal eccentricity or mental illness,
but is worthy of the name of Art, worthy of being appreciated for its æsthetic
qualities. It thereby turns the worrisome risk of categorical bias noted in 10.1
into a chance for affirmation. Recognition of outsider art as an æsthetic category
not only depended on `the critical visual framework laid down by modern Western
art' (ibid., p. 8), and on `claims by [outsider art's] apologists about the artists'
fundamental difference' from `a supposedly dominant cultural norm' (ibid., p. 15),
but also involves a positive claim about the consequent æsthetic qualities of outsider
art, its `purity' of expression preserved by the `absence of deviousness or cynical
manipulation of fashionable taste' (ibid., p. 16). It is thus in one respect a
privative category, its boundaries partly determined by the scope of what counts
as æsthetically `mainstream', but also one to which `apologists' ascribe positive
characteristics. Outsider art is not merely the `artworld's' other, then, but subject
to positive construction as an æsthetic category. Indeed, the category has been
criticised for exactly that reason: at least one commentator is outright sceptical
about the idea that there is anything more to `outsider art' than that some outsider
creations happen to qualify as art objects (Davies, 2009).
As with any form of art, appreciation is not guaranteed. `One man spent 15 years
encrusting his entire garden with sculptures and sea shells, only to have it pulled
down by his son with a J.C.B. when he died.' (Bell, 2007) Hence the perceived need
for `a network of small organisations in both Europe and the United States devoted
to the preservation of such works and the support of their creators' (RawVision
website).
If someone were to make an utterance along the lines of `Outsider art is worth
preserving', it would strike me as a perfectly intelligible one: it looks thoroughly
meaningful (albeit uncomfortably general), and perhaps is true. But if we say that
some piece of outsider art, qua example of `outsider art', should be preserved,
what are we pointing to? Notice that `outsider art' by definition is not a genre
or movement after the fashion of, say, `French Impressionism'. In the latter case
it is comparatively easy to see why the category as a whole should be an object
of concern: we take an interest in how one Impressionist influenced another, how
they understood their own work in comparison with their predecessors', and so
on. (Cf. 9.3) No such collective self-understanding permits us to talk in general
terms about the work of outsider artists; no wonder the category is vulnerable
to scepticism. Yet what we do have (recalling Chapter 10) is the very category
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itself, along with the scholarship associated with it. `Outsider art' as a category is
constructed by observers outside the outsiders and imposed by them upon wildly
disparate creationsand for our present purposes that's fine: items of outsider art
are valuable as outsider art, to people disposed to care about outsider art, in that
they have lent themselves to being studied and admired as outsider art. The category
is thoroughly artificial, shot through with social contingency, and laced with the
categorists' open agenda not merely to describe but to validatebut none of that
necessarily implies, even if the æsthetic category should prove to be conceptually
problematic, that any and all cultural value we could find in outsider art as a class
must automatically be somehow unreal.
So the emergence of cultural heritage within our practices of organising and
classifying may indeed be respectable. What does this portend for our knowledge of
it? Consider now, as we previously saw on p. 25, what makes environmental ethics
possible: that we are able to adopt ways of looking upon the ecological surroundings
we inhabit which let us grasp the intricate interrelations of their parts and thereby
understand them as complex organic systems. We have got our hands on a powerful
conceptual ratchet which irrevocably alters the frames through which we encounter
these parts: `not my lake, but The Environment ' (Boyle, 2003, pp. 71-2).
Why talk of `an environment' or `environmental harm?' Why not simply
list the pros and cons of each particular piece of development, type of
technology, aspect of land use? ... Why reify these individual loci of
potential harm into a single entity called `the environment?'
... The environmental movement... gained much of its persuasive
power by pointing out that there were structural reasons for bad
environmental decisionsa legal system based on a particular notion
of what `private property' entailed, and a scientific system that treated
the world as a simple, linearly-related set of causes and effects. In both of
these conceptual systems, the environment actually disappeared; there
was no place for it in the analysis. Small surprise, then, that we did
not preserve it very well. ... The concept of the environment allows, at
its best, a kind of generalized reflection on the otherwise unquestionable
presuppositions of a particular mode of life, economy, and industrial
organization. (ibid., pp. 70-4)
It makes no difference for our prospects of untwisting the ratchet whether or not
we then find ourselves sympathetic to the conclusion that an ecosystem may possess
`systematic value' (Rolston, 1994, p. 25). We cannot unsee the biosphere once we
have come across it. Neither, I suggest, can we expel cultural heritage from our
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moral imagination once we have thought of it.14 We shall certainly continue to
argue both about what exactly it is and about how it fits (or awkwardly declines to
fit) into the rest of our lives as moral agents, much as we continue to have a need
for environmental philosophy. What we cannot do is act as though being cultural
heritage were sheerly a matter of meeting a set of conditions for membership of the
category. Holism is inescapable if we are to replicate the successes of environmental
ethics with respect to the cultural ratchet; but now we have a vantage point offered
to us by the very idea of cultural heritage itself.
12.6. But Whom Shall We Call?
What then for our consultation? We do, after all, speak of objects as items of
cultural heritage (and ascribe value to them as such); but what I have been hitherto
assuming in this chapter, and perhaps should now reconsider, is that we ask a
straightforward question (which of course may not be an easy question) when we
ask cultural insiders to ascribe value to each cultural item singly. If we look not
only at cultural items themselves but at the way in which a cultural group sees fit to
organise them, then evaluation of cultural heritage  understanding and appreciating
objects as cultural heritage  comes to look like an ongoing exploratory, investigative
and in some respects even creative practice: one within which the categories into
which items can be placed, and even the category of `cultural heritage' itself, an
organisational category by means of which we find ourselves able to reflect on what
we are doing when we cart objects away and place them in museum cases, appear
not so much in the foreground of our moral landscape as in the frame which lets
objects appear for us in light of them. To pose questions about the moral salience of
items of cultural heritage is, perhaps, to invite ourselves to consider them together
under this category and at length to discover in what ways this lets us identify value
in their interrelationshipsor, to put it another way, in the network within which
they cluster together as aspects of culture.
There is still a role for testimony and expertise, for as I said above, actions must
be interpreted; and this goes for actions which are themselves interpretative. When
we ask what practices of cultural construction and recombination and appreciation
exist amongst the members of a cultural group  when we walk, for example, through
the galleries of a museum and understand ourselves to be strolling through applied
historical epistemology, itself already in the course of posing questions such as ours
 we shall of course need guidance as much as we ever did; but we shall understand
14Janna Thompson has previously drawn a link in the opposite direction, suggesting that
some environmental phenomena may qualify as cultural heritage and for that reason
warrant ethical concern (Thompson, 2000).
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this guidance to be closer to the hermeneutician's than to the pollster's. The
arrangement of an exhibition facilitates certain conversations, much as geometry
of a legislative chamber, for example, subtly influences the kind of debates that
can take place within it and so is `not silent relative to our moral epistemologies'
(Preston, 2009, p. 178); but inevitably they remain conversations rather than utter
promulgations, dialogues without foregone conclusions.
You might be forgiven for finding such a conclusion disappointing, especially when
we begin to wonder whether in appealing to (this time) curatorial expertise we have
smuggled in an eyebrow-hoisting élitism, or for that matter whether we have once
again failed to establish what to do when two institutions seem to have been set
up to encourage differing responses. The New Acropolis Museum in Athens, `a
kind of polemic in glass and concrete, conceived as an argument by the Greek
government to bid for the return of the Elgin [M]arbles' (Lacayo, 2007), invites
outright contrast in its agenda with the encyclopaedic aspirations of `universal
museums' (in particular the British Museum, the Marbles' current possessor) and
their `collections meant to represent the world's diversity, [whose curators] organize
and classify that diversity' (Cuno, 2008, p. 140). The wrangling over the Marbles'
fate cannot but be vastly more political than epistemic. These are genuine concerns,
and only a fuller and lengthier treatment of museological themes could lay them
wholly to rest;15 but as philosophers we know at least that dialectical conversations
need not be unenlightening.
Well, then: given that any sophisticated culture (which is practically to say,
anything we can recognise as a culture) will contain reflective people who no doubt
already have been long devising forms of appreciation for the heritage of the culture
within which they exist (whether or not they know it by the name of `heritage'),
can't we still just parachute in our pollsters, our interviewers and our observers
for a weekend check of the local temperature, relying on precisely that reflective
sophistication and sensitivity of our hosts to have already mapped the paths to the
information we desire? (If the map is still markedly incomplete, on the other hand,
should that not give us grounds to consider our scepticism reinforced?) We can
indeed talk about the ethics of cultural heritage, and we can no doubt make use of
the concept of value within it; but when it comes to holding up individual objects or
isolated practices and enquiring after the value of each single one as cultural heritage
without great contextual sensitivity, and when it comes to seeking answers which
we cultural outsiders can readily absorb and bolt onto our moral philosophies, we
shall continue to face the various difficulties noted in the previous sections.
15I should reiterate, however, that I am treating museums merely as an example of such
kinds of epistemic practice; other kinds may be less institutional.
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In Clarice, however, the very act of organising objects as museum pieces is an
epistemic one, not only in the narrow sense that a museum facilitates learning things,
but as a window onto a lost past and therefore onto the very possibility of a heritage
for the city. If the practices through which we approach our and others' cultural
heritage resemble those of imaginary Clarice, so that the things we do with museum
pieces and monuments and all the other things we might place under the grand
heading of `cultural heritage' turn out to be bound together in what are already
partly epistemic activities, then what we might do in probing after knowledge of
the value of that heritage turns out to be what might best be thought of as moral
meta-epistemology: a complementary scheme of epistemological enquiry which is
capable of standing back and understanding the pursuit itself as a collection of
practices embedded into and contributing to one culture or another. It may indeed
be that what we do when we pay our care and our attention is already inclined
in this direction. Philosophical reflection offers a vantage point which promises to
be at once respectful of the particularities of every such activity, as it makes its
exploration into history or art or theology or any other matter, and capable of
interpreting these practices as aspects of an enquiry into ethical knowledge about
a culture and its heritage. It is in this direction, then, that I tentatively suggest
development of a robust moral epistemology for cultural heritage ethics might turn.
Treating the practical epistemic explorations which such a scheme would comple-
ment as themselves culturally embedded need not commit me to the view that there
are no objective matters of fact, fit for universal recognition, about which are the
items that possess value for a given culture. Neither does it obviously prevent us from
asking how much value something has for a culture; we shall have to expect answers
which are often intricate and heavily contextualised, and  yes  open to contestation
and reconsideration, but nobody, I imagine, has ever really asked such a question in
anticipation of a response given in points out of ten. Items invariably turn out to be
`unique in certain respects, and valuable for certain purposes' (Coningham, Cooper
and Pollard, 2006, p. 261). As an approach to moral epistemology for the ethics of
cultural heritage this does at least suggest an answer to the question of whether
the former Afghan government or the Afghan museum curators had the greater
authority to judge what was valuable for Afghan cultural heritage: we ask, in the
first place, which party was engaged in the more thoroughly, sincerely and humbly
epistemic, enquiring practice, and we have good reason to favour the curators by
default.
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Ignorance, though allegedly identifiable with bliss, is seldom advertised as a
repository of value; but mystery and the unknown have another flavour, and ancient
mystery a powerful attraction. What the historian or archæologist perceives as a
gap in knowledge yet unfilled, to another cast of mind may be wondrous just because
it is unfathomed. Though science (in the broadest sense) has wonder of its own,
and philosophy need hardly unweave rainbows, we cannot brush aside the claim of
mystery to figure as a good; and if the quest for knowledge which filled the previous
chapter does not exhaust the ways in which we may find ourselves approaching
cultural heritage, then we had better be prepared to tell a still more intricate story.
Yet if the mystery to which we are receptive is indeed a good then it is one unlike
any other, wildly unyielding to the taxonomic tools which uncover intrinsic value
and instrumental value and so on. What exactly is it, after all, in which we uncover
the mysterious and which we might therefore take to be a candidate for inclusion in
our moral economy? Mystery, at least in David Cooper's view of it, `cannot already
be invested with an all-too-human ontology of things' (Cooper, 2002, p. 285). It
seems, certainly, that we can after some fashion locate mystery, acknowledging that
we have found ourselves in its presence if we are suitably attuned, as in Rudolf
Otto's theological reflections on the holy:
Let us follow it up... wherever it is to be found, in the lives of those
around us, in sudden, strong ebullitions of personal piety and the frames
of mind such ebullitions evince, in the fixed and ordered solemnities
of rites and liturgies, and again in the atmosphere that clings to old
religious monuments and buildings, to temples and to churches. If we
do so we shall find we are dealing with something for which there is
only one appropriate expression, mysterium tremendum. The feeling of
it may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the mind
with a tranquil mood of deepest worship. It may pass over into a more
set and lasting attitude of the soul, continuing, as it were, thrillingly
vibrant and resonant, until at last it dies away and the soul resumes
its `profane', non-religious mood of everyday experience. It may burst
in sudden eruption up from the depths of the soul with spasms and
197
13. The Mysterious In Heritage
convulsions, or lead to the strangest excitements, to intoxicated frenzy,
to transport, and to ecstasy. It has its wild and demonic forms and can
sink to barbaric antecedents and early manifestations, and again it may
be developed into something beautiful and pure and glorious. It may
become the hushed, trembling and speechless humility of the creature in
the face ofwhom or what? In the presence of that which is a Mystery
inexpressible and above all creatures. (Otto, 1923, pp. 12-13)
For Otto, indeed, mythologies and even ghost stories are explicable as offshoots
of this responsiveness to mystery (ibid., pp. 15 & 16). It is unlikely to prove easy
to take account in a piece of moral philosophy of `the atmosphere that clings to
old religious monuments and buildings, to temples and to churches', but if we aim
to take cultural environments seriously in the course of constructing an ethics of
cultural heritage then there is little prospect of escape. In the next chapter I shall
have some more general remarks to make about what is involved in experiences of
encountering heritage, particularly where the presence of history makes itself felt; in
the present chapter, with the last one's reflections on moral epistemology still fresh
in memory, I should like to address the question of what we are to do when we begin
to suspect that sometimes what is most valuable in an item of heritage may lie in
what we do not and perhaps cannot know about it. I have suggested in Chapter
12 that we have a decidedly slippery branch of moral epistemology on our hands. I
now wish to confess that I understated the difficulties. The problem is not merely
one of getting our hands on this knowledge, but of seeking to do so precisely where
mystery, the very veiling and shadowing of clear and crisp nuggets of knowledge,
may manifest itself not as the kind of problem we can afford to eradicate, but as a
source of value in its own right.
In many of its aspects this theme of mystery is a well churned battlefield, and
it is not for me to add another volley to the famous clashes of secular and sacred,
or of supposedly mystical Orient and soi-disant rational West. It would indeed be
strange to do so, when it is hardly sun-worshippers alone whom Stonehenge draws
to gaze on the circle of ancient standing stones which `has stood on Salisbury Plain
for thousands of years, evocative and enigmatic, arousing awe and wonder in each
generation that has gazed upon it' (Stonehenge Visitor Centre website, emphasis
mine). Rather, I propose to talk about the challenge for moral epistemology which
we must face when we take seriously our human openness to the mysterious, and
when we find that we must render it commensurate with our practical ethical
decisions as beings living within cultures. We know already, of course, how to
talk about Stonehenge as a thing which we value after an antiquarian fashion: we
say that it is a piece of heritage, or even (if we are in a legalistic frame of mind)
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that it is an item of Britain's cultural property. We want to know how this thing
called heritage might find a place within our ethical lives, but mystery by its nature
resists interrogation; or rather, it invites it without end.
The true meaning of this ancient, awe-inspiring creation has been lost in
the mists of time. Was it a temple for sun worship, a healing centre, a
burial site or perhaps a huge calendar? How did our ancestors manage
to carry the mighty stones from so far away and then, using only the
most primitive of tools, build this amazing structure? Surrounded by
mystery, Stonehenge never fails to impress. (English Heritage website)
13.1. Is There a Special Problem of Mystery?
Taking account of archæological knowledge in our moral philosophies is problematic
enough, when the interpretative authority of scholars may find itself contested
(Cooper, 2006b); and it is not only in antiquarian surroundings that we may
find ourselves seeking an appreciation of the mysterious. According to Cooper,
mystery may also be found in that most domestic and quotidian branch of culture,
horticulture: `The Garden, to put it portentously, is an epiphany of man's
relationship to mystery. This relationship is its meaning.' (Cooper, 2006a, p. 145)
I must acknowledge, as I tiptoe around the edges of this topic of mystery, that
we have probably even less hope of isolating a class of mysterious items than we
have of listing the world's historically interesting things. There are, of course, a
great many identifiable mysteries in the sense that there are many known gaps in
our knowledge: the fate of Lord Lucan, for example. The fact of his disappearance
leaves us mystified (already in the wake of a `murder mystery', moreover), but
without a sense of mystery, and it would be no loss to us to gain knowledge of what
happened.
Not all such gaps in our knowledge are mysteries of this purely epistemic sort. The
`Voynich Manuscript' has come to be styled the world's most mysterious manuscript
not only because its text has thus far resisted all attempts at decipherment,1 but
also because of the perplexity engendered by its illustrations, which include strange
balneological scenes involving `nymphs' apparently caught up in bulbous, organic
plumbing. A meaningful interpretation of the text would  it is hoped  explain these
images, along with the unidentifiable plants and the manuscript's other peculiarities;
but it is conceivable that something, particularly in the æsthetic experience of
looking at the manuscript, would evaporate with the dawn of understanding.
1Some ancient scripts, such as Linear B and Egyptian Hieroglyphics, have undergone
decipherment in which mystery has been traded for knowledge.
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Other manifestations of the mysterious have little to do with puzzlement. No
amount of theological exposition is guaranteed to detract from the sacred mystery of
Otto's monuments and churches; and archæological and astronomical investigations
into Stonehenge have done little to dispel the enigmatic aura of the ancient site. In
the former case, one who believes that the `Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither
have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them
that love him' (1 Cor 2:9, K.J.V.) will not expect that here there is a puzzle which
can be fathomed. In the latter, though we may not approach the site as a sacred
one, its very antiquity marks it as a solemn survivor of a vastly distant age.
When items of our cultural heritage are thus mysterious, what are we to conclude?
As the previous chapter ended by observing, we face ample enough difficulties, and
cannot hope for exact and accountant-like answers, when we have to enquire after
something's value in light of its contribution to history, to art, and so on. Perhaps it
ought not to faze us when we additionally realise that we shall not be neatly folding
our Lord Almighty and Heavenly Father into our framework for heritage ethics this
afternoon, or when we recall that in reading the list of names inscribed upon some
village war memorial we are not merely enjoying some helpful soul's contribution to
public information, but finding ourselves invited to open ourselves up to meditations
on death, on sacrifice, on gratitude and more. The sacred, in particular, may well
seem to resist being treated as `just' another category, and that is a difficulty to
which I shall return in the final chapter; but for now my anxiety is simply that in
having to grapple with mystery in our evaluations of cultural items we run the risk
of attempting, in the well worn formula, to eff the ineffable.
Indeed, someone might reply, and no less so when you talk about the beauty
of the Yorkshire Moors, or a sense of belonging engendered by participation in a
traditional festival. It is true, the critic might continue, that mystery resists even a
basic taxonomy, in that we might be taken aback if asked to compare (for example)
the mystery of Stonehenge to the mystery of the Pyramids of Egypt; but again our
ordinary manner of talking about beauty makes it clearly a partner in crime, and
we are happy enough to talk about the beauty of a flower, of a sunset, of a face, of
an act of kindness. Just what, then, is so special about mystery?
There are tempting lines of response to the approximate effect that mystery owes
less to sensuous experience (or its debt is less direct); that accordingly it looks less
open to explanation even partly grounded in terms of natural properties, so that
whereas we should expect somebody's account of the beauty of a painting to dwell on
colour and the like, we might be surprised if a discourse on mystery took the same
course;2 and in consequence that even attempting a supervenience-based account
2In practice, matters will tend to be more nuanced. If we are of the view, for example,
200
13.1. Is There a Special Problem of Mystery?
of mystery might well look like an artificial reification for the purposes of a naïve
reductionism. I think that there is something to be said for such a strategy, but I
fear that it might stumble headlong towards what might be styled the autonomy
of mystery, in which mystery not only serves no further end (plausibly true) but
stands quite distinct and even estranged from other domains of human experience
(plausibly false). We shall not rashly wish to claim, I suspect, that there is after
all no very significant link between the mysterious and the æsthetic, or religious
mystery and other elements of a religious life.
We must indeed recall that mystery may be a quite quotidian affair, whose
frequent insinuation into everyday goings on ought to be compatible with any
putative account of it. As I noted above, according to Cooper even the humble
enjoyment of a garden may bring us into contact with the mysterious; according to
Otto, the ghost story is its offshoot. Clearly not every encounter with mystery is
signalled by involuntary shudders (for who wishes a garden to be uncanny?), and
not every one invites attitudes of reverence or solemnity. Even so, presumably not
every situation has mysterious aspects, since otherwise there would be no distinctive
phenomenon of mystery to talk about. (It is presumably easier to open oneself to
mystery in some settings than in others: try feeling mystical during an exam, or while
dodging drunks on a Saturday night.) No doubt we find ourselves emotionally moved
by mystery when a sense of it comes upon us; someone who claimed straightforwardly
to perceive mystery, as though it were simply a feature of certain situations which
was reliably there to be noticed by the observant critic, might strike us as a rather
alien sort, or at least one falling short of the fullest appreciation of experiences which,
as Otto puts it, `may burst in sudden eruption' upon those receptive to them. Yet
this too, after all, is a feature of many and varied situations: many things move us
to emotion, and the emotions are called passions for a reason.3 Mystery may occupy
some special place in our experiences, but that place is one which is troublesomely
tricky to pin down for my present purposes; we cannot, after all, go out to a mystery
that mathematics belongs to a scientific or rationalistic compartment in our thoughts,
or simply one which is ruled by the exactness of accountants, then we may be happy to
grant that it would be an odd soul who thought that the mystery of Stonehenge emerged
from its geometric properties. If, on the other hand, we find ourselves sympathetic to
any of the various traditions, going back at least as far as the Pythagoreans, in which
the mathematical and the mystical are interlinked, then our surprise might well be
rather less. We must acknowledge, at the least, that the shape of Stonehenge is not
wholly irrelevant; but we must also recall that both erosion and human intervention
have influenced that shape over time.
3The reason being that it often feels to us as though we are passive in the face of profound
emotion; I do not intend accidentally to discount the sort of voluntarist account of
emotion which appears in the early Sartre and subsequently in the writings of Robert
Solomon.
201
13. The Mysterious In Heritage
gallery to look at exhibited enigmata, and if we headed out even onto the Salisbury
Plain (on a mystery tour, perhaps) with the attitude of a botanist or a butterfly-
catcher, I suspect that that very attitude would ensure that we caught no mysteries.
We can talk about mysterious places or mysterious artefacts, but it is quite another
matter to establish quite what makes them so.
What then might a distinctive problem of mystery look like, if it is tricky to say
much more than that some items of cultural heritage are mysterious (and that this
may contribute to their value)? I suggest that the problem of mystery lies precisely
in the fact that we cannot investigate mystery, which will seep out of our hands if we
snatch at it, in the ways in which we might approach an interrogation of historical
sources, for example.
This may not look as though it ought to be a particularly awkward problem
for me, because my account of cultural heritage as a repository of value is set up
to emphasise the variously networked associations between cultural items, and we
can say that mystery emerges in the writings of one or another mystic, which were
commented on by some other writer, &c. However, as I took some pains to suggest
in 10.2, evaluation is not purely a matter of measuring cultural activity without
needing to consider what a cultural item is or what it signifies. On the contrary, I
said, heritage and the cultural reflection which it can involve are altogether bound
up with the ways in which we categorise the world; and it is here that mystery
looks conspicuously awkward, for what could fit less readily than the mysterious into
crisply categorical thinking? Of course, we can talk about mysterious places, events,
phenomena, experiences, &c. and clearly in doing so we are talking in categorical
terms; but what we accomplish in so doing is not so much the development of a way
of carving up the world as the delineation of an aspect of the world which resists
the ready application of conceptual thought altogether.
Now it is true, of course, that in spite of all that a great deal has been said and
written both about mystery in general and about specific mysteries. We can point
to clusters of cultural items surrounding mysteries even when we admittedly can
barely grasp what lies at the heart of them. Consequently it may be tempting to
treat mystery like phlogiston: a genuine aspect of culture, in history and formerly in
science, even though the thing itself is inaccessible (in the case of phlogiston, because
it never existed in the first place). Yet phlogiston is within our conceptual grasp;
we know that no phlogiston has ever appeared in the experimental investigation
of combustion precisely by virtue of being able to tell what it would take for a
substance to answer to the description of phlogiston. Mystery is not like this, and
in consequence we face the daunting task of trying to reckon the cultural value
of writings and other creations which concern mystery without having any secure
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and confident grasp of what it is that they are about. If we tried to examine, for
example, the culture of string theorists and to appraise their papers and conferences
as cultural items without having the slightest grasp of what their contribution was
to physics; or if we attempted to evaluate the contribution to their culture of the
Balagtasan debating poets of the Philippines while possessing only a rudimentary
comprehension of Tagalog poetics; or (heaven forfend) if someone sought to lay
down the law concerning the contributions of philosophy to our heritage whilst
armed only with a brace of Very Short Introductionsany conclusions might be
felt to be not automatically credible. In these cases expertise is required not for the
reasons considered in Chapter 12, but simply because many subjects are difficult and
sometimes obscure or unfamiliar; and mystery offers a similar clutch of difficulties
without the comforting thought that there exists an obviously corresponding branch
of expertise on which we might draw.
13.2. Is There a Special Solution?
Mystery, then, is distinctively awkward. That said, I concluded Chapter 12 with the
observation that nobody expects reflection on the value of items of cultural heritage
to produce numerical scores; this is a region of moral epistemology in which there are
not only no formulaic or straightforward answers but also few prospects of reaching
conclusions in disciplinary isolation.4 If this is what awaits us whatever aspects of
cultural heritage we aspire to investigate, does mystery pose so special a problem
that it demands a special solution? If it does, is there any special treatment with
which we might meet this demand?
I think the answer to the first question is, again, that even our most refined
investigative practices run into trouble when up against the mysterious: our
interventions will either annihilate mystery or leave it untouched. Someone
who learns that the layout of Stonehenge is partly a product of modern human
intervention may never again be quite able to feel a sense of mystery when looking
upon the ancient stones; someone else may remain as open to the monument's
mystery as before; but in neither case have we reason to think that the act of
arrangement has helped anybody to penetrate into this mystery in anything akin to
the ways in which the arrangement of objects in a museum or art gallery might aim in
the direction of visitors' enlightenment. If there are things which are not to be looked
at steadily  the Duc de la Rochefoucauld listed death and the sun  then mystery
enjoys an impeccable candidacy, and this rather confounds any hope that walking
4Here, too, mystery may prove especially inconvenient; it may be possible to experience
a shared encounter with mystery, perhaps even as part of a cenobitic life of mysticism,
but any suggestion of a shared research project may look like a taller order.
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among ancient standing stones could be, as I said in 12.6 of strolling through the
galleries of a museum, a tour of `applied historical epistemology'. Mystery may cling
to objects with a tenacity which survives transition to a museum, but our ability to
investigate objects which are mysterious, though perhaps it can destroy one mystery
or another, or put it beyond our reach, has a doubtful claim to insight into mystery
itself, especially if our investigations are to be bounded by a particular concern for
cultural heritage. Whether or not we have an anthropological sense of `culture'
particularly in mind, what we mean must be human culture and accordingly will
not be easily reconciled with any gesture towards
something `beyond the human'. Those last four words will... be taken
as indicating what is beyond conceptualization and articulation: the
ineffable or mysterious, in effect. [By implication they are] referring to
what, if anything, lies beyond human practices, purposes, perspectives,
evaluations and whatever else constitutes our distinctively human
existence. [This existence can be] answerable to what lies beyond such
practices etc., beyond in effect the form or forms of human life. (Cooper,
2005b, p. 127)
So, whatever are we going to do about it? Well, firstly, we can take heart from
the fact that on my holistic account, the value of cultural heritage is in general only
derivatively to be found vested in particular objects, ideas and practices; since we are
already dealing with value which manifests itself amidst the intricate interactions
of networks of cultural items, the refusal of mystery to be readily tied down for
evaluation as the mystery of something in particular need not come as an utter
shock. If we can be relaxed about not being quite able to say where the boundaries
of a historic landscape might be (though we confidently think it beautiful), or what
precisely constitutes the setting of a historic building (though we remain keen to
preserve it in its setting), then it need not greatly alarm us that sometimes we can
say little more about the role of mystery in making particular cultural items what
they are than that mystery `clings', for example, to Otto's old religious buildings.
The resistance of mystery, indeed, need not count entirely as a negative aspect
thereof. In a way it too signals something which is more weakly manifest in cultural
heritage more broadly, and which I have at times sought to indicate by drawing
a comparison with ecological ethics: that despite being thoroughly human cultural
heritage it escapes sheer human whim as soon as it comes into being, and may indeed
outlast the civilisations which created it. Cultural heritage, in its way, resists human
caprice; and sometimes (and not infrequently when we encounter the remnants of
those dead civilisations) it so resists even our epistemic practices that we are left
with feelings of utter mystery.
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It is at this point that I think we had better frankly admit the limitations of
`value' as a conceptual tool in moral philosophy, and turn again to patiency. I noted
in 11.2 that calculated evaluations may not strike us as greatly helpful when we are
forced to choose, say, between saving two human lives; yet even though we cannot
peer into the minute inward workings of a human soul and act as though sitting
in divine judgment, moral philosophers have on the whole not given up hope that
philosophical guidance can help us to make choices with the limited information we
can possess. We cannot forget that there is more to an individual human life than
a set of rights or virtues or felicific contributions; and we cannot forget that there
is more to Stonehenge than some historically diverting architecture; but in neither
case need we be prevented from proceeding on the basis of what we can know and
express.
How then to proceed, when asked what should be done with a cultural item
where heritage touches mystery? We can scarcely hope, I think, to address mystery
itself as though, where x is a cultural item, `the mystery surrounding x ' might
count as another cultural item. Instead, then, we must contrive to note those
cases in which mystery clings to cultural items, and consider those items in the
light of their mysterious characteristics, in effect acknowledging that they possess
a concealed dimension which we cannot adequately grasp.5 At the same time we
must bear in mind that this dimension is not completely concealed; if it were we
could hardly know about it, and it would be wholly detached from human culture.
If we cannot very readily investigate a given case of mystery in the manner of
a research project, then any grip we might manage to get on it will presumably
come not through detached and disinterested intellectual scrutiny but through the
passionate, emotional engagement of people with their heritage; and it is to this,
the matter of what is involved in encounters with cultural heritage, that I turn in
the next chapter.
5I return to the religious aspects of this theme in Chapter 17.
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14. Encounters With Heritage
When talking in general terms about culture and cultures and cultural items, it
is easy to find oneself thoroughly adopting a stance of critical or anthropological
detachment. In many cases, and in some ways, this is beneficial, helping those
trying to navigate what is sometimes a deeply emotive subject area to evade the
temptation of political tantrums; and frequently we must simply acquaint ourselves
with controversies over heritage without ourselves feeling any of the yearnings and
grievances which they may involve, finding ourselves heavily reliant on the testimony
of others (see Chapter 12 above). Yet it can hardly escape our attention that to
belong to a culture is not a purely intellectual endeavour, and that encountering both
our own and our neighbours' cultural heritage is sometimes a matter of profound
emotion.
I do not mean merely that cultural items may elicit feelings of approval or
disapproval. No doubt the contributions of cultural items to human happiness (and
sorrow) are among those human interests which we ought to take into account;
but it is not distinctively interesting to note that culture may feature in utilitarian
calculations. Neither am I especially concerned in this chapter with the deeper and
more exact ways in which culture may be thought to contribute to human wellbeing:
by supporting self-respect, community, autonomy and so on.1 I mean rather that
there are forms, or perhaps aspects, of engagement with cultural heritage which
demand special attention not for the knowledge which they bring to either expert
or layman, or purely for the sensuous or sentimental experiences their æsthetics
may occasion, but particularly for the possibility which they open up not merely of
perceiving or observing or investigating cultural items but of encountering culture as
something to live with. The bulk of anybody's involvement with culture is made up
of engaged, everyday, often tacit involvement in what are sometimes called forms of
lifeand moreover, it is not only in stepping back for the sake of science or criticism
or indeed moral and philosophical reflection that we find ourselves being jerked out
of that most central of cultural practices, the act of going about our daily business.
Other phenomena are involved when we stand in awe, as in the previous chapter, at
the sheer enigmatic antiquity of Stonehenge; or when we open some antique volume
1Recall, for example, Sarah Harding's discussion of heritage and the good life, as described
in 8.2.
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among the library stacks and feel as though we have entered into conversation with
our precursors; or when we participate in even the most minor of ways in some local
tradition, and feel that in so doing we reinforce a sense that we belong to the locality
and its community, whether we are continuous residents or `returning to our roots'
or newly arrived and welcomed.2
What are we supposed to make, for example, of a sense of belonging? (Can we
insert it directly into our value taxonomy: `communitarian value', or something
of that nature? We should remember before we try that people are not always
glad to belong where they feel they do.) What I principally want to note is that
our experience is not one of forming the belief that we belong somewhere, and
consequently developing proprietorial feelings towards that place's heritage. That
of course can happen, but it is not the experience I have presently in mind. On the
contrary, it is through an encounter with this cultural heritage which we believe to
be ours that the feeling of belonging emerges. We go to the festival; we open the
old ledger; we tour the stately home (provided we are not treating it purely and
merely as entertainment, on a par with channel hopping); but there is an element
of dependency in feeling that we are participating in things which are wider and
inscrutably older than ourselves.
14.1. The Presence of History
Here, heritage emerges not as an instrument by means of which we acquire valuable
experiences, but something through which we are confronted by our place in the
wider world. This is perhaps most clearly evident in attitudes towards history.
Of course, even the work of academic historians is not exhausted by dispassionate
theorising about how and why things happened as they did: when someone
judges that landowners mistreated their tenants during the Irish Potato Famine, for
example, or indeed that historical figures ought to be judged by the standards of the
times in which they lived, that person is clearly concerned with history and historical
evidence, but the matters most critical to the judgment are normative ones and in
2Guests in the locality will of course experience a different form of welcome and different
feelings. I assume for simplicity's sake that feelings of this sort are not easily mistaken,
though of course it may happen that people come to revise their beliefs about where
they belong. Certainly our knowledge of ourselves and of how we fit in amongst other
people can be deeply flawed: if we can make mistakes about whether we are boring our
present company or whether we can rely on those we consider our friends, perhaps we
can also be mistaken in our sense of belonging. Similarly, the realisation that one has
misjudged somebody is a commonplace experience; maybe, then, we can be mistaken
in our sense of whether somebody is fully `one of us'. (There may also be a normative
aspect to such deliberations: do people who have lived in a neighbourhood for five years
therefore deserve to be considered locals, for example?)
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some respects moral ones. From here it is quite a short step to wondering how much
we inherit of both ancestral glory and ancestral guilt, since after all the past conduct
of those with whom we associate ourselves is frequently not a matter of fact from
which we can readily detach ourselves; regrettably, grudges can be heritage too.
This in turn has its effects on what it means to encounter remnants of the ancestral
past. In 13.1 I briefly used the example of coming upon a war memorial, the historic
importance of which is that it records the names of `our glorious dead' not so much
in order to inform the public as to act as part of public memory, as a proclamation
and a focus for common reflection. (Indeed, public monuments tend, inevitably, to
be in some respects political: their existence reflects political priorities concerning
the organisation of public space and the distribution of public funds.) Such a
monument, of course, is still constrained by strict demands of accuracy: imagine
the reaction if one of the recorded names had been found to be misspelt. In partial
contrast, perhaps there are aspects of cultural heritage which are subject to less
stringent requirements of exacting veridicality: what we might call the legendarian.
Commenting on Alois Riegl's addition of `age-value' to the other kinds of value
ascribed to monuments, so that their very signs of visible aging and decay create a
potential for impact on the observer, Stephen Bann remarks that `the poets, novelists
and indeed historians who were tinged by the antiquarian sensibility were able to
carry their intuitions further by articulating new, colourful, dramatic narratives of
the hitherto neglected past' (Bann, 1990, p. 131). Colour and drama need in no way
entail historical fiction; but to poets we ascribe poetic licence, and in general we do
not necessarily place stringent demands of accuracy on a hagiography or an elegy.
The legendarian objective is not so much knowledge qua enterprise of fact-collection
and the cultivation of theoretical understanding, but more of an engagement with
or involvement in the past, and often specifically and significantly in one's own past:
sometimes making our folk heroes and villains present to us, sometimes laying our
collective ghosts to rest.
Commenting on Alexander Etkind's discussion of cultural recollection (Etkind,
2009), Eli Zaretsky contends that `there are two different ways to understand
memory: the first conceives of memory as the recollection of an event, the other
insists that the act of remembering is not completed until the event is situated
into a meaningful, coherent narrative, one that is constantly changing in response
to changes in memory...' (Zaretsky, 2009, p. 201) Collective memory, for Zaretsky,
means not merely commemoration but the establishment of `meaningful narrative[s]'
(ibid., p. 203). Whatever it exactly means to engage in remembrance in this sense,
the aim in representation of the past is not so much simply to know history
as a body of factual knowledge as to come to terms with it: Etkind's `cultural
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memory' embedded in our surroundings  `multiple types of signifiers: from memoirs
to memorials; from historical studies to historical novels; from family albums to
museums and archives; from folk songs to films to [the I]nternet' (Etkind, 2009,
p. 189)  is accordingly not only a source of information about the past but moreover
a collection of ongoing practices of commemoration.
What resides in historical records and other sources, then, is not merely
information in its thoroughly dry and truth-apt sense, but more broadly material
for the assemblage of historical imagery. A legendarian approach to historiography
will of course be constrained by the expectation that its treatments of history
 be they elegiac, hagiographic, epic, tragic or whatever else  will in outline
reflect the way things came to pass,3 and as such it can be concerned to reflect
truths, but broadly so, taking an interest in `the historical, scientific, cultural
and æsthetic truth that [an] object and its context can provide' (John Merryman,
quoted in Gillman, 2006, p. 30). Bann again (1990, p. 102, this time commenting
on Nietzsche's The Use and Abuse of History for Life): `The antiquarian attitude
is not an imperfect approximation to something elsewhich would be the maturity
of scientific, professionalised historiography. It is a specific, lived relationship to
the past, and deserves to be treated on its own terms.' The legendarian attitude is
perhaps likewise such a `lived relationship'. `For the traditionalist,' Avishai Margalit
writes in the related context of inherited remembrance, `the [collective] memory itself
matters a great deal, while its veracity counts for less.' (Margalit, 2002, p. 61)
Such lived relationships can at times be fraught, and the past can prove a
difficult thing to manage. Sticking fairly close to home in considering how past
events may cast long and discomforting shadows, to avoid having to deal with
the complication that cultures markedly unlike ours might incorporate likewise
dissimilar historiographies, we have the recent example of the Bavarian State
government's attempts to prevent the reprinting of items of Nazi propaganda by
the British publisher Peter McGee as part of his Zeitungszeugen series of facsimiles.
Glossing over the legal details  Bavaria attempts to use copyright law to restrict
the circulation of (unannotated) Nazi propaganda, having taken possession of the
publication rights after the War  we can see two divergent attitudes towards the
same area of historical knowledge and study emerging. The Bavarian government
has an interest in preventing certain malignant aspects of the mid-20th Century
from seeping back into the present: it has engaged in a kind of appropriation of the
past (in a more direct sense than that suggested by Germany's usual restrictions of
Nazi material in its Criminal Code) in order to keep it at bay. Other parties to the
3In contrast, the narrative genre of historical fiction is constrained more by historical
plausibility: the setting requires verisimilitude, but the plot need barely even be inspired
by real events.
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dispute regard publication as educational and `scientific' (Moore, 2009): as a matter
of making information publicly accessible.
In part, this falls into the usual template of anticipated `media effects' versus
freedom of information and scholarship; but it also reflects different ways of treating
the historical information available (or not) in propaganda documents. Here is
a possible interpretation: the Bavarian government is in the position of needing
to facilitate a kind of `safe' popular relationship with the Nazi era that permits
soul-searching (and scholarship) while at the same time firmly dissociating it from
present-day German culture. Consequently it finds itself acting as a kind of historical
gamekeeper, and gatekeeper: its moral stance towards German history takes priority
over its interests in historical scholarship. An educational publisher, on the other
hand, will not necessarily take an amoral stance towards history, but will be engaged
first and foremost in the enterprise of looking at historical evidence and presenting
it for public examination. For the one, the material and written heritage of the Nazi
era forms part of a political narrative of de-Nazification and emancipation from the
legacy of the period; for the other, that very same heritage represents an object of
study and analysis.
Thus a great deal of what we do with history not only diverges from the practices
and priorities of historical scholarship but on occasion may come to practical blows
with them. There is indeed a profound normative question of what ought to be kept
alive in popular memory and what may safely be left to the attention of academic
specialists, and of what treatment is due to each member of the former class:
nobody commemorates what took place at Senlac Hill (though schoolchildren are
certainly expected to learn about 1066) in quite the way in which we commemorate
the Armistice. Margalit even suggests that remembrance amongst a collectivity
can be a loosely networked phenomenon in which memory is shared through a
division of labour, thereby finding echoes in my own use of the idea of a network in
conceptualising culture:
A young man I met in Prague knew vaguely that something awful
and sinister happened in Lidice during the war, but he didn't quite
remember which war and what exactly happened. What happened
was a retaliatory massacre of the male residents of Lidice after the
assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, the Nazi governor in Prague, by the
Czech underground. This young man, however, is plugged into networks
of shared memories that can fill in the missing information. It is less
likely, though, that he is plugged into a network that can fill in the details
of the retaliatory massacres by the Nazis at roughly the same period in
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Oradour-sur-Glane, France, or Puten, Holland. (Margalit, 2002, pp. 54-
5)
In ceremonies of remembrance, in shared classroom curricula, or in amorphous
networks of shared memory, history makes its presence felt. It is precisely this
power which in rather different ways impresses both the Bavarian State, which
would like to keep recollection of the Nazi era on a short leash, and James Cuno,
in whose eyes political interference in historical narratives is an unnerving prospect.
Sartre remarks with typical cynicism that narratives of the past are created `in order
to gain the adherence of the masses... [who in turn] demand a political project
which illuminates and justifies their past' (Sartre, 2003, pp. 521-2). History is an
entanglement, a hereditary predicament interpreted and reinterpreted and argued
over in a multitude of moral and political lights.
14.2. The Cultural Entanglement
It is not uniquely true of its historical aspects that culture is in many ways a
predicament which reaches metaphorically out to wrap its tendrils around us; it is
no doubt wholly possible to make a conscious decision to `integrate' into a cultural
group, but it is also possible to find that one has `gone native', and that is always
how we find ourselves belonging to the cultures into which we are born. I am not
about to attempt a phenomenology of cultural belonging; it would be immensely
difficult, and perhaps sheer folly, to attempt such a thing as though `what it is like
to understand oneself be an x ' must conform to the same general template whether x
happens to be `Enlightenment metaphysician' or `Tom Lehrer fan' or `12th Century
Chinese farmer' or whatever else. It hardly follows, however, that we are licensed to
pretend that all these experiences are merely secondary to culture, and therefore of
limited importance until we seek to weigh up the sort of human interests considered
in Chapter 11. We are participants in culture and cultures. Certainly there are
cultural items, most obviously material objects, which may persist as such, out of
sight and mind alike at the back of some drawer, and nevertheless in some small
way part of culture (not least through membership of the category `things lurking
in the recesses of drawers', when many of our homes abound with forgotten clutter).
Certainly, it is possible to reify and talk in abstract terms about all manner of
practices and behavioural traits without being much obliged to give thought to
what it is to live with them: manners, nervous habits, mental disorders, dialects,
gestures, and so on. Nevertheless, insofar as a culture (or more precisely what is
sometimes styled a `living' culture) is something in which people participate and to
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which people belong, their experiences of this participation are, if not parts of their
culture (recall Chapter 5), at least deeply involved therein.
What then are we (within our limitations) to say about such experiences? (The
choicest-looking examples, after all, may well prove on closer examination to be
the exceptional cases, much as the atmosphere in which we live and breathe is
always most noticeable when the weather is chokingly humid or the cold wind is
biting, though this atmosphere is no less present at any other moment in our lives.)
Perhaps we should ask instead what must befall a moral philosopher who hopes
to set such matters aside. You might think that I would be the best placed to
be that philosopher, since it is my declared project to construe cultural heritage
as a moral patient in its own right, and since it is I who thought that `Heritage
and Human Interests' would make a nice title for a single chapter (Chapter 11)
of this document. That may be sobut I am also the philosopher who thought
it worthwhile to include an entire section (2.3) on fan cultures; clearly I do not
think that culture is on the whole a spectators' sport. There is no need for me to
detach culture wholly from human individuals, any more than environmental ethics
must construe `the environment' or `nature' or `the natural world' as though humans
belonged to the altogether unnatural.
What then would be lacking if I paid no great attention to the experiential aspects
of belonging to cultures? More specifically, what would impede my attempts to
produce a framework for so thinking about the ethics of cultural heritage as to be
moving in the direction of moral illumination? What we would lose, I think, is a
sense of cultural heritage not only as something which is physically or abstractly
there for us to notice (when we stumble upon some dilapidated old building, or a
plough turns up some ancient coins, or we catch ourselves humming along to some
nostalgic tune on the radio), but as something to which we can be attuned (or not)
and which can exert a pull on us (if we are prepared to respond). We cannot suppose,
for example, that the experience of the Amish youth deciding whether he will make
a life for himself among the pre-electrical technologies of the Amish community, or
whether out in the world beyond, amounts to a choice between certain pros and
cons, with his self standing equally aloof from both. The predicament is one of
deciding how to respond to one culture which already has a grip on him, and to
another which is possibly beckoning, possibly indifferent. True, one generally cannot
(without bathos) renounce one's choice of aftershave or one's taste in wine or one's
preference in board games, even though all of these may reasonably be looked upon
as parts of culture; but where renunciation becomes a possibility (and it does so
even in the merely recreational commitments involved in supporting a sports team),
and where we think either that it is possible to renounce a cultural heritage or that
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it is significantly and constrainingly not possible to leave one behind, we shall we
hard pressed to account for the phenomenon unless we are willing to entertain the
idea not only that we can cling to culture, but that culture can take hold of us.
Suppose we grant, then, that culture may involve a calling; that consequently it
may present itself to us as a source of demands; and that in further consequence
we may find ourselves with a moral phenomenology which apparently asks us not
only what culture can do for us, but what we can do for our cultures. Do we then
have grounds for thinking that we are getting closer to learning what our actual
moral obligations pertaining to cultural heritage may be? (No doubt people have
existed who sincerely experienced the K.G.B. or Savonarola's Bonfire of the Vanities
as a source of demands for commitment; and it is notoriously hard to renounce the
Mafia. What keeps people inside, in this last case, may be fear, but the employment
of fear for this purpose is itself part of the culture of the Mafia.)
I certainly do not imagine (and the length of this document is the proof) that
the callings people suppose they find in their cultures are always either virtuous or
veridical. To perceive such a calling is properly a starting point for moral reflection,
the conclusions of which cannot be presupposed, since it is always open to the human
individual to be conservative or revolutionary, and to prefer to stay at home or to
leave it (although of course some individuals have considerably more freedom than
others to act on these preferences, and it is true that freedom of choice is itself
not altogether distinct from cultural practice). It is in our practical experiences of
culture, however, that we are most immediately confronted by the context within
which our decisions must occur; and if we find our relation to culture put in question,
we naturally will be hungry for answers.
The case of the imagined Amish youth, of course, is the exception to a rule which
more frequently sees us easily and unreflectively float with the currents of custom;
the very impossibility of a life outside any culture ensures that we shall put far less
in question than we continue to presuppose as we cook our meals (cuisine) and take
our evening strolls (recreation) and indulge in gossip-mongering (social propriety).
Some of the most noteworthy cultural experiences, meanwhile, do not put anything
obviously in question; among these are experiences of the sort noted in the previous
chapter, such as awe at the mysterious vista of Stonehenge, which leave us fumblingly
bereft of answers, but not necessarily in possession of adequate questions either.
When we sit down as moral philosophers, however, in order to consider cultural
heritage, we must commence this by acknowledging not only the knowledge which
people share about the value of items of their own cultures (as in Chapter 12
above) but also the normative predicaments into which even the possibility of such
knowledge may place them. Thus culture emerges not only as an object of our
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enquiry but as something which may resist our indifference and make searching
demands of us. It emerges as a moral patient not at the point at which we decide
that it does need to be looked after, and start wondering what that may mean, but
earlier, when we realise both that things can go well or badly for cultures and their
heritage and that cultures do not take this quietly.
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15. Pulling the Threads Together
According to the first-century scholar Josephus, the children of Seth, the third son
of Adam, raised two great pillars, one of stone and one of brick, upon which they
inscribed their astronomical discoveries; for their grandfather had prophesied that
two great cataclysms would be visited upon the world, one of water and one of
fire, and the Sethites were anxious to protect their knowledge from destruction. If
existent, these pillars would have been an early example both of redundant backup
storage and of empirical testing on an industrial scale: those who later found a lone
pillar of stone would learn from its antediluvian writings not only of the heavens but
also that a pillar of brick had once existed, and they would come to know thereby
that the world had already perished in the deluge of water that carried the sibling
pillar away, while the disaster of fire was yet to come.1 What most impressed those
later writers, however, in whose retelling the number of pillars expanded to fourteen,
after the seven liberal arts (Stephens, 2005, p. S69), appears to be the very `struggle
of memoria literarum against the forces of obliteratio... Not only does the Flood
menace both life and culture, but writing, the vehicle through which human culture
is transmitted across time, must fend for itself.' (ibid., p. S69) This is not a tale
with a human hero, or the story of a dynasty or nation; its protagonist is a concrete
record of collective memory, and the narrative is one of artefacts' endurance under
assault by the elements.
The Sethites of course are supposed to have addressed their writings to future
readers, thereby making a gift of their knowledge to later human beings. No doubt
there is also the wish to live in memory, immortalised through one's works; Horace,
whose writings were preserved by copyists rather than on mighty pillars, considered
them a monument more durable than bronze (Odes III.30). Yet the abiding image
in the story is not of the speculative hopes of the antediluvian benefactors or of the
gratitude of their later beneficiaries, but of the very monuments tasked with carrying
knowledge through the disaster. The legendary Sethites created an artefact more
resilient than themselves.
1Walter Stephens suggests that the Sephites sought to ensure that one pillar would survive
whichever catastrophe came first (Stephens, 2005, p. S65); presumably, if fire had been
first the heat might have cracked the stone but it would merely have rebaked the brick.
However, it seems uncertain whether the bidirectional interpretation is necessitated by
Josephus' text.
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I promised readers a defence of the idea that cultural heritage qualifies as a moral
patient; and on p. 62 I suggested that this would require an `elaboration' of the
place of cultural heritage in our moral landscape. In accordance with this view, my
style of argumentation has at times resembled the progression of an incoming tide
more than it has a brisk route march from premises to conclusion; as I indicated
in 12.5, I have aspired not so much to proceed deductively, or indeed inductively,
as to progress towards a `conceptual ratchet' which will help cultural heritage to
make itself manifest before our moral vision in something akin to the way in which
environmental philosophy allows us to perceive ecological problems not only in
isolation but moreover as aspects of broader phenomena of environmental harm.
So culture emerges as a loosely agglomerative network of intricate interconnections
(9.3), and then as a collection of categories like some sort of multidimensional
matryoshka doll (Chapter 10), not as the culmination of some grand metaphysical
schematisation2 but in order to demonstrate how we can think holistically about
culture and employ our `value' toolkit while doing so.
In Chapter 7 I suggested that disputes over the fate of some cultural item, such as
a controversially excavated artefact, frequently involve two broad ways of thinking
about an item's passage through time. To originalistic thinking, the point of interest
is the point of origin (or for some, notably archæological, purposes, the point of
discovery), and it is this that provides a standard against which the rightness
of subsequent transactions may be judged. A strong form of originalism may so
associate an item with the genius of its originating cultural group as to suggest a
sort of cultural droit moral, in which insofar as an item may move about outside
its source group it remains nevertheless tied to it on a sort of deontic leash; in
consequence, especially when the item in question is something as abstract as a
style or motif, we run swiftly into controversies involving appropriation (i.e. which
transactions, involving what items, are permissible in light of the point of origin)
and, where the source group undergoes noticeable changes, of authenticity (see 6.1
above). Traditionalistic thinking exhibits less interest in origins as indications of a
standard of rightness; its emphasis is on continuities and the persistence of cultural
items through changing contexts.
There are no doubt cases in which a preoccupation with origins will readily
appear to take `cultural property' beyond its reasonable bounds: to ask whether
the Taliban were the culturally correct people to be destroying pre-Islamic artefacts
in Afghanistan might seem akin to enquiring, on finding a child being beaten to death
by its foster parents, whether the adoption papers were fully in order. In other cases
2While talking about culture will always tend to involve some measure of reification, it is
hard enough just to work out what we mean when we declare something to be `part of
our culture', as Chapter 5 indicated.
218
our originalistic sympathies may be stronger: this is particularly so in the case of
religious artefacts, which will hardly lose their connection to the devout through any
transfer of worldly ownership. To judge what reactions fit which circumstances is
a formidably thorny task, and my aim has not been to sidestep it but to step back
and to ask what holism might contribute by placing less emphasis on the individual
cultural item and its history, and more on the flourishing of culture and cultures
at large. Since individual cultural items do exist, and some of them are of great
importance for many people, this approach is clearly not going to sweep away all
previous ways of framing problems and dissolve all current controversies (alas!), but
again a comparison can be drawn with environmental ethics: ecological thinking
certainly does not so transform our thinking as to remove particular trees and lakes
and marshes from it, but hopefully it offers us a finer understanding of how they
and their vulnerabilities are interrelated. Culture is not composed of artefactual
atoms. It is not even built out of items and their interrelations, although this is
a more helpful model (hence 9.3 above). Cultural items presuppose culture even
though sometimes, buried in long-untouched soil until some archæologist unearths
them, they are all that remains of a culture. Culture is always, implacably there,
and much of any moral philosopher's task in investigating it must be to bring this
omnipresent background to centre stage.
What then of cultural `heritage'? Heritage is decidedly not always and implacably
there. Heritage, crucially, is something that can be lost (5.1 above). Heritage
plainly can be damaged or neglected, stolen or abandoned, underfunded or forgotten:
it takes the role of trees and lakes in a cultural ecosystem.
It was never obvious that we had to talk about `cultural property' or `heritage' or
`patrimony'. People can and usually do consider the looting of archæological sites
without reference to the appropriation of traditional stories, and think about the
impact of copyright law on archival work without having the protection of material
culture during warfare hovering in the backs of their minds. Yet we find ourselves in
a world in which disparate topics such as these sometimes are discussed under the
grand umbrella of cultural heritage; and when we consider them under the light of
this notion of the cultural, we may indeed begin to see them not as wholly isolated
problems but as aspects of something else. Much as we cannot simply forget, after
being exposed to ecological thinking, that on top of there being trees and lakes and
so on there is `the environment', I suggest that we similarly cannot just forget to
see cultural heritage in all its holistic splendour. A tree, after all, can grow in a
glasshouse in a little soil, but nothing can be a cultural item altogether on its own.
My claim, then, is that consideration of our dealings with this thing we call
cultural heritage invites us to enter into a certain sort of holistic view which
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emphasises the grand and sprawling whole (culture and cultures and cultural
heritage) over the individual component (this artefact, our creation myth, my song).
It is not, I readily admit, clear what could prove either the helpfulness or the
plausibility of such a conceptual ratchet (so we find ourselves in a rather awkward
predicament if it really is impossible to go back); neither is it obvious what could
possibly refute it, which may cause consternation for minds of a Popperian bent. The
same is true of my further claims: that the `value' with which moral philosophers
might hope to deal is no less fuzzily distributed than culture itself, and that we can
go further than talk of value and understand this manifold, holistic phenomenon of
cultural heritage to count as a moral patient in its own right, bound up by nature
with human existence but a potential object of moral obligations which need not be
explained in terms of what some collection of humans happens to need or want or
favour.
My approach is not, however, intended as a mere appeal to the like-minded: these
are my intuitions and surely you (under ideally rational reflective conditions) would
share them too. Culture, after all, incorporates the very ways in which we carve up
and categorise the world (Chapter 10 above); as such it incorporates resources for
reflection upon itself. In thinking about this thing called culture, then, we come
at length to realise that we are deploying and developing conceptual tools which
themselves are built from cultural resources. The very practice of philosophically
reflecting, in general terms, on how culture is involved with ethics will thereby tend
to lead us towards the lofty viewpoint from which culture becomes able to look not
only like a complex collection of many interacting items, but like something capable
of dynamic and organic-seeming growth and decay, of budding and bursting into
creative splendour and, in short, of flourishing.
We do not have to perceive culture as capable of flourishing, as possessing any
more form and integrity of its own than a sand dune receives from the winds and
the laws of physics. We do not have (at least, allowing certain assumptions about
reductionism in the sciences) to say that a tree is alive, let alone that it is doing
well or badly, when physical and chemical descriptions will suffice; and we certainly
do not have to talk about environments and ecosystems and biospheres when we
do ask whether organisms in the world around us are doing well or badly. Yet we
do so, and it makes ample sense for us to do so as beings which both live and lead
their own lives, and whose lives therefore proceed and flourish not only biologically
but socially and economically and creatively. We find ourselves not only among
plants but living within an environment, and that environment emerges for us as a
potential recipient of care. Another thing within which we live is culture, and it too
is something which can benefit from human care.
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I promised you a framework for thinking about the ethics of cultural heritage (see
p. 20 above), and the previous chapters have indeed laid out the shape of one,
albeit and inevitably with a great deal of space left for cross-pollination with other
domains of thought and with the reflective practices distinctively found in particular
cultures. After all this talk of network models of culture and cascading categories
and museum exhibitions as concretely embodied cultural self-examination, however,
it will be understandable if you are uncertain whether this holistic framework is
eventually going to be of any practical use in advising people who have to deal with
the very particular problems of deciding who gets to exhibit this artefact or sing that
song or prevent some archives from crumbling to dust. Help had therefore better be
at hand; I cannot, of course, describe in detail how any given case might go from
the application of a framework to specific normative guidance, but I can indicate
the ways in which a few exemplary cases might play out.1
It may appear that my conception of culture, with its emphasis on dynamic
interactions and associations between cultural items, incorporates a universal, built-
in preference for disclosure and publicity, for the mingling and creative merging of
ideas, and in general for the cosmopolitan. In fact, while this may be true as a
general tendency, we may find ourselves requiring a more nuanced casuistry. Even
the darkest of secrecy may have its place in a culture: Freemasonry, for example,
positively thrives as an esoteric body around which rumour and speculation may
freely swirl. Moreover, in conceiving of culture as akin to a network which has a
topography and in which we may loosely discern clusters of closely related items, I
am clearly not so cosmopolitan as to disavow any endorsement of the distinctively
local. Difference and distinctiveness are themselves associations after a fashion, and
both similarities and contrasts lend colour to culture.
I believe, nevertheless, that what I have to offer, though nimble and flexible
in its applications, is not so multiply pliant as to be useless. Its stance
regarding temporality distances it a little from both originalistic and traditionalistic
tendencies, since associations between items may span epochs, leapfrogging both
points of origin and successions of continuity. It similarly distances itself from a
1These sketches do not necessarily embody my detailed views on what tend to be complex
questions; in particular, they largely ignore questions of human interests.
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narrow focus on the possession and control of `cultural property', since its construal
of each cultural item as a nexus of associations makes that appear rather like an
obsession with the ownership of some individual railway junction, which ought never
to be allowed to eclipse the operations of the railway network in the disputants'
attention.
I gestured towards one piece of specific normative judgment at the very end of
Chapter 12, when I wrote:
As an approach to moral epistemology for the ethics of cultural heritage
[mine] does at least suggest an answer to the question of whether the
former Afghan government or the Afghan museum curators had the
greater authority to judge what was valuable for Afghan cultural heritage
[and whether pre-Islamic artefacts ought to be destroyed]: we ask, in the
first place, which party was engaged in the more thoroughly, sincerely
and humbly epistemic, enquiring practice, and we have good reason to
favour the curators by default.
Since, given my views on culture and categorisation, a cultural item is not altogether
distinct from the categories into which it finds itself placed, and accordingly not from
the practices of investigation and reflection which are bound up with these, what
the curators possess is not a purely and modestly epistemic authority. After all, in
that chapter I was asking a question heavily concerned with moral epistemology,
and with who possesses the authority to make pronouncements about value with
which moral philosophy can work. Practices of enquiry in this direction, and the
characteristics (striking a note mildly suggestive of virtue epistemology) which bring
about success in them, are hardly sequestered from reflection on what moral agents
ought in fact to do.
Of course, the chances are high that readers of this document are already in favour
of not wantonly destroying significant and irreplaceable artefacts, so at this point
I am not breaking any very new ground or reaching any controversial conclusions.
Nevertheless, the case at least shows that mine is an approach within which it
is possible for conclusions to emerge when the proper fate of some cultural items
is under dispute, and that the conclusions which do emerge in this case have the
appearance of plausibility.
It is predictable enough that a framework which emphasises the interconnections
between cultural items will seldom be a cheerleader for their destruction, but what
of disputes over where an item ought to be or who ought to control it? A reduced
emphasis on individual cultural items and on the trappings of `cultural property'
hardly permits me to ignore the disputes that do arise over such questions. Yet one
might anticipate that I would say either that many associations between items are
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not subject to spatiotemporal limitations, and hence that it matters little where
things are and in whose hands, or that everything eventually becomes local as
it associates itself ever more strongly with its present home and owners. The
former possibility might imply that the Rosetta Stone, for example, is just as much
a product of Ptolemaic Egypt however close to Egypt it is now ; but of course
nobody disputes that anyway, and the modern symbolism and iconicity, and by (also
contestable) implication the ownership, of the Stone remain topics of disputation.
The latter might seem to endorse a sort of universal `finders keepers' rule for cultural
heritage; and no doubt it is true that cultural items settle into their new homes
however they came to be there, but it might be felt to overlook certain important
questions of propriety if that proved to be all I had to say.
In fact, what I say differs somewhat from both these alternatives. In the case
of the Rosetta Stone, first of all I would distinguish between the Stone as artefact
and the Stone as cultural item: clearly there are important supervenience relations
between the two, but it is not immediately obvious that the physical origins of
the Stone are of critical normative interest, and the political information which it
carries, though of interest in its own right, is not what makes the Stone iconic. The
Rosetta Stone is remembered for the world it opened up, and this is its most crucial
connection to Ancient Egyptian culture more broadly; but for whom did it open up
this knowledge of Egyptian hieroglyphics? For anybody; the Stone is practically the
antithesis of esoteric writing. What it offered to the French and British scholars who
worked on interpreting it happily fulfilled its function as a multilingual proclamation
and a meeting between cultures: a sort of linguistic border-stone; a cosmopolitan,
connective nexus even by design.
What then of a certain other exhibit in the British Museum, formerly a temple
frieze for the enjoyment of the gods? The case of marbles ripped from an
architectural setting which still exists, but to which they cannot practicably be
restored, is certainly a troublesome one. You may remember from p. 100 that,
though an enthusiast for cultural `topography', I expressed some unease at the
idea that we might be able to draw `concentric circles' around some focal point
of cultural interest; no doubt there is usually some sort of gradual attenuation of
what is sometimes called local interest, but I do not think that we are actually being
asked to suppose that it follows a linear or inverse square or other such law. That
aside, I see no overall difficulty in accepting that Athens has a genius loci with
which the Elgin Marbles are anciently associated, albeit one weakened outside the
Parthenon itself.
The Marbles are celebrities among internationally expropriated artefacts, and that
contributes to making them a troublesome case: much of their fame (or notoriety)
223
16. The Framework In Action
rests only indirectly on their æsthetics and on what they tell us about ancient
Athens, and rather more immediately on a modern dispute between the Hellenic
Republic and the British Museum. I find myself positively tempted to suggest
that the place for which they are recognised within modern culture is not at all
inappropriately served by their placement in the same collection as other imperial
spoils (implying, perversely, that campaigns for their return constitute a reason to
leave them where they are). Still, this was not their cultural role for most of their
existence, and it need not be so forever.
I am inclined, therefore, to look forward to the Marbles' proposed futures, and to
wonder (echoing my remarks about the case of Afghan curatorship) what sorts of
enquiry and reflection might be opened up, or narrowed, by their being surrendered.
Clearly the Marbles' links to Athens are strong, and the exhibition of the New
Acropolis Museum would constitute a closely knit cluster of related cultural items
which, particularly with the Marbles' inclusion, ought to constitute a peak on the
topography of cultural value. On the other hand, I share some of James Cuno's
disquiet about political intervention (discussed above in 2.1), and this leads me to
think that we might wish to know, once the New Acropolis Museum is no longer
quite so new, whether it will principally be seen as an archæological museum or as
a repository for beautiful antiquities or as a predominantly political project. As I
noted on p. 195, it has certainly invited a political interpretation:
Bernard Tschumi's delicate exercise in blending contemporary architec-
ture into a weighty historical context carries a political message from
the Greek government. It is an argument for bringing home the Elgin
Marbles. (Ouroussoff, 2007)
Everyone agrees that the New Acropolis Museum is the best argument
for the return of the Marbles. (Vardas, 2009)
Tschumi's museum is a kind of polemic in glass and concrete, conceived
as an argument by the Greek government to bid for the return of the
Elgin marbles... (Lacayo, 2007)
Aside from the fascinating idea that a work of lasting architecture can function as
an argument2 (making the museum itself an interesting example of cultural heritage
whose significance is bound up with its particular situation), these observations
incline me to wonder to what extent the Marbles would thrive in their new home as
the focal point of a flourishing cultural cluster, and to what degree they might
2Or at least, as something which is argumentative. In fairness we should note a dissenting
comment: `The new museum, designed in pastiche Corbusian style by... Bernard
Tschumi, is not so much an argument as a punch in the face. It is big and brutal,
like something flown in overnight from Chicago.' (Jenkins, 2009)
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find themselves suddenly employed as the centrepiece of a project of political
hagiography. Patriotic fervour is no doubt a fine thing, and its reinforcement a
possible use of the Parthenon frieze; but if indelicately done it can be suggestive less
of popular cultural self-reflection than of narrow political interests.
I have things to say, then, about the proper fates of material objects from
antiquity; what of intangible cultural heritage, often so effortlessly replicated and
adapted by comparison? What am I going to say to the Aboriginal artist (recall p.
36 above) who desires not secrecy from cultural outsiders but stylistic exclusivity?
It would be fairly accurate to anticipate that I will see great potential for cultural
flourishing in the speed with which intangible heritage can travel and blend; but if
we find ourselves asking whether `a culture' is flourishing, we are certainly going to
be concerned with the extent to which it enjoys a distinctive existence.
Intangibles certainly enjoy the potential for what looks like vibrant flourishing,
beyond the endorsement of their creators and perhaps in spite of their disapproval:
recall my discussion of fan cultures in 2.3, and the acts of translation and creative
reinterpretation and world-expansion which a cult item may enjoy quite outside
its commercial life. Culture, as it is just now unfolding within my Web browser,
takes the form of a video panel split into quarters: in each quadrant a hacked copy
of Super Mario World so arranges its terrain as to send Mario hurtling forward
in such a way as to produce carefully planned sequences of sound effects, and
together the four `instruments' provide an accompaniment to Queen's `Don't Stop
Me Now'.3 Employing the taxonomy Lawrence Lessig uses in his Remix, this
intricately meshed piece of creative reworking with its precarious legal status may
be considered an example of `Read/Write' culture; in expanding on its cosmopolitan
potential, Lessig in turn draws on a term employed by Henry Jenkins in the latter's
book of the same name, Convergence Culture. Read/Write culture `is flat; it is
shared person to person'. Its converse is Read Only culture, with a lesser emphasis
on `performance, or amateur creativity, and more comfortable (think: couch) with
simple consumption' (Lessig, 2008, p. 28).
If finding an audience is indicative of creativity that contributes to the flourishing
of a culture, finding an audience inspired to redistribute and translate and even
adapt and creatively build on what it loves is undoubtedly a still more promising
sign; there can scarcely be a more convincing indication of a flourishing culture
than the budding of subcultures and the growth of cultural items into fan cultures
which produce further cultural items in their own right. Particularly when it comes
to intercultural influence, however, there is a caveat: I associate the manifestation
of value within culture with a `topography' of cultural activity, and there can be
3http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vDWJFMXOY88 (retieved 26th July 2011).
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no topographical peaks if the landscape is flattened and undifferentiated.4 For
this reason there remains some scope to argue that the appropriation by other
cultural groups of Australian Aboriginal artistic styles and motifs, for example (again
recalling p. 36), constitutes a threat if it portends a significant dissolution of one
culture into a neighbouring one; although I share Young's scepticism about whether
the actual consequences of appropriation alone are likely to be so dramatic, even
where art plays a notable role in signifying social identity (Young, 2008, pp. 123-
4). An ultimate cosmopolitanism in which all the world's cultural variations were
smoothed out would not produce a world in which value had everywhere reached its
maximum potential in culture. If we mix red and blue paint we shall expect, not
interesting patterns of red and blue marbling, but a great expanse of purple; and
while purple is a fine colour, there is no systematic sense in which it is superior to
red or to blue or even to both together. There is also no universal sense in which a
cultural `melting pot' is the optimal state of human affairs.
Despite all the problems (which you may recall from 6.1) with notions of
authenticity, distortion, and the like, there are grounds for thinking that on occasion
flourishing will require some measure, if not of isolation, at least of neighbourly
discretion. What follows from this observation, in any given case, will of course
be a complicated matter, particularly when the liberty of individuals enters our
vision; where people welcome what looks to us like assimilation, we cannot simply
scold them for it, less still stamp our feet and demand that they better regulate
themselves in order to enforce purity. It will be difficult, moreover, to ask people
what their self-reflection as a cultural group tells them when it is the very definition
of the boundaries of their culture which has been brought into question by its
increasing blurriness. `If the Pintupi cease to burn the vehicles of dead persons
and begin to sell them like other Australians' (Hendrix, 2008, p. 189), must that
matter? Perhaps it would reveal deep thanatological shifts; perhaps it would be a
minor loss of economic distinctiveness. It seems, at any rate, that someone trying
4Suppose some object o becomes subject to a disagreement of some kind  a patrimony
dispute, perhaps  between two cultural groups, A and B, and the ostensible value of
o to A is equal in degree to its relevant value to B. Yet A is a small and impoverished
group, whereas B is a large and prosperous society in whose cities one can barely turn a
corner without being confronted by a museum or an art gallery. In such a circumstance
as the one imagined, A would no doubt point to the value of o as a proportion of the
total value of the comparatively small number of extant cultural objects available to
A. B, by contrast, would perhaps contend that nothing could be better for o than to
be integrated into the vibrant cultural and intellectual milieu of B, with its already
imposing cluster of cultural items. Even with both sides talking about value, then, we
might expect to see the concept put to different and conflicting uses; but there will at
least be a case to make that A's possession of o would be the more striking spike in a
cultural topography.
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to make use of a framework such as mine will be able to talk both about the general
benefits to culture of cross-pollination and about the threats to specific cultures and
distinctive localisms. That at least gives us reason to hope that such a person would
be equipped to ask pertinent questions about what, in each specific case, is truly
good for cultures.
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17. Concluding Prospects
This has not, in every respect, been a work of philosophy of the sort which neatly
lays out its foundational premises and upon them erects a weighty column or
pyramid capped with inexorably demonstrated conclusions. What I have sought
to show, as Chapter 15 indicated, is not so much that reason compels one to adopt
a position such as mine as that, once one does imaginatively enter into it, it is hard
to forget having done so and there is little evident appeal in so doing. It is hard to
forget having once comprehended the flourishing of an ecosystem, and not obviously
profitable; it is more interesting and even promising, perhaps, to forge onwards and
even to flirt with the ethical visions of the Deep Ecologists. So it is too, I propose,
for the flourishing of culture and cultures and cultural heritage: undoubtedly people
will continue to wrangle over what will continue to be called cultural property, but
I hope that this piece of philosophy has made it easier to embrace and articulate
visions of culture in philosophical ethics which are more holistic and less concerned
with erecting encircling fences. John Cottingham has written that `it is by tapping
into the imagination, or whatever we call that partly inaccessible creative core of
ourselves, that we are suddenly able to see the vision of the world that has energised
the speaker' (Cottingham, 2009, p. 254). My emphasis is less on the epiphany than
on the after-image.
I hope, too, that in employing a form of argument which appeals as much to the
imagination as to more abstractly calculating forms of reason, I have made it easier
to see why we need not find some straightforwardly malign consequence for human
happiness before we can talk about harms to a cultural environment. If we find
ourselves asking, our imaginations not only sparked by science but subsequently
sodden with what Christine Korsgaard wryly labels the Modern Scientific World
View, how it is that a bag of molecules such as myself or my dog can have moral
standing  and how, by extension, there can be such a thing as moral standing
 we have set ourselves up to ask a hard (though not a worthless) question. If,
in a Humean mood, I wander outside to play with my dog in the sunshine, then
for these two bags of molecules the problem will dissolve at once, not because I
have switched psychological gears from Philosopher to Man, but because I am by
disposition a philosopher (and a man) whose cosmos has among its fundamental
phenomena lolling tongues and wagging tails and sprawling on the grass in Summer.
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To see my dog as other than a proper recipient of care and affection is something
my imagination can never entirely recall how to compass.
My cosmos is also one in which there are packed library shelves and catchy tunes
and terrible puns and arguing about philosophy, not to mention other people with
different opinions to argue with and sometimes learn new things from; and I do
not think I am truly unusual in finding it little harder to treat a book with respect
than to treat a dog so. I shall treat them very differently, for dogs are meant to be
dog-eared, but psychologically I have never found that my disinclination to mistreat
books, even badly written ones, amounted simply to my having a `pro-attitude'
towards books, or altogether to a gentleness on my part (James, 2011), or to my
being what results when a child is born to two workers in the public library service.
I should like to think that in this respect my psychological dispositions have been a
sound guide for philosophical judgment, and have provided an imagination capable
of bearing witness to a cultural environment which requires and rewards human
care.
With a philosophical framework in hand, then, what next? Clearly a great deal
more work would have to be done to expand the sketches of the previous chapter
into anything resembling exact and detailed policy advice, and in particular there
is much more to be said than Chapter 11 could contain about how human interests
interact with human responsibilities towards cultural heritage. There are, however,
a few things in particular which I must admit to feeling I am obliged, at any rate
for the present, to leave hanging.
Foremost among these is the role of religion, significant in T.S. Eliot's and in
many ways in Matthew Arnold's conceptions of culture (Rees, 1967, p. 107ff.), and in
Roger Scruton's view of `common culture' and particularly `high culture' (Scruton,
2005, pp. 5-21). I have tiptoed around this topic, and indeed around one of its
most perplexing aspects, in my remarks on mystery in Chapter 13, but elsewhere in
this dissertation I have perhaps allowed myself to give the impression that what is
religiously valued could constitute just one more item on the open-ended list of ways
of finding value in cultural heritage. If we inform the devout believer that his worship
constitutes a collection of practices which together with their writings, their sacred
places and so on make up the culture of his co-religionists, and that the capacity of
these things to act as repositories of religious significance is one of the respects in
which they moreover possess cultural value, I do not know whether he would agree or
not, but I should not be surprised if he replied that we were missing the point. Like
other aspects of culture, religion provides a context within which we can (hopefully)
make sense of our lives, but when one thinks of `religion' one immediately calls to
mind the transcendental associations which the word possesses; whereas `culture',
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though it perhaps can imply something greater than the here-and-now, is a word
that lends itself altogether more easily to usage in a worldly and frequently an
anthropological manner.
Of course, the major driving point behind the epistemological anxieties of Chapter
12 was that it is not for me to lay down a list of cultural valuables in an armchair
exercise; and from that point of view religious value looks no more my problem than
æsthetic value or historical value. Yet religion tends to burrow down into the life
and outlook of its adherent, and declare how the world is constituted and what are
the important things in it, to such an extent that it threatens quite to undermine
the status of any nice little secular theory of heritage ethics. This is of course a
concern for pretty well all secular moral philosophy, and so I need not apologise for
not having laid it fully to rest in the course of my project; but in light of the fact
that so many cultural artefacts and practices are inescapably of a religious nature,
and that depending on one's own religious outlook one may deem such an object or
practice to be anything from sacred to blasphemous, I must admit that I do seem
to be particularly ill-placed to evade the complications of the matter.
Should I have aimed at a purely secular theory that treats all matters of
transcendental importance as external to itself? The answer must simply be
that this was never an option: I want to incorporate historical value, but much
(most obviously biblical) history has been written religiously; I want to incorporate
æsthetic value, but so much artistic creativity and æsthetic appreciation of the world
is religiously informed; and we could no doubt continue in this fashion and end up
concluding that within strictly secular bounds I must have practically nothing to
talk about at all, once my holistic emphasis on cultural interconnection is taken into
account. Ruling all religiously tinged questions out of order was plainly not going to
work; and taking religiosity seriously precludes treating `faiths' as though they were
merely lifestyle preferences, although of course my theories still have to be neutral
with respect to them.
Since the value which I have been asking about is not simply a manifestation
of subjective human preferences, conferring value on items through the sheer
psychological act of valuing, I do not have to assume that if something is valued
within the culture of a religious community then that automatically contributes to its
value as cultural heritage, even its value as heritage for that community specifically.
Neither must I necessarily assume that even things created for religious purposes
depend on their place within the practices and doctrines of a living religion in order
for their religious origins to tint their place within a culture. The Pyramids of
Egypt, for example, are products of the beliefs and burial practices of a religion
no longer practised in Egypt or anywhere else, so that (distant transgenerational
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affinities aside) we do not have to concern ourselves with the kinds of moral worth
which worshippers of Anubis and Osiris placed upon them; but inasmuch as they
reflect the widespread human transcendental concern with what happens to us after
death, and insofar as we have any sensitivity at all to the mysterious (again recalling
Chapter 13), it is perhaps arguable that we have a kind of distant sympathy with the
predicament of the ancient pyramid-builders and are capable of appreciating their
creations not merely as sublime pieces of architecture but moreover as reflective of
the religious impulse in mankind.
All of which is all very well, but (with the possible exception of the Positivist
`Religion of Humanity' associated with the later Auguste Comte) nobody builds
temples in worship of human impulses. I do not anticipate, given the broad space
for epistemic consultation and reflection which I have left open, that any of the
manifold religions of the world is very likely to force a complete rethink except
insofar as it also demands a very different way of life from that which most of us
live; such demands, however, are not unprecedented, even if few of us care to heed
them, and even our more worldly existences are hardly free of the echoes of the
transcendent. For a celebration of this-worldly cultural production such as mine,
the heritage of religious lives continues to raise profound questions.
Another thing which I think might repay further and closer examination is the
phenomenon of what might be called anti-heritage: separation from a heritage not
through unthinking neglect but through an act (or in practice more of a deliberate
process) of renunciation or excommunication. We may doubt that this is even
possible; though when holding a culture together through extreme changes can be
so hard, as Jonathan Lear shows it to be in his thoughts on how the Crow people of
North America sustained their culture through externally enforced changes to their
way of life (Lear, 2008), it need not be so hard to believe that sometimes cultural
change happens because people simply choose to let go, or to banish the unwanted.1
(Michael Brown writes that commodification of `indigenous identity' has produced
`heartbreaking stories of communities disenfranchising members through the sudden
imposition of more restrictive membership rulesthe goal being, apparently, to
reduce the number of people with whom the new wealth must be shared' (Brown,
2010, p. 576).) The question, rather, is whether outright voluntary cultural
separation is a possibility, or whether in practice every counter-culture movement
sustains more (in its language, its cuisine, and so on) than it rebels against. If it
is possible to renounce or be forcibly parted from even part of an ancestral culture
(perhaps to `go native' in another, adopted culture), then various questions follow:
1It might be interesting to examine practices of censorship and Bowdlerism in this light.
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are the exile's immediate offspring also unable to call the ancestral culture theirs?2
Might the exile retain some claim, as a sort of estranged cousin, on the material
heritage of the lost culture if it otherwise dies out? For me, especially, there is a
question which other conceptions of culture and heritage may not have to face: if
we are agreed that estrangement of this sort does seem to be possible, how then can
this be so, if culture is a boundless network whose tendrils extend indefinitely? I
have occasionally remarked, especially in 14.2, on the possibility of turning one's
back on some cultural practice or other, but the possibility (insofar as it really is a
possibility) might reward further thought.
Lastly, and in view of my metaphilosophical remarks above, I suspect that
the human imagination may offer further space for methodological exploration;
according to Lady Warnock, only in the writings of Sartre do we find a method
which `actually uses imaginative inventions to make us accept philosophical points'
(Warnock, 1994, p. 60). I invited you to imagine culture as a network, but here
again there might be further yet to venture, and I conclude with a metaphor from
both an eminent philologist and an influential author of fiction. In the reflections of
J.R.R. Tolkien on our narrative inheritance, there is indeed an `intricately knotted
and ramified history of the branches on the Tree of Tales' (Tolkien, 2008, p. 39),
not quite a network but at least a pedigree; but there is also a Cauldron of Story,
containing a common stock to which sometimes new ingredients are added, and
some of which is every so often ladled from the pot and served (ibid., p. 46). If we
cannot draw borders in soup, we nevertheless may gaze inexhaustibly on storytellers'
`shoreless seas and stars uncounted' (ibid., p. 27).
2A related case is that of certain secret information given to a white scholar, but not to
the sons whom they judged unworthy, by the elders of the Australian Aranda people.
`Although the elders might have considered their sons unreliable guardians at a time
when Aboriginal culture was being challenged and to some extent destabilized by the
intruding white culture, what of their grandsons, who may want to re-establish their
tribal identity and take pride in their unique heritage?' (Prott and O'Keefe, 1992,
p. 315)
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